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5The changes that started at the very end of eighties in the former socialist countries
concern the total life of society and it is practically imposible, even for a much bigger
science work, to give a full picture of the historically unique transition. That’s why I have
tried to choose the themes in order to make the most full revision of the most
characteristic features for Bulgaria during the last 11 years. Thus the separate chapters of
the work are unified naturally by the trend to analyse the important events and processes ,
characteristic for the country transformation. ∗
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6Introduction
I. THE LEVEL OF TRANSITION IN BULGARIA
Bulgaria has a long way to go in its transition to the market economy. By January 2001
official data and estimates show that a lot has been done and still more has to be done in
the coming years. In 1999 the private sector has produced value added (VA) which is
57.1 % of gross domestic product (GDP) or 65.4 % of gross value added (GVA). Some
downward corrections reduce this percentage to 45 % of GDP. These and other numbers
are very encouraging as they show the steady change in the economy due to privatisation
and new emerging businesses. In 1999 the private sector has employed 61 % of all the
employees. At the same time according to the Global Competitiveness Report estimates
the economic growth of the country in 2000-2008 (measured by GDP per capita) will
average 1.68 % per year which amounts to 18 % more with respect to 1998 but is still just
89 % of 1989 record. According to other estimates in 2000 the gross domestic product
per capita ($) has been $ 1890, the average gross monthly wage $ 105, the unemployment
rate 17.8 %, and the inflation rate 12.1 %. These and other economic readings mean that
the country is behind all other Eastern European countries (EEC) candidates for accession
to the EU, with respect to the number of its population, and has registered second highest
rate of unemployment.
After a decade of painful efforts and several governments being in power, the country
will have its next elections in midsummer. The vote is coming under the following
tendencies and current issues:
• The years of transition that have passed (1990-2000) clearly show that the political
and institutional reforms have had been leading in front of the economic reform.
Usual as it may be, it turned over time into a very serious problem because a sluggish
economic reform proved to have a markedly negative impact on the speed and the
overall quality of the socio-economic change.
7• The political system and the institutions have had begun to gradually lose their
connection with the economic reform in that they had being reproducing themselves
for the sake of the democratic process with no due impact on the speed of the
economic development of the country.
• With respect to the abovementioned, political structures capsulation and bureaucracy
have had emerged to such an extent that they have had highly reduced the efficiency
of the institutions.
• The lack of democratic tradition and the shortages of qualified and well-trained
experts and devoted to their duties new politicians coupled with the lack of political
will and due deeds (measures) have had appeared as one of the reasons for the slow
run of the Bulgarian economic reform.
That doesn’t mean that the country has no good quality records. Bulgarian society has
had already achieved a broad consensus on its foreign policy orientation, it is having a
financial (under a Currency Board since mid 1997) and a political stability.
Recently Bulgaria is going through a relatively new socio-political situation: As it has
been acknowledged, the time of the restrictive stabilization policy has already gone but
the time of the new economic growth policy - though generally declared by the
government - has not yet come. This, in fact an awkward, transition moment and the
disappointment of the electorate makes foretelling this midsummer vote results very
difficult.
Whatever the new Bulgarian government, two things are out of question: the European
orientation of the country and its decided efforts on the road to the market economy. The
future new accents in the economic policy and whether it will be totally liberal are not
clear now. What is clear is that the elections and the new cabinet will guarantee the
ongoing ethnic model, which proved to be a successful one, and its good bilateral
relations with the neighbouring countries.
By now the new economic growth policy has been generally discussed. It is expected it
will reckon on selected sectors growth. And this has already been criticized for giving up
the total liberal market policy, favouring some branches and ignoring most of the others.
The likelihood of following such an approach means that Bulgaria will highly depend on
its international economic relations with the European countries - including its 
8neighbours, Russia and Ukraine - as well as with USA. These several countries prove to
be the main import/export partners of the country.
II. POSSIBLE ROLE OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM
The changes of the international system have changed the role of the independent
countries. They were an important element in the bi-polar world. Under the new
conditions arises the question “neutral towards whom?” 
Switzerland is a unique example of an independent country. If the level of independence
can be measured, Switzerland for sure is the most independent of the independent
countries. It is hard to estimate the role of the independent states in today’s system. The
bi-polar Yalta system doesn’t exist anymore. Now there is one leading military alliance -
NATO. And the role of UN has obviously diminished.
Today’s world is neither bi-polar, nor hegemonic (though some people may call the USA
a hegemon). It resembles most to a multi-polar system, though one of the poles - the
USA, has clearly a leading role. The role of the independent states has changed with the
change of the system. But maybe it is early to say that their role will diminish. Maybe the
new trends will lead to something totally different from anything that we know and we
will witness a system in which the change of some values will make the voice of the
independent countries sound louder. Obviously the new international order will not be
free of conflicts. It will generate opportunities for the independent countries to continue
to execute their important structural functions in the insecure world. The international
organizations will need the good turn of experts from countries to which they could
confide. Their experience and capacity to provide positive impulses in the international
relations should not be neglected. 
9III. BULGARIA IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN ASPIRATIONS
AND REALITY
This study is about transition in Bulgaria and its status on the European scene1. The
complexity and diversity of the matter puts, however, natural limitations to it. On the one
hand, providing a comprehensive picture of Bulgaria’s transition would require the input
of a large body of scientists from all walks of academic life. On the other, in order to
clearly see the ways and trends in Bulgaria’s reforms and to reduce the uncontrollable
number of variables in the process, one would need to focus on powerful generalisations
rather than on peculiarities. Research has now past from the domain of general trends and
models to more fragmented case studies featuring various aspects of the transition
process. Nevertheless, the study revisits the former in the less ambitious attempt to
provide the readers with better understanding of where Bulgaria stands today and the
environment it offers for safer political and economic integration with its immediate
counterparts. Such an approach would increase the unpredictability risks as to the
conclusions inferred, but would equip those interested in Bulgaria’s recent developments
with practical tools to evaluate and judge them.
The hub of this presentation rests in the claim that mass impoverishment of the
population underlies transition in Bulgaria. This imminent feature of the country’s reform
process shapes up its driving forces and potential for re-integration into a common
European space, the rules of which are set up by a complex but single and mighty player -
the European Union. The main body of the introduction provides a brief overview of the
economic and political dimensions of Communist Bulgaria that served as the starting
point of transition. It then sums up the transition debate in Bulgaria in the context of the
wider international transitology discourse
and suggests insights for better understanding the major factors determining the character
and pace of reforms in the country.
                                           
1 The present Dissertation arose on the threshold of the second millennium during working on a sponsored
by the Volkswagen Foundatien international project researching EU, WEU and NATO and the Slovak
Republic, Bulgaria and Ukraine 1999-2001
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Bulgaria’s Communist Legacy - A Difficult Starter for Transition
As in other authoritarian states of the region, transition in Bulgaria, i.e., the fall of
communism, started in 1989 to signify that the country had already found itself at the
cross-roads of a deepening political and economic crisis. At this point, researchers turn to
statistics to make their case. However, it would be either useless or misleading to
whatever reliable data on Bulgaria’s world standing before 1989. Little was ever know
about the economic situation of a country strictly controlled by a small political elite. The
membership of the Bulgarian Communist Party (about 10 per cent of the population)
provided the ‘economic’ basis of this leadership. The economy bankruptcy of the regime
was delayed by way of accumulating foreign debts kept in secret from the people. The
redistribution of wealth was directed to the central and local elites - notably those in hold
of government offices. Bad, underdeveloped communications and other distorted public
networks secured isolation and fragmentation of the popular discontent and rendered the
public opinion easily manipulated. 
Since in the communist states there are no real market relations, it is hard to talk about
economy in its most classical sense. One of the saddest misunderstandings of past century
is the inertia of talking about central economy in free market terms. Being a by-product
of an ideological foundation, the former communist economies were heavily dependent
on this very foundation. Explaining such a phenomenon in free market categories made
things seem totally strange and unintelligible. Let us take for example the annual
obligatory gathering of the agricultural crops by secondary school and higher education
students which they were to do almost for free. Let us add to that the high numbers of
village population at that time. On top of it, we can also add the perfect geographical
conditions for farming. In real economic terms the intervention of the students would
have meant unfair competition, to say the least compared to the farmers who did not get
such aid. But in spite of that, foodstuffs were in great demand all over the country. It
suffice to recall the early morning queues for yoghurt, the Bulgarian mundane national
food, the lack of toilet paper except in the main central shops in the capital city, the mass
buy-outs of potatoes and cabbages in late autumn for storing them in the winter months.
This is just the beginning of a long list of awkward happenings. The economic word for 
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that is ‘inefficiency’ - a category totally misleading and inapplicable for an omnipresent
centrally planned production of goods. The other term used by capitalism economists to
explain the collapse of the communist system of states is ‘low productivity’ which is also
made obscure by the very logic of the communist production methods and by the lack of
free market triggers to make sense of it. 
In the second half of the 80s however, lower living standards and market stagnation
pointed to the obvious collapse of political monopoly and central planning. As a group of
scholars put it in an ecological context:
Over-centralised bureaucracies, massive inefficient agricultural and industrial enterprise,
an ideology that prioritised production over other social goods, and weak civil societies
led to poor ecological practices and at times dangerous working and living environments
of substantial numbers of people2 .
In the middle of the 80s, Bulgaria already bore the features of severe economic
impoverishment. To epitomise the effects of a rapidly increasing but unknown for the
people at large foreign debt, came the 1985 national electricity crisis, the unsuccessful
attempts to diversify and improve consumption and foster agricultural production, and the
failure to undertake technological renovation in the heavy and light industries to keep
pace with world’s trends. 
The total economic stagnation, to which a total political diktat corresponded, brought
about high levels of disillusionment and dissatisfaction among the population. The
communist party ruled the country ‘constitutionally’ in perpetuity to the extent that there
was a national constitution allowing for that. Its monopoly was somewhat ‘softened’ by
the presence of a satellite remnant of a dwarfed but once powerful farmers’ party. The
union of the two, without challenging the leading role of the communist party, epitomised
in the same proportion fashion of brotherly relations between the workers and the
peasants. It also symbolised the diminishing role of peasants in communist societies and
the eventual victory of the working class over what has still remained from the petite 
                                           
2 Pickles, Shapira, Yarnal, Koulov and Paskaleva, 1998
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bourgeoisie. Such a model of political monopoly was part of the international set up of
states fixed by the post-war realities, the Cold War and the balance of powers between
mighty ideological rivals. But in addition to the harsh economic sufferings of the people,
the external snowball effects of Russia’s ‘Perestroika’ which challenged the foundations
of communism served as triggers to the events of 10 November 1989, when an intra-party
coup d’état toppled from power the leader of the ruling Bulgarian communist party - a
sure sign that crucial changes affecting deeply people’s lives were to begin soon. 
IV. THE BULGARIAN TRANSITION DEBATE
Never before has the term transition stood for such radical economic and political
changes as those initiated in the former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe a
dozen or so years ago. ‘Transition’ replaced ‘revolution’, which in fact it was. It stood for
reconstruction and modernisation to bring back the benefits of private initiative and the
free movement of goods, services, capital and people across borders, which it eventually
did. 
One of the most exciting circumstances about political and economic transition in Central
and Eastern Europe is that it came almost unexpectedly. Politicians and academics,
people from both ends of the world were taken by surprise. When it came, prophets were
not in place to guide them. While a vast body of Marxist literature on ‘the road to
serfdom’ flourished ex-ante and furnished one of the most devastating human
experiments of all times - the arrival of authoritarian regimes in the 40s, most academic
input on transition to the state of liberty came to the fore ex-post. The ‘Washington
Consensus’ of the first half of the 90s has for the first time clearly associated the success
of democratisation with the need for new institution building. Only recent theoretic
research has cast more light on the sources impeding or fostering democratic change.
Conceptualisation has focused on ‘the legacies of the past’ as the negative force and ‘the
imperatives of liberalisation’ as the positive one. Others have emphasised ‘the immediate
context’, in which the above perform, mostly the way they have been constrained or 
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mobilised by new institutions, hegemonic norms and international imperatives3. Cases
considered to be on the extremes of the continuum have also been studied to expose the
forces of constraint and limits of transition success4 
Literature on Bulgaria’s transition has developed in close relation to this debate but is
somewhat less theorising. The Bulgarian debate on transition is represented by a faculty
of researchers of various academic backgrounds - political scientists, economists,
sociologists and historians, among others. While recognising the complexity of the
transition process in comparison to previous ones, they clearly differentiate between
political and economic transition both in terms of timing and accomplishments. For
example, Dainov5 considers the successful end of political transition in Bulgaria the
decision of the National Assembly, in May 1999, to provide an air corridor to NATO for
bombing Yugoslavia in during the Kosovo crisis. He bases his argument on the
assumption that by this act the alternative political tendency - “some Russophile
neosocialism” - has eventually been marginalised. A. Todorov6, on the other hand, relates
the end of Bulgaria’s political transition to the results of the last parliamentary elections,
in June 2001, in which the “communism - anti-communism” paradigm has finally lost its
role in the public debate and as a driving force in Bulgarian politics. Stanchev7 reviews
post-communist reforms in the country and helps to look at the transition as a series of
more or less successful reforms leading to new political and economic equilibria and
institutions8.
                                           
3 Crawford and Lijphart, 1997
4 Borinski, Phillip, Double Enlargement: NATO Policy towards Eastern Europe, in: OSTEUROPABUCH
(Part 1), pp.48-97
5 Dainov, Evgenii The Bulgarian Transition - a Prehistory, Democraticheski pregled magazine 1, 1999
6 Todorov, Antonii The End of Transition, in Democraticheski pregled magazine Summer 1, 2001
7 Stanchev, Krassen  “Plunder and Informality in the Bulgarian Economy”, in The Grey Economy in
Bulgaria, Centre for Social Practices, 2002
8 For the actual state of the Bulgarian debate on transition see also: A Critique of the Transition to
Democracy, in: Politicheski Izsledvania bulletin, 3/1995; Antonii Todorov, The end of Transition, in:
Democraticheski pregled magazine, Summer/2001; Dimitar Ialnazov, Economic Transition in Bulgaria
from an evolutionary Perspective: The Currency Board and the Prospect of EU Accession, March 2002;
Dobrin Kanev, On the Prospects for Consolidation of Democracy in Bulgaria, in: Politicheski Izsledvania
bulletin, 3/1995; Evgenii Dainov, The Bulgarian Transition – a Prehistory, in: Democraticheski pregled
magazine, 1/1999; Georgi Ganev, Corruption and the Quality of the Bulgarian Economic Environment,
Paper, October 1998; Ikonomika I institutsii na promiana pri prehoda kam realno funktsionirashta pazarna
ikonomika (Economy and Institutions of Change in the Transition to Real Functioning Market Economy),
Universitetsko Izdatelstvo “Stopanstvo”, 2002; In Search of Growth: Bulgaria’s Lessons and Policy
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A number of Bulgarian authors, either individually or in co-operation with interested
centres of excellence and international institutions (EU, WB, UNDP, among others), have
provided scholarly input in understanding transition in the country. Some tend to accept
the role of the immediate context in the play of various factors for speeding up or slowing
down Bulgarian transition. For example, bad performance has been attributed to the ‘lack
of political consensus and weak (or undermined) institutions’9. The incessant normative
changes in Bulgarian legislation are also considered to have undermined the stability of
transition, in particular the rules necessary for the normal functioning of enterprises10.
The ‘role of institutions, openness, transparency, free movement of ideas and dialogue’
are viewed as prime factors in the success of democratic reforms11 . Others put the blame
for the delay on past egalitarian and paternalistic values and the priority of personal,
family and corporate interests of politicians resulting in the lack of state care in excess of
bureaucratic state12. More complex models have also been developed stressing the need
for a lesser state in terms of intervention in one’s initiatives and a stronger civil society as
opposed to emerging mafia-like structures13. According to another study, transition has
been grossly affected by the collision of the “late nomenklatura value system” with the
new liberal and democratic one, thus leading to ambiguities dominating the behaviour of
the major Bulgarian political parties14. 
                                                                                                                                 
Options, A Report by the Institute for Market Economics, October 1999; Krassen Stanchev, Plunder and
Informality in the Bulgarian Economy, in: The Grey Economy in Bulgaria, Center for Social Practices,
2002; Krassen Stanchev, Minorities, Economic Reforms and Property Rights Subject to Restitution, in:
Politicheski Izsledvania bulletin, 3/1995; L.Christov, A Role for Independent Central Bank in Transition.
The Case of Bulgaria, in: D. Jones and J. Miller, eds., The Bulgarian Economy: Lessons from Reform
during Early Transition, Ashgate, 1997; Nikolai Valkov, Place of the Bulgarian Model in the Theory of
Transitions, in: Politicheski Izsledvania bulletin, 4/1996; Stati Statev, Macroeconomic Imbalances of
Transition, in: Banki, Investitsii, Pari, 2/2002; Zhelio Georgiev, Democratic “Ethos” in Post-Communist
Bulgaria, in: Politicheski Izsledvania bulletin, 4/1996.
9 Institute for Market Economics In Search of Growth: Bulgaria’s Lessons and Policy Options, October
report, 1999
10 Stefanov, Svetlin The Economic Transition in Bulgaria, Nie11, 2000
11 Minev, Duhomir Civil Society, Political Democracy and Economic Transformation, New Publicity, 2000 
12 Borissov, Yurii The Bulgarian Transition, Novo Vreme, 2001
13 Todorov, Antonii Dilemmas of Civil Society: A Critique of the Transition to Democracy, Politicheski
izsledvania bulletin 3, 1995
14 Georgiev, Zhelio Democratic “Ethos” in Post-Communist Bulgaria, Politicheski izsledvania bulletin 4,
1996
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But probably one of the most intriguing moments of Bulgarian transition to full-fledged
democracy is that the country’s ‘reform goals have never been publicly announced as part
of any of the political setting. Moreover, they have never been included in a written
government statement’15. The absence of written commitments to the transition process
has given politicians a leeway for manoeuvring which gave them the impetus to attempt
‘a sort of second edition of central planning’ during the second socialist government
(1994-1997)16. Indeed, only smaller or marginal parties addressed the issue in a more
straightforward manner by pointing to the implantation of peculiar redistributive
mechanisms of corporate character in the body of transition. They also turn the attention
to the corruption at all levels of state administration and the non-economic logic of newly
accumulated wealth in the hands of politicians and statesmen17 . 
An awkward illusion about transition was that it could be fully rationalised. In the
beginning it seemed logical: the advantages of free market economy over central
planning were incontestable; the liberal model was there - well established and well-
fared, serving citizens at its best. Why not copy it then? But while boldly pasting the
ready-made model, the states of transition have enhanced the shortcomings before
installing its essentials. Results were poor and costs went unexpectedly high18. 
The question who paid the cost of transition to modernity is a central one. An historical
comparison would be useful. Private owners and the rich paid the costs of turnover to the
communist states in the post-war period. It was a zero-sum game of winners and losers. 
                                           
15 Institute for Market Economics In Search of Growth: Bulgaria’s Lessons and Policy Options, October
report, 1999
16 Institute for Market Economics In Search of Growth: Bulgaria’s Lessons and Policy Options, October
report, 1999
17 Political Programme of the Bulgarian Euroleft Party
18Copying ready-made models of the past has lead to underestimation of the need for unique transition
models of the present. Indeed, blueprints such as the transition to full-fledged democracy in Spain, Portugal
and Greece were there but to a much lesser extent. From today’s perspective, this was transition of another
kind. The ideological, military and political Cold War divisions in Europe at that time accelerated the
transition process in the above countries by way of swiftly integrating them in the existing European and
Euro-Atlantic structures. There is no such geopolitical set up today: the political and economic criteria for
membership of the Central and Eastern European states into the European Union are much higher than in
previous decades. Though the reasons for that are complex, it could be certainly stated that today’s
transition is not fear-driven.
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On the contrary, in Bulgaria the poor paid the cost of transition to the liberal state en
masse. It was to be a positive-sum game but again it was not. Being poor-driven,
transition was economically limited and half or less successful. By successful I assume a
Pareto optimal transition as a minimum, i.e., such a change that will leave nobody worse
off than before with others being better off. From this point of view, none of the
transitions were successful - most went bad and others worse off. This claim deserves
explanation with regards to end results. 
In the economic field, restructuring with privatisation was the crux of transition to free
market economy. But existing state monopolies reinforcing the dominant role of the state
over private initiative hampered the process of market liberalisation. Legislation was
neither enforced nor its instruments in place to guarantee competition and fair distribution
among market players. High taxes favoured redistribution to the detriment of small
enterprises and purchasing power of citizens while the expected ‘public goods’ from
collecting them did not happen. Combined with incredibly high rates of corruption, the
tax-driven and market-hampering transition transferred the wealth of the state into the
private hands of a few who took advantage of their political position, disabling public
procurement rules while delaying the introduction of proper legislation. Privatisation,
ironically called manager/employees privatisation, served artificial schemes in favour of
political elites and their cronies. 
A striking example of the above is the compensatory bonds scheme developed to
compensate individuals for their expropriated property during the communist regime. For
various reasons many of them sold their bonds on the market at a price four to six times
less than their nominal value. But for those who were in the exclusive position to buy out
the bonds, their nominal value remained unchanged the final result being that others than
the victims of the previous regime profited in excess from the compensatory regime.
Many of those who lost their property in the communist era lost it once again during the
transition period. No doubt this would have happened anywhere had not a rule of law
been adequately established. 
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Economic restructuring and privatisation as major instruments of transition were at the
heart of the efforts managed by a number of international institutions. Initially, such
organisations as the World Bank and the European Union, among others, invested heavily
to this end. Different approaches were tried affecting Bulgaria’s transition in one way or
another. As some critics have put it, one of the reasons for the paralyses of the economic
policy of the country is hidden in the gap between the recipes of the IMF as an advocate
and executor of a policy based on the principles of reform, on the one hand, and the
imperatives to adapt to the common policies of the EU, on the other. International
pressures and incentives are indeed important for the reform process. The ‘possibility of
membership in a Western organisation like the EU or NATO could provide a powerful
incentive for the adoption of domestic political institutions that would be in harmony
with those in the West’19. It is not by chance that the accession-driven Phare Programme
of the EU in Central and Eastern Europe is fully meant for democratic institution building
and norms enforcement in the region. As straightly put, alignment ‘of legislation to that
of the EU and preparation for EU enlargement have the potential to bring about
significant economic benefit to the countries’20. Now that accession deadlines are coming
closer, it can be inferred that while entry into NATO will fully legitimise Bulgaria in the
democratic and political community, entry into the EU will signal the achievement of a
certain high level of democracy and functional market economy. A recognition by
membership may also foster a chain reaction to speed Bulgarian international integration.
Despite the various cleavages dividing the political forces and opening gaps between
politicians and citizens, the orientation towards European integration, viewed mainly as a
membership into the EU, is a unifying national factor of success in Bulgaria’s transition.
Though being in essence a foreign policy factor, the drive towards European integration
greatly affects the sectoral structure of the country’s economy. Those who negotiate
Bulgaria’s accession into the EU have to project their negotiating positions in accord with 
                                           
19  Shugart as quoted in Crawford, Beverly and Lijphart, Arend, Old Legacies, New Institutions: Explaining
Political and Economic Trajectories in Post-Communist Regimes, Internet based source, 1997:33.
20 The World Bank The Dual Challenge of Transition and EU Accession, Country Economic
Memorandum, 2001
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the EU strategy and common policies, i. e., to find the country’s place in the single
economic area of division of labour of the Community in the context of the objectives it
pursues with regard to the new international system. 
But being outside-driven, there is still not enough evidence that the economic transition
will be seen by state officials and political players controlling foreign aids as a chance to
turn citizens into utility maximisers, rather than as a way to push economic output and
stabilisation in general, regardless of who pays the cost. The ownership of who really
makes the transition, the grant giver or the beneficiary, is thus challenged. Outside
institutions are important but domestic policies are a powerful modifier as well.
Moreover, one could detect lost opportunities for millions of citizens because of the
persisting macro approach. 
Then comes institution building: economic restructuring with no relevant legislation,
enforcement mechanisms and institutions proved to be inefficient and misleading.
Administrative capacity building, enhanced by foreign grants, mainly from the EU, was
to help accelerate the way to free market and fair competition. But an administrative
reform is an area where strong political will is needed. A successful reform would not
have been employing just the ‘right’ persons in the ‘right’ positions but such a set up of
state institutions that would guarantee a minimum collectivisation of people’s activities.
A lesser state against an expanded former bureaucracy involved in each and every trend
of human activity would have been a good recipe for success. But success did not become
evident. Unitary overcentralisation still remains at the core of state involvement. The
application of the subsidiarity principle to take decisions at most efficient levels, usually
at lower ones, so persistently pronounced by the EU member-states to which Bulgaria is
eager to accede, could have, and still can, substantially help solve the above problem.
Overcentralisation versus regionalisation pushed the ever-existing centre-periphery gap to
devastating proportions with unemployment and decline being their major outcomes. To
illustrate this statement, one can compare the current unemployment rate in the capital
city of 4-5 per cent against 33 per cent in the smaller cities, some of them being just 100
km away from the centre. 
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Compared to the economic one, the political transition of Central and Eastern European
countries seems to be less studied. However, politics informs the essence of transition to
the extent economy does. Democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, civil
society are the general attributes, among others, political transition was to enforce.
Political transition in Bulgaria started with the spontaneous mushrooming of political
groupings, which began competition between each other via free and democratic
elections for the rule of the state. It can be observed, however, that the new political elites
have shown a vicious propensity to revive models of communist state management when
in power. This has been demonstrated through unwillingness to give up areas of state
authority. Ruling elites have been as a rule reluctant to decentralise, deregulate, place
private initiative at equal footing with the state, introduce laws to the benefit of
meaningful majorities, and guarantee the independence of powers. The immunity of
members of parliament guaranteeing a high degree of impunity during their term of office
is one example of the privileges state officials were vested with. It is only natural that
those privileges will be made use of in most efficient fashion but with no constraints to
prevent from doing harm to others. Thus one can say that transition was elite-driven and
privileges-driven which considerably increased its costs. 
The fight for dominant positions in the Council for Electronic Media, which regulates the
media sector, exemplifies that politicians resist giving up their excessive powers. Those
in power control the council by quotas securing the majority of votes in the decision-
making process. Presently, the majority in Parliament controls it, which makes the media
sector heavily dependent on the legislative and executive powers. In the absence of
constraints, the decisions to be taken will be politically biased whenever necessary.
Should there have been a political will, a solution would have been found21. 
                                           
21 One such solution could be by drawing lots. Presently, the Council consists of 5 members elected by
Parliament by a simple majority and 4 members appointed by the President of the Republic. Media
representatives are also there but through the quotas of these two institutions and entirely dependant on
their will. Let us imagine another set up whereby Parliament, the Presidency and the media sector are
represented by three persons each making the total number of Council members equal to nine. Every year,
two of the members are taken out by a lot and replaced by two new members appointed by each institution
in consequent turns. It will definitely happen that in the first year one of the three institutions will gain
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Should a positive-sum game model have been followed, the costs of transition could have
been lower and more evenly distributed among citizens. The course of presentation in this
study is a bit different, which makes it worthwhile. It analyses the achievements of
Bulgaria’s transition leaving to the reader to judge whether they are bad or worse. It
announces, however, the slow but steady arrival of modernity in the country. But it also
suggests a slow but steady differentiation and particularisation of individual interests and
objectives. 
Little or rather nothing has been said about the achievements of Bulgaria’s transition so
far. Scientists generally agree that political transition is now over. True enough,
democratic institutions are already in place and there is a broad public consensus on the
irreversibility of political developments. 
1. Main Tendencies in the Transition of the ex-Socialist Countries from East
and Middle Europe
Distance of time is very important for the history, because it is one of the conditions for
more comprehensive processes tracing – it decreases the emotions degree and frees wider
territory for reasonable arguments and calm analysis.
A characteristic of socialism, which was concretely realized during twenties and thirties
in USSR under the direction of Stalin, and which was carried in Eastern Europe after
World War II, was that the socialism of Soviet’s (or Stalin’s) type have won in Eastern
Europe under an outside pressure. If the War was not successful for the anti-hitlerite
coalition, where on European continent the leading role have had USSR, Eastern Europe 
                                                                                                                                 
advantage in terms of representation in the Council, but will be offset by the others in the following year.
Thus, should a political decision be taken in the first year by the group temporary dominant in the Council,
it will be successfully counterbalanced in the second, making its political achievement short-lived. In this
situation, the members of the three representations in the Council may wish to coordinate their intentions in
order to achieve long-term results by way of cooperation and compromise. They will eventually achieve
mutually advantageous results by moderating their political ambitions. Thus a purely zero-sum game can be
transformed into a positive one. The costs of this behaviour will be low but the gains will be there as all
players will be able to maximise on their differing interests taking into account those of the others.
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wouldn’t follow the new global super-power in the sphere not only of foreign policy, but
also in the society reforms.22
The outside factor significance became even more visible after Stalin’s death, which was
followed by serious shakings in USSR and the Eastern block. They finished with the
intervention of the Soviet’s armed forces in crushing the riots in the periphery. At the
same time started the defreezing as a change in the relations between Moscow and the
periphery - a change, directed to higher equality, or to relative autonomy of Eastern
European countries. In the decades that followed the middle fifties crisis the evolution in
the relations in socialist block continued, the outside dependence was modified but it
stayed on. It was personificated mostly by two words that were officially denied but
practically active  - “Breznev’s doctrine” for the restricted sovereignty of the socialist
countries. We are speaking not only of the sovereignty restriction (which is a common
process, typical for the international relations in XX century, when the numerous
international organizations gradually took a part of the national sovereignty of their
members), but also of the restrictions imposed on Eastern European countries by
Moscow. They found expression in the restricted only in the frames of Eastern Soviet
block right of these countries for independent decisions in the inner and foreign policy.
The borderline that marked the operation freedom of the small eastern block members
was outlined by the Soviet intervention in Hungary in the autumn of 1956, by the actions
of the Warsaw treaty’s armed forces against “Prague’s spring” in 1968, by the readiness
to prevent by all means the Polish trade-union “Solidarnost” from encroaching on the rule
With thus gained relative freedom, not only in the frames of Eastern block, in the middle
of eighties, came the big turn in our region. The numerous attempts for reformation of the
Stalin’s socialism, realized in the periphery (Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) were
not left without a trace. The block was gradually liberalizing – the role of the market and
the private initiative in the economy increased, in the political life was formed half-legal 
                                           
22 This is a thesis of the western historiography during the whole after-war period, while the pro-Soviet one
preferred to avoid the discussion on the problem for correlation of the inner and outside factors.
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dissident movement, in the sphere of culture so called socialist realism was buried and its
place was taken by the diversity of modernism and experimenting.
In the middle of eighties, after tiring everyone gerontocracy, (the times of late Breznev,
Andropov and Chernenko), started the era of big reforms – “economization” of the
relations in CMEA, decentralization of the leadership and planning, publicity in the
media and so on.23 These reforms are not something new; they have already been tested
in different times and countries and with different results. And the final result can be
found as a common direction in the slogans: “ Back to Lenin” and “More socialism”,
which are so general, that they remind us the Pascal’s sentence: “We run carelessly to the
precipice, holding something in front of our eyes so that we can’t see it”. When today I
look back to the total euphoria from the end of eighties, connected to the hopes for
change and the feeling of new-gained freedom of speech, I think that the Pascal’s
warning seems to be the most adequate description of the state of political elites and the
societies in Eastern European countries. 
However, in the course of three decades, the changes remain fragmentary and zigzag –
the economic reforms that started everywhere in sixties were quickly stopped, after their
political consequences became evident in Prague’s spring in 1968. The final result
(mostly of unseccessness, than of the reforms themselves) was the gradual exhausting of
the inner motives for development, and appearing common crisis of the socialism.
The faith of the eastern Europeans in the advantages of socialism, which was still
predominating in sixties and seventies24, has faded in the middle of eighties. The
consumerism competition, started by the pragmatics J. Kadar, E. Gerek, G. Husak was
definitely won by the West and the gradual opening of the East to the world did not rise, 
                                           
23 About the reforming of the relations in Eastern block see Gorbachov, M. “Life and reforms”, M.1995,
Book 2
24 For example by a sociological research from August 1968 we learn that only 5% of the Czechs and
Slovaks are adherents of the Czechoslovakia’s capitalist development. Data source: Crampton, R. J. Eastern
Europe in the Twentieth Century. London and New York, 1994, p.339 
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but sharply reduced the prestige of the modest, but accessible to everyone existence in the
socialism.
In a certain moment of “perestroika” – somewhere about the middle of 1989 M.
Gorbachov declared in public that he desist from controlling the Soviet sphere of
influence in Europe, received by Stalin as a reward for Soviet’s army contribution for the
victory in World War II. It can be disputed which factor have played bigger role for this
decision of Gorbachovs – ideological reorientation of the system or the economic
difficulties, facing USSR25, but the fact is undutiful. At first sight this general change in
USSR’s attitude to its allies from Eastern block seemed like a huge step forward –
towards freedom and independent actions of the countries from the region. But actually
the foreign-political turn was made without any preliminary preparation and without
asking the opinion of these countries. In a well known in the whole after-war period
Soviet manner, the fateful decisions were taken from the center, without Soviet leaders to
ask their allies about their opinion26.
The eastern block countries reacted in different ways to the new Gorbachov’s USSR
course. The different positions once again emphasize the old dividing line between the
two Eastern block sub-regions – Middle Europe and the Balkans. The “perestroika"
brought to the Middle European countries Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary the
liberation, which they wanted a long time ago. All three of them had negative balance in
their relations with the big eastern neighbor. In Poland the Soviet armed forces were
dangerously set ready for intervention twice – in October 1956 and in the end of 1980. In
Hungary the Soviet army crushed with weapons the Hungarian riot in October-November
1956. And in Czechoslovakia the intervention of Warsaw treaty’s army on 21.08.1968 
                                           
25 There are enough proofs for both theses, given by the Soviet leaders from this period, Yakovlev, A. “The
colla,se. The concequences.”, :. 1992. On the other hand the USSR economy in 1989 was so cranked by the
excessive armament competition with USA, and by the chaotic repairs, that Eastern Europe that before was
a strategic advantage, now became economic burden. See Schweizer,P. “Victory.The role of the USA
administration’s secret service in the dissolution of USSR and the socialist block”, M. 1995
26 USSR from Gorbachov’s time surprised everyone – the West, as well as  Eastern Europe, by
withdrawing from its shere of dependent countries, and to be more precise it closed its protective umbrella ,
under which for four decades existed the serial leading teams of the socialist block countries, later renamed
as community of the socialist countries. See Rakowski, M. “Jak to sie stalo.” Warszawa, 1991, s. 252
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(with predominating soviet presence) erased for few hours pro-Russian and pro-Soviet
dispositions. The rise of the limitations for reforms in the inner policy and foreign
orientation gave carte-blanche to Polishes, Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks to test
something different for their further development – soon it turned out to be the Western
model.
On the Balkans Rumanian dictator (the governing of Chaushesku can only be determined
as a family dictatorship) even tried to organize resistance in the frames of the Warsaw
treaty countries against Gorbachov reforms.27 This attempt was doomed to failure, as a
part of the block members were interested in continuation of changes and others did not
dare to oppose the Soviet leader.
The consequences were unique; first of them was the juridical farce where Elena and
Nikolae Chaushesku were quickly convicted to death and then executed. The political
withdrawal of USSR from Eastern Europe left Bulgaria without support too. It can be
concluded by the memories and the documents, concerning the summer and the autumn
of 1989 that the political class in Bulgaria was divided on the question about
“perestroika” and about Gorbachov – one part remained faithful to its pro-Soviet feelings,
while the other one tried to move away from already visible dangerous consequences of
the reforms. The paradox was in the fact, that in contrast to traditional division from the
socialist times to “pro-Soviets” and “nationalists”, this time the reformers were amongst
the first ones, and among the second one predominated the conservatives. At the end, as
always in the contemporary Bulgarian history, the group connected to USSR prevailed,
but in contrast to the previous cases they could not hold the power for a long time, as the
geopolitical situation was radically changed. 
                                           
27 Chaushescu took a critical position towards the changes in progress, in a big speech during the meeting
of the Political Consultative Commettee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization on 07.07.1989. The negative
position of the Romanian leader after the election victory of “Solidarnost” in June 1989 in Poland  and the
possibility for forming a government with its participation, was characteristic too. These positions of
Chaushescu from the summer of 1989 contradicted to his whole position in Eastern block  until then, when
he was fighting for independence of the countries from the block. The reason for the turnover was hidden in
the apprehension for his own destiny.
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Separate cases on the Balkans are the two most rebellious and disobedient countries in
Eastern Europe – Yugoslavia and Albania. Both of them stayed calm during the crisis in
Eastern block, because they thought it did not concern them28. Furthermore, to an outside
eye it even seemed that the crumbling Soviet system was a living proof of their rightness
in their arguments with USSR. Yugoslavia and Albania had completely different
ideological and geopolitical positions, but both of them counted on their own legitimacy,
which would protect them from the emerging crash of the socialism in pro-Soviet Eastern
Europe. But the clash between USSR and USA on the global level turned out to be much
more comprehensive and became a clash between the two systems – socialist and
capitalist. Under these circumstances there was no way Yugoslavia and Albania to stay
out of this main conflict, they found themselves on the side of socialism and that’s why
they couldn’t prevent themselves from the whirlpool, caused by the wreck of the state
socialism in Eastern Europe. Yugoslavia and Albania also experienced a crash, but not
together with the rest of Eastern Europe countries and not the same way.
For all ex-socialist countries the coming out of the Soviet socialism was not directed to
its reformation or democratization but leaded to its radical substitution for its antipode. In
other words we are talking not of “the socialist choice” between state and democratic
model, but of denial of the socialism at all. This evolution demanded different duration of
time  - for example in Poland the transition had been made even before the others started
it; DDR was swallowed in the very moment it lost its legitimacy – when the East-
Germans started to demonstrate, scanning “We are one people”, while for Albania two
years were needed to start the process29, and in Serbia the political power in spite of the
few wars and the numerous political clashes still kept its character until the end of 2000.
                                           
28 First changes in Jugoslavia started as late as 1990, when during the XIV-th Congres of  Jugoslavian
Communist Party, summoned on 20.01.1990 was accepted the abolition of the leading role of this party,
and political pluralism was declared, and Jugoslavian Communist Party renamed itself  as Serbian Socialist
Party. See Banac, I. Post-Communism and Post-Yugoslavism: The Yugoslav Non-Revolutions of  1989-
1990. In: Cornell University Press, 1992, p.168-187.
29 See  Biberaj, E. Albania: The Last Domino. In: Eastern Europe in Revolution. Cornell University Press,
1992, p. 188 – 206.
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How does the transition of Eastern Europe looks from a global point of view? In spite of
the euphoric slogans at the beginning, which proclaimed new freedom for the people of
Eastern Europe, the region was not liberated, but passed from the sphere of influence of
one super-country to the zone of another. The USSR place was taken by USA and their
allies30. We cannot deny the fact that the obedience in forties was realized much more
drastically than the methods used in nineties. In the first case armed forces were used, as
well as “councilors”, punitive economic clauses, while now it was acted indirectly:
financial subsidies, loans, political experts advise, building informal structures31.
The transition during the last ten years had absolutely concrete and visible aim: joining to
already existing, functioning and attractive for the eastern Europeans structures, which
seemed to be the structures of EU. Let’s remember that the final aim of the previous
transition was beyond the horizon. An the only moment when it appeared in the distance
– the provided for 1980 Hrushchov’s “leap” in the communism32, caused right away the
“huge” Breznev’s theoretical contribution – the developed socialist society, by which he
removed once again the communism and hid it beyond the horizon. The pragmatism and
the seemingly easy and quick feasibility of the aims of new transition were doubtless.
That’s why we must not be surprised by the lightness with which even the first destroyers
of the socialism formulated their aims. An example: on 24.04.1989 (i.e. long before the
fall of the Berlin wall) Leh Valensa stated: “I wish all the best to Gorbachov and his
reforms. But we till don’t know how would communism look in its final phase. In stead
of this we know very well which political and economic models in Europe and in the
world have passed the check-up of time and we want to turn to these very models, and
not to try to reform foiled ideologies and conceptions”.
                                           
30 As Primakov said in his private visit in Sofia in the spring of 2000 “It is the same thing - until 1989 you
couldn’t be internationalist and criticizе CPSU,  and now you can not be a democrat and criticize USA”
31 J. Kenan’s strategy for “communism reticence” was motivated this way, the same vision lies in the
articulation of the “Truman doctrine”, with which USA helped Greece and Turkey, “threatened by the
communism”. See Great Issues in American History. V. III, New York, p. 403 - 419
32 The new program of CPSU, which was passed during its XXII-nd Congres (17 – 30.10.1961) declared
that in 1980  “will be created the material and technical base of communism … This way in USSR in broad
outlines will be built the communist society”. XXIII CPSU Congress, Stenographic Report, v.III, :. 1962,
p.276
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Already in the middle of fifties the intellectuals formulated the question “Is the socialism
reformable?” but they gave it different answers. By the conclusions of the negativists was
born the political emigration in fifties, and during the next years – the dissident
movement; and by the positivists group were born the reformers of the socialism. In other
words if “socialism with human face” may be was possible for Eastern Europe until the
end of sixties, at the end of eighties it was already not possible.
The latest reforms, realized by awkward reformers, people who have lost their faith in
their own system, and believed completely to the efficiency of the other one, inevitably
predetermined the crash of the real socialism. As concerns the Bulgarian case, we cannot
keep silent about the same way of thinking of the main person, who started the reform of
the socialism, Petar Mladenov.
It was obvious that the preliminary expectations for BSP/BCP’s lost in the elections in
June 1990 reflected negatively on its pre-election campaign and strengthened
helplessness of the party leaders after unexpected for them victory. The idea of power
responsibilities division at the beginning of the painful coming out of the state socialism
is praiseworthy, but the parliament democracy principles demand this responsibility to be
legitimized by democratic elections. When this principle is not respected the action
responsibility is dissolved, and this lead to moral degradation of the political elite and the
society as a whole.
On the first elections in Middle Europe new right wing won categorically, while on the
Balkans won ex- and present communists that were in power till then. This gave different
start of the changes – in the bigger par of Europe was realized a radical change of the
political system and “shocking” change in the economy. Meanwhile the Balkans
preferred the easy political adapting to the principles of parliament democracy and in the
sphere of economy the reforms of the socialist era were still going on. The results of the
first period were also different – in Middle Europe new political subjects were born in all
directions – left-wing, center and right-wing, and in economy the population quickly
started to feel the pain of the lost social security. On the Balkans half-and-half economic 
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changes made the economic crisis of the socialism long lasting. At the end of the first
period of transition – 1993-1994, the bigger part of Middle Europe have already
succeeded to become disappointed with the right-wing and turned to the left-wing (quite
usual), while on the Balkans the disappointment in the left-wing grew and the hopes
turned to the unknown – the new right powers.
After the first democratic change of the governing  - so-called left wave the face of the
new left wing took shape too. In Middle Europe it continued in the way of the right wing
– implementation of the western model of capitalism, but it tried to make it more gently
and moderately than the right wing.
The left wave legitimized permanently in the society and in the international
organizations the new left-wing in Middle Europe (it turned out to be “tame” and
acceptable for the West), while the international organizations responded to the Balkan
attempts for searching a new paradigm of transition and society, with suspicions and
accusations of neo-communism, as well as with efforts (more or less successful) to
overthrow the power.
Today we found ourselves in a third transition after a serial change of power, which
according to S. Huntington is already not a guarantee for stable democracy. The new left
wing in Middle Europe has lost the power33 – this is the political price of the horrible
social realities of the transition, but it keeps its high prestige and prepares for the next
governing. On the Balkans the leading right-wing is slowly and painfully learning to
govern, and most often they follow the ready-to-realize model given by the West, while
the left-wing, not less painfully is “normalizing”, once again using Western model, and
probably will also sooner or later return to the governing. But the question “What will the
left-wing do with the government?” has only one answer: the same thing as the right
wing but varied.
                                           
33 His thesis was formulated as a “test of the double change”: after two democratic and crisisless changes of
power, we can conclude that the political democracy is already stable
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As Sigmund Bauman said: “In human history no victory is final; and no defeat too”34
2. Transformation to Democracy in Bulgaria
2.1. The Election Law, the Political Regime and the Political Institutions.
The new Election Law carries all sins of the political compromise. In 1990 was imposed
a combined election system – 200 mandates were determined by the majority
representation, and 200 – by the proportional. The majority element was chosen by the
ex-political elite as a way for keeping its power. In the Election Law are determined 28
Majority Election Districts and is introduced 4% barrier for entering the Parliament. The
distribution of the mandates in the proportional representation is realized by the method
of D’ondt.
A paradox in the Law is article 37, paragraph 3, which allows organizations and
movements, that are not parties but do want their candidates to participate in the
Assembly elections, to be registrated by the procedure provided in the Political Parties
Law. This way in the election competition were included a number of organizations as
“Unity of Invalids” or “Unity of People with Heart Diseases”. This fact didn’t facilitate
the electoral consolidation.
In the period 1990-1995 were passed four election laws: “Law for Great National
Assembly Elections – 1990”, “Law for Election of President and Vice-president of the
Republic – 1991”, “Law for Election of Members of Parliament, Municipal Councilors
and Mayors – 1991”, “Law for the Local Elections – 1995”.
                                           
34 “In human history no victoryis final”. Interview with Zigmund Bauman. In: Culture weekly, 09.07.1999
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The comparison between the concentration of the votes in the first two elections, hold by
the different election systems in 1990 and 1991, shows that the introduction of the
proportional representation didn’t have a considerable effect on the electoral behavior.
The obtained results from the majority and proportional representation in 1990 are also
evidences for the insignificant influence of the election system. As a whole we can assert
that the political effects of the election systems in Bulgarian political process are not so
significant.
In spite of it all, the debates on the Election Law do not decrease and are used by the
political elite as means for blackmailing coalition partners and opponents. In the same
direction are going the debates during the last year before the serial Parliament elections
in Bulgaria. The discussion about the election barrier, which now is 4% serves to the
governing party for political blackmailing its coalition partners that could have
difficulties in leaping across a bigger barrier, as well as MRF that could also have
problems with the bigger barrier. On the other hand the opposite BSP insists for a
majority element, hoping that its absence from the government during the last years
would ease it in finding uncompromised persons. One way or the other, the changes in
the Election Law are declared to be a priority for the new political season and they will
be subjects of bargains and negotiations between the political elite
Another factor influencing the political system is the political regime. Bulgaria was one
of the few countries, which passed new Constitution at the very beginning of the
transition. The first democratically elected Parliament (the Great National Assembly) was
created with the aim to pass the new Constitution. The fact that the ex-Communist Party
had the majority in the Parliament, and the opposition was heterogeneous and
ideologically confused, predetermined the compromised character of the Constitution. Its
weaknesses are still a source of tension between the powers.
A Parliament form of governing was accepted in Bulgaria, institutionalized by the passed
on 12.07.1991 Constitution of Republic of Bulgaria. The main contradiction underlying
in the Constitution was about the powers of the elected by the majority representation 
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President of the country (which were too restricted) and the Parliament regime. The fight
between the president institution and the executive power (elected by the Parliament) is
constant; no matter which political party they represent. The ex-president Zelyu Zelev,
representing the opposition UDF was accused of overthrowing the first democratic
elected government of UDF. At the moment the conflict between the President of the
country – Petar Stoyanov, and UDF that set him up, is also sharpening.
2.2. Formation and Development of the Political Parties and Party
System in Bulgaria
2.2.1. Dynamics and development of the parties and party systems
The above-described peculiarities of the party system in Bulgaria are in the base of its
development dynamics in the last years.
1. The Bulgarian parties are still in the process of searching for their ideological-
political identity. The main parties (UDF and BSP) are looking for their political face
turning to analogical western parties.
UDF keeps forming the image of a Christian-democratic party, putting the accent on its
ideological identity as a people’s party, The National Council of the party passed a
document called “Charter for the Values of UDF as a European People’s Party”.
BSP is trying to accept the social-democratic model for ideological base of the party. An
important step in searching for identity was the Declaration for NATO recognition.
2. The party space is still not clearly differentiated. The “unimplantedness” of the
parties in the social system and deteriorated economic situation lead to a constant
instability of the party system. New political subjects keep appearing all the time,
some of them having real claims for participation in the party system.
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There is also predominating mistrust to the main political parties. The mistrust to BSP is
69%, against 21% confidence.67% express their negative attitude to UDF and only 23%
trust it. About 13% is the confidence for the small parties. (Data from research of the
Sociological Agency MBMD)
The sociological probing shows the unwillingness of the most of the people to be
identified with the existing in the moment political parties. Only 41% of the asked
declare to be close to some party. 41% are also the people that do not see in the country a
political party, which could represent them. (Data: BBSS Gallup). This is an evidence for
a certain vacuum in the party system, which is possible to be filled by some of the new
political players. More and more political leaders talk openly for the necessity of change
of the party-political model. Among the experts predominates the thesis for the play out
of the political elite. The restructuring of the political space is continuing. “The Civil
unsatisfaction” continues raising new public movements. In almost all-regional cities are
already structured civil movements that declare to be against the parties.
Something new in the political landscape is the coming of civil movements that claim to
unify the Left spectrum of the political space. The leader of Political club “Ecoglasnost”,
a party from BSP coalition, announced the creation of a new red formation. According to
him it will unify the civil movements and parties from the left spectrum – communists,
socialists, agrarians and liberals. The Union should be created 6 months before the
elections.
Activation of such kind of political subjects shows that the crisis spread not only over the
social-economic structure of the society, but also over the whole party structure. The
tendencies in the development of the political processes direct to total redefinition of the
party system and its reasons.
The behavior of the ex-Minister of Internal Affairs Bogomil Bonev changed from a
criticism of the government to gradual positive coming into political game. In Bulgaria
came back the ex officio premier Reneta Injova, who also declared her wish to participate 
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in the future elections. Both of them declared willingness for joint actions. The leader of
syndicate “Podkrepa” Konstantin Trenchev also joined them. But while the first two of
them attack directly the governing, Trenchev headed the social discontent again. His
presence was observed in all the strikes at the beginning of the autumn. For the first time
after 1997 Konstantin Trenchev presumes openly sharp attacks against the powers.
No matter what kind of formations and relationships enter Bogomil Bonev, Reneta Injova
and Konstantin Trenchev, those are the people that openly declare themselves to be
against the status quo of the currently existing party system. At the same time there are
enough people in the society that would support a right party outside UDF.
Another question that the experts ask is if the mistrust to the main political subjects won’t
redirect the votes towards the small political parties, something that already happened in
the Parliament elections in 1991, in a similar political situation. The presence of these
parties in the electoral field of UDF, as well as their attempts to realize their political
identity by critics to the governing party could play a bad joke to UDF.
3. The axiological and ideological opposing becomes more and more exhausted. The
coming in 2001 Parliament elections will be the first to be hold after a regularly
expired mandate of the governing majority. This will deprive them of the
mobilization resource of the crisis situations. The common European consensus will
deprive the “European idea” of the ideological potential for election message. The
main messages will rotate around the economic and politic pragmatism. This will put
the people as well as the parties in front of a new situation
4. Although the economy strategies take bigger and bigger place in the party messages
and the orientations of he electorate, there exist some significant axiological
elements, determining the electoral behavior and the presence of ethnic and
nationalistic parties.
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In contradiction to the ethnic longings of the different communities, as well as to the new
demands to our national sovereignty, in connection to our joining EU, the nationalist
demands of the different political subjects are activated too. Typical example is IMRO,
the current partner of the governing in the parliament coalition UDF. IMRO, using its
participation in the governing coalition, declares its future political intentions, especially
the intention to participate independently in the coming elections. The party openly states
its nationalist trends, declaring to be against selling land to foreigners and party creation
on ethnic base. Some time ago these MP voted against the Framework Convention for the
Minorities’ Rights Defense. IMRO will aim to take the place on the Right from the
Center of the political specter. Characteristic for the nationalist organizations in Bulgaria
is that they are not so aggressive to the “foreigners”, but are turned to the historical past
of the country.
5. The continuing lack of clear economic strategies leads to creation of a clientelist
economy and unstable governments, dependant on the corruption. Even the UDF
Government that came to power with the main slogan “fight against the corruption” is
shaken all the time by corruption scandals. The serial scandal about the financing of
the governing party involved the name of the premier’s wife Elena Kostova (boss of
the “Future for Bulgaria” foundation). The political situation in which the events run
did not allow the governing to confirm in the public space the thesis for “ the fight of
the government against organized criminality”. Grigory Luchanski, who introduced
Mickel Chorny (the owner of the only GSM operator in Bulgaria) in the Bulgarian
economy, was announced by General Atanasov to be “a man of the special services of
ex-USSR” and a ”gangster”.35 Three days later Grigory Luchanski declared that he
financed the foundation of Elena Kostova “Future for Bulgaria” with $ 80 000, as
well as that he was blackmailed to finance UDF. The ex-president Zelyu Zelev stated
that there are proofs of blackmailed businessmen and that “UDF is really a Mafia”36.
The leader of MRF explained that he was expecting such a thing a long time ago. The
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scandal is really huge. According to the BSP leader Georgi Parvanov  “Kostov is
sinking in the big corruption”37
On the 18.09.2000 was dismissed the deputy-minister of the Defense Plamen
Radonov, accused of huge double-dealing. Even before that some premier’s
councilors, directors and Main Road Administration were accused of corruption.
In Bulgarian economy policy there are no clear rules and strategy for the priorities
and key interests of the state, accepted with consensus by all political forces. The
economic is ruled mainly by so-called friendship circles.
According to Petar Jotev the fail of the deal is connected to defense of the national
interests. But until the last moment the governing was answering to the opposition’s
critics that the deal is maximum profitable for the country. That leads to impression
for the existing of others, not economic motives, in the process of negotiating the
deal.
Following actions on the privatization of the telecomm also raise some doubts in the
experts, connected to the thought that the governing will hurry to sell the second
GSM operator in order to take the money before the elections, and the deal for BTC
will be postponed.
Unduly long continuing privatization, and connected to it economic interests of the
governing elite, are a constant generator of corruption in Eastern countries. Pre-
joining funds of EU also can be a possible source for corruption. Bureaucratic
methods of Bulgarian administration created additional possibilities for corrupting.
Probably international institutions, granting resources in the framework of the
Stability Pact or pre-joining preparation could think of establishing a national
institution for the Eastern countries, which to sanction effectively the
misappropriations that happen very often, and especially those in huge amounts.
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The parliament vacation passed under the sign of the scandal with eavesdropping the
General public prosecutor. On 28.07.2000. The Press-service of the Cassation
Persecution Office reported that officers of Military Prosecution Office had found
eavesdropping devices in the home of the General public prosecutor of the Republic
Nikola Filchev. In the first phase of the scandal, after the report from General public
prosecutor for the presence of eavesdropping devices in his home, the reaction of
many political subjects showed that not everybody understood what was going on.
The first official reaction of MIA, expressed by the General secretary of the Ministry
Bojidar Popov was, that there is no enough information on the case. The statements of
the Minister of Internal Affairs that Emanuil Yordanov was shocked and surprised, on
the background of the first statements of the premier, that they knew before about the
case, and that this is a “war of the cops against the government” showed that the
different centers of the power in UDF had a different access to the scandal
information. The first interpretation from the experts that this was an attempt of the
Prosecution Office to react to the demand of restricting the magistrates’ immunity, or
Filchev’s wish to prevent himself from compromates and to obsess the whole
information power, were not further developed too.
In return the reactions of the Premier were inserted in the scheme of the cops that are
shaking the Government since its very beginning.
Right after the report from Nikola Filchev, BSP demanded the resignation of the
Minister of Inner Affairs and National Assembly calling. The sharpest reaction was
from MRF, which demanded the resignation of the government and asserted that the
state has become police-like. On 29.07.2000 Kostov ordered the Minister of the
Internal Affairs Emanuil Yordanov, the Minister of Justice Teodosy Simeonov and
the Minister of the Defense Boyko Noev to find how is enforced the Law for
Intelligence Devices.
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In the Parliament debate on a special meeting (on 03.08.2000) the main political
parties did not changed their positions.
Ivan Kostov developed the thesis for “the war of the ex-cops” and their wish to
overthrow the power. Once again “Zashtita”, the party of ex-military officers and
policemen was brandished as a scarecrow. Ivan Kostov stated after the Parliament
debate: ”The majority of the politicians do not want to be controlled by ex-State
Security. The debate positioned everybody who is in the political space. Out of it left
BSP.”38
The MP from BSP were supporting the thesis that this is an internal war between the
wings of UDF
The same thesis was developed by the MP from MRF39
At the end was passed the suggested from UDF resolution for checking the way the
special intelligence devices are being used.
After the Commission declaration that the General Public Prosecutor was not
eavesdropped, and Bojidar Popov – General Secretary of MIA and Bogomil Bonev
were the culprits; many people asked themselves if the second part of the “gate” was
not directed too. The appointment of General Slavcho Bosilkov to the post General
Secretary of MIA and the discharge of Bojidar Popov, a protégé of the National
Assembly Chairman (who is known for his bisexual inclinations), gave reason for the
experts to conclude that no matter who directed the “gate”, Ivan Kostov used its
results best and obsessed the structures of MIA. Another motive for the whole scandal
the observers see in the distraction of the society attention from the social-economic
problems.
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There were other two accents in the scandal development – real or “played” was the
“war” between the Premier and the President, and the lack of response to the scandal
from the society and the out-parliament forces.
According the sociologists “Bug-gate” run in the frames of the media space and
didn’t have so wide public response. They think that the development of the scandal
showed the lack of “positive power” in the governing.40 Their attempts to explain
everything by the undestroyed structures of State Security (after 3 years of governing
the country) and the obvious lack of coordination between the services demonstrated
incompetence and will have negative effect on the government reputation.41
It is expected that with the coming of elections the contradictions between the
President Petar Stoyanov, who sharply show the mistakes of the governing, and UDF
to get deeper. This theme will create another division line in the party circles. The
development of the conflict will have a negative effect on UDF electorate, because
the President has extremely high rating.
Although the debates for change in Bulgarian Constitution started right after its
creation, the changes are still not realized. The main discussing questions about the
Constitution changes do not find the needed consensus in Bulgarian society. At the
beginning of its mandate the governing majority declared that it will look for support
for some Constitutional changes: giving right to foreigners to buy land, permission of
existing of ethnic parties (although MRF is existing now), abolition of the MP and
magistrates immunities, giving financial independence for the Municipalities. Later
the governing renounced their wish for changes concerning the land sale to foreigners
and possibilities for registration of ethnic parties.
At the beginning of the new political season the change in he Constitution was
declared as a priority of the governing majority.
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The changes in the Constitution are connected with the UDF’s demand for abolition
of the MP and magistrates’ immunity and giving bigger financial independence for
the Municipalities. The statements of the politicians from different political forces
show that this will be difficult consultations and there will be hardly reached any
consensus. The theme for the Constitution change does not come on time, even
according to UDF MP. According to BSP prepared changes will give governing the
possibility for political repression. IMRO also declared to be against the abolition of
the magistrates’ immunity.42
The Law for the political parties and the Election Law will be changed too before the
Parliament elections next year. Especially topical is the theme for the political parties
financing, which unstated status is a source of corruption. The conducted consultations
between UDF and their coalition partners brought to a common position for keeping the
proportional representation and 4% election barrier. BSP, however, insist for majority
representation. The question for additional election barrier for participating coalitions is
to be discussed. On the financing question all the Parliament parties share the opinion for
budget financing of the parties. The questions which parties will be financed by the state,
and with how much money, will cause serious debates. Ekaterina Michaylova, the
Chairman of UDF Parliament group hinted that she would launch the idea for state
financing only for the parties that received 1% on the elections, established and somehow
participating in the government of the country. In the UDF suggestions in this direction
we can see the attempts of the governing to restrict the coming of new political subjects
on the party scene. It is expected that they will meet the biggest resistance on this point
from the Parliament parties, which future plans include wider coalitions. In the Election
Law are provided requirements for the enough quantity of members for registration of a
party and participation in the elections. 
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2.2.2. Formation of the Political Parties in Bulgaria
The structuring of the political parties and the coming of the pluralist party system are
some of the most important features of the democratic change after the collapse of
totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe.
The coming of the political parties in Bulgaria in the early 90-ties was marked by a
number of peculiarities, which left a lasting stamp upon the party system character.
1. The change of the regimes in the Central and Eastern Europe runs in a different way.
The models determined in Western literature in the terms “replacement”,
“transplacement”, “confrontation”, “implosion”, “contractual change of the system”
and so on are the cause for the different way of the party system
formation.43“Imposed transitions” are fixed by the abilities of ex-elites to control
unilaterally “from above” the processes of transformation, determining their speed
and contents.44
In Bulgaria was realized a change “from the high quarters”, which in the models of
transition is called “transplacement”, or changes45 directed from above. This
predetermines the leading role of the ex-communist elite in the person of so-called
reformers in the total political process. The most important consequence of this control is
the party system formation from above.
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When the reforming wing of Bulgarian Communist Party organized the falling of Todor
Zivkov’s regime on 10.11.1989 it declared itself to be for system reorganization and
promised realizing of a new social model in the frames of which to enter pluralization of
the party system.
In April 1990 the Party changed its name into Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), which
became a cause for violent internal debates. In spite of the rise of three trends (which
later became a base for formation of three wings – radical, moderate and conservative),
the party succeeded to keep its unity and to hold back the tempo and direction of the
democratic processes in the way it wanted to. The process of new party system formation
was dominated by the ex-Communist party.
In Bulgaria the anticommunist opposition was structured as a conglomerate of 18 parties
and movements (some of them had only 5 days political biography), without organization
structures, political traditions and electoral support.
At the first stage dominated so-called dissident groups, part of which were ex or even
current communists and reformers. The most important of them are the created after the
middle of 80-ties “Publicity and Reorganization Support Club - 1988”, the ecological
formation “Ecoglasnost”, established in 1987 and Independent Professional Unity
“Podkrepa”. Thanks to the ex-Communist Party active intervention, part of the existing
till 10.11.1989 dissident groups and leaders were removed from the party forming
process. (The reasons for it are their frankly anticommunist messages)
Another source for party structures creation were the parties that had existed before 1944
– Radical-Democratic Party (RDP), Democratic Party (DP), Bulgarian Agrarian People’s
Unity (BAPU) “Nikola Petkov” and (BSDP). The political activity of these parties was
ceased a little after establishing of the communist regime and they didn’t have
organization structure or electoral connection with the society.
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The third compound part were the new risen opposition groups as ФНСД, ОДЦ, The
Club of the Repressed after 1945, and parties imitating some European groups of parties
– for example the Green Party. Those groups were more radically disposed because they
were formed during the radicalization of the political processes.
This period can be characterized by two peculiarities:
1.Weak opposition against Communist Party (In contrast to some Central European
countries)
2.Lack of social adjustment to radical system changes and strong anticommunist moods
in the society. On the first big meeting organized by the opposition on 14.01.1990 the
political messages did not include openly anticommunist slogans, the demands did not
come out of the circle of “publicity and democratization of the society”, and some
economic slogans rotated definitely in the Left space.
Gradually the transition became “contractual”; its main characteristic is reticence of the
elites included in the political negations, and their mutual responsibilities for constant
contracting and competitive majorities’ formation.
The Communist Party initiated the conduction of the “Round table” on 16.01.1990 and
determination of the political subjects to participate in the debate was also its “merit”.
The Round table as a form of contractual transition in Bulgaria has also its peculiarities.
While in the Central European countries it is the final stage in the development of
political processes of communists’ regimes erosion, in Bulgaria it anticipated the
development of the processes. In fact the Round table was the birthplace of Bulgarian
party system with all the following consequences. Only in Bulgaria the party system was
structured on the base of the Round table sides. The created party system had two
characteristic features:
1.The ex-Communist Party (renamed into Socialist) is still not split at this stage and did
not remain isolated from the society (in contrast to ex-communist parties in the countries
of Eastern block.
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2.Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) was the only formation from the anticommunist
movements in Eastern Europe, which kept for a long time its structure and its key
positions in the political game.
The Round table structured the party space on the axis communism-anticommunism. In
that moment in Bulgaria existed another actual enough division in the society – about the
national question. At the beginning of the democratic changes the ethnic question,
provoked by he attitude of communist regime to Bulgarian Muslims and Turks, was one
of the hot points for polarization of the society. The Communist Party, however,
succeeded to master this cleavage, calling a Round table on the national question at the
beginning of January. As a result all openly nationalistic parties and groups were
marginalized. In the same time BSP permitted the registration of Movement for Rights
and Freedoms (MRF) as an ethnic party of Bulgarian Turks (which is an offence against
the Constitution), which allowed them to include in their pre-election messages
nationalist propaganda and to attract nationalist vote. In spite of the negative moods
among the other parties’ elite, MRF succeeded to obtain a reserved place in the
developing party system thanks to its firm ethnic-cultural mobilization possibilities as
well as to the restricted view of life and low horizon of the bulk of its ranks.
At the same time the ethnic-cultural cleavage succeeded to raise Bulgarian nationalist
orientations too.
The Agrarian unions also had a reserved place in the political palette during the first
period of party system formation. Obviously the divisions on the axis city-countryside
were not removed by the communist regime too and the traditions of the Bulgarian
political history had their influence.
Meanwhile on the political scene came a number of party formations, caused by the
natural for this kind of transition polarization, as well as by over-liberal Law for Political
Parties Registration.
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The new-formed parties are remarkable for their considerable structural weakness, lack of
organization and eclectic political programs. Their fate is preliminary determined because
of the above-mentioned model of party system formation.
The first democratic elections in Bulgaria were hold in June 1990. The weakness of the
opposition and the ex-Communist Party stability predetermined the election results.  The
victory of the ex-communist opposition, however, didn’t solve the main question for
“system change”. The transition kept developing under the formula of contractual
development. The leader of the opposition coalition Zelyu Zelev was elected for
President of the country, although UDF had minority in the new-formed Parliament.
In the political competition the main participants were two political conglomerates. On
one side was ex-Communist Party, which in spite of keeping its unity, was already torn
by contradictions. The aim of the communists was, with the help of more or less
concessions, to keep the status quo. On the other side was the officionalized opposition
UDF, which did not suggest real economic alternatives, but was consolidated around
anticommunist slogans. At this stage of party system development the political subjects
did not raise significant economic strategies, which the society could reach a consensus
about. Such strategies did not appear during the whole 10-years transition period in the
country.
In that period there wasn’t clearly expressed group interests in the country. In that
situation the electoral behavior was concentrated on the paradigm communism-
anticommunism. As a result after the first democratic elections in Bulgaria was
established bipolar quasi-party system. But a certain doubt was raised - if we could talk
of real political parties at this stage of political process development.
More and more often the parties started responding post factum to the society interests,
instead of forming them. From the middle of 1991 the consensual development potential
started to decrease, leaving place for the confrontation.
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The reasons for that are the weaknesses of the party system itself, which definitely
couldn’t master and represent the society interests, as well as the arising social-economic
and other value divisions that started internal differentiation in the party blocks
themselves.
Typical for Bulgaria is a common retard of party evolution, connected with political
parties’ legitimization and differentiation, as well as of formation of their profile, and
their continuous vegetating in unstable blocks of coalitions and movements.
2.2.3. The Political Parties in Bulgarian Society.
Many authors that are engaged in research of party system formation in the post
communist countries pay attention of the fact of its instability. The main determining
factor for this instability they see in the heritage of the communist regime and the post-
communist society structure itself. Its main characteristic is the lack of civil society.
The “Civil society” is such kind of society that was formed autonomously and
independently from the state orientated logic of structure development and in its frames
the separate consisting subjects are voluntarily engaged on public activity for keeping
individual or group interests.46
If we accept the Dahl’s statement that the democracies in Western Europe function on the
base of capitalist economic system47, we must bring as a main prerequisite for
development of the political market the creation of economic market in the frames of
which must be formed the interests that are articulated and represented in the political
sphere.
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We can suggest that the forming economic market will create its consequences in the
political sphere. The economic interests that are articulated there can be transformed into
political interests. In Western countries the groups’ interests are represented by the
language of political interests, which brings to the creation of political divisions
differentiated by separate parties.
In the post-communist countries as a whole we don’t have to deal with differently
realized economic interests. In the initial transition period it was difficult to talk about
political interests formation in the context of existing of some more stable group interests.
Social – political divisions were practically liquidated during the governing of communist
regime.
We can commonly say that the forming party system didn’t have a strong support in the
existing social structure. The political parties didn’t create clear electoral connections
with certain society groups. In its initial appearance the party system was not organized
on the base of existing social - political divisions, because they were still not clearly
formed. In this transformation phase the party system structuring process run on
ideological level.
Recognizing this peculiarity of the party system formation in the post-communist
countries, some authors impose the thesis that the political conflicts in those societies
have a specific character and are not connected in general with social political divisions.
According to G. Schopflin for example, the political conflicts, produced in these
countries and the parties formed on their base lean mostly on certain values and
ideological messages instead of on group interests. This predetermines the appearance on
the political scene of additional conflicts, having pure axiological character (ethnic,
national, religious or cultural), and their solution with the help of competitive bargains is
much more difficult compared to social-economic conflicts. According to the author,
formation of the ideological conflicts leads to weakening or even to impossibility for
elaboration of consensual style of policy, based on consultations and negotiations.
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The social-political divisions in Bulgaria almost didn’t play any role at the first stage of
party system formation with the exception of the axis “city-countryside” (presence of
agrarian parties) and of the ethnic-religious axis. Gradually together with the
differentiation of the social- economic structure these divisions will search for their place
as a party-forming factor. Despite all the difficulties in defining the parties on the Left-
Right axis, the social-economic differentiation of the electorate show that we can talk in a
certain sense for defining of UDF as “Right” in economic sense and BSP as a “Left” in
the same sense.
Another party system feature during the first stage of development is the lack of constant
enough, defined connections between the electors and the party structures. The parties
were not “implanted” in the social structure. It was impossible to fix a social group,
which was consistently Left or Right (although we can observe some tendencies to
forming such groups). The electoral behavior of the people was very unstable. With
unstructured electoral market and confronted style of behavior of the political players, the
changes in the electoral behavior had a special influence on the party system structure.
The “unimplantedness” of the parties in the society, as well as the insufficient
differentiation of the social-political divisions predetermined to a great extent the
autonomy of the party elites. The way of behavior of concrete groups of leaders was
decisive for the character of the inter-party competition and was repeatedly a basic
motive for appearance of new parties and disintegration of other existing groups. (The
political transformation of the part of UDF leaders in the 36 National Assembly, whose
behavior became a reason for the UDF government’s fall, was an example for the
existence in the party system of so-called “leader’s parties” and their existence and
rotations in the political space are results only of leader’s decisions.)
Typical for this kind of political structure is that the fragmentation of the party system is
caused more often by conflicts that appear in the frames of political class, than by the
influence of the social needs.
48
The fact that at the beginning of transition in Bulgaria was not existing stable civil
society with articulated and realized group interests, allowed the parties to try to
“implant” themselves in the society, attempting to bring in to certain parts of it their own
program-ideological positions. Typical example is the ideological development of the
governing party UDF. From heterogeneous coalition, predominated by Left elements it
became Christian-democratic kind of party. The public acceptation of these
transformations was hampered by the contradictive economic party strategy, which is far
away from the Christian-democratic values, as well as by the lack in Bulgarian society of
religious traditions and strong Church, which are basic conditions for Christian-
democratic parties in the West. This predetermined the eclectic character of the UDF
electorate and the impossibility to use the ideological and valuable moment as a unifying
point of this electorate. Similar is the situation in the Socialist Party, which has been
trying to define its ideological appearance for 10 years and still hasn’t succeeded.
Predominating opinion among the specialists is that there is a lack of clear differentiation
between “the Left” and “the Right” in Bulgarian political space on the political party
identification level, as well as on electoral anticipations level.
The system of bipolar competition (axiological in its entity), however, gradually loses its
significance. The society turned to the conditions of living and a lot of social groups
started to put the inter-party competition accent on the plane of economic problems. The
elections in 1994 and in 1997 showed a change of the priorities in the vote motivation.
2.2.4. Formation of the Party System in Bulgaria
The main factor influencing the party system structure were the relations between the
parties, determined by their size, electoral support, ideological self-identification and
coalition potential.
After the elections for Great National Assembly in 1990 in the Parliament were
represented 4 party formations – BSP (the renamed Communist Party), UDF – coalition 
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of opposition parties, MRF (its allowance to the party competition caused many political
debates) and BAPU (state). From 6 990 435 electors 2 887 766 voted for BSP, 2 317 798
voted for UDF, 368 929 – for BAPU and 491 597 – for MRF on the proportional and
majority representation. 4 independent MP, supported by the represented parties, received
mandates in the Great National Assembly.
With such a separation the Socialist Party had the opportunity to form a government,
which it did, and the opposition received the control over the majority, capable of
conducting constitutional veto.
The model of the inter-party competition, established in the pre-election fight, was
strongly confronted.
As far as the pre-election coalitions are concerned, neither of the parliamentary
represented parties developed strategy for pre-election unions. UDF made a few attempts
to form a coalition with outside parties but they all failed. BSP didn’t needed coalitions.
And BAPU and MRF were characterized by an obvious lack of coalition potential. For
the rest political subjects BAPU was just an imitation of totalitarian party and MRF was
not accepted as an equal partner neither from the Right, nor from the Left.
A peculiarity of the political transition was the “reversing”, itself, of the Left and the
Right in the traditional acceptation of these divisions. Thus, self-defined as Right UDF,
from the political point of view suggested Left (in the sense of radical) messages and
self-defined as Left BSP holds to the conservative political values (from the point of view
of keeping the status quo, not from the point of view of traditional conservative values).
The confusion in the economic platforms is not smaller, because among the right UDF
demands for changing the economic system, market economy and private property, there
are frankly Left slogans. We can even assert that the pre-election platform offered by
UDF in 1990 is economically Left. For its part BSP also succeeded to put Right slogans
in its Left platform. Thus, as regards the social-economic offers, they were similar to
some extent.
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However, we can say that the Socialist Party definitely staked on the etatist and
egalitarian spirit, while in the UDF’s platform predominated liberal moments.
The ideological polarization of the programs, however, is predetermined by the political
part of the platforms where the extreme views (keeping the status quo and fast change of
the system) are staked by both sides
As a whole BSP declared its political development in the Left space (and at this stage
there wasn’t competition for the Left space) and UDF was accepted by the society as a
Right political force although the Unity itself tried to cover the whole space on the Right
from the Center, and the really predominating structures and opinions in it on this level
were Left-Centrist (BSDP, BAPU, People’s Party and “Ecoglasnost”)
What was common for both political formations at this stage of development was that
they were charged with a lot of potential internal conflicts on the base of ideological and
elite contrasts.
MRF from its beginning had a clearly expressed ethnic-religious character, in spite of the
fact that in the public space (with the exception of the moments of electoral mobilization)
it avoids this image. The analyses of its programs and political behavior, as well as its
electors’ behavior, however, give us the right to determine it as an ethnic party.
BAPU is a party that inherited its public place from its participation in the political
system of the communist society, but having connections with certain social groups. The
division city-countryside is topical for Bulgarian society and its specific manifestation is
determined by Bulgarian political history. BAPU is structured in the Left by its program.
Later the logic of political process will impose a clearer shaping of the different agrarian
organizations on the Left and on the Right, while they were passing through a process of
different transformations.
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As a whole we can summarize that the formed after June’s elections in 1990 party system
was strongly polarized (polarization are in the ideological-axiological aspect), which
predetermined its instability.
The second peculiarity was the inner contradictions within the two main blocks; their
inner unity was supported only by the polarization.
The third peculiarity was that so constructed system (of the big party system type)
allowed in its structure to come in some small parties, which represented the group
interests formed in the society. The party system structure and their own coalition
potential, however, did not allow them to take the place of the third (axis) party.48 
An important factor for the instability of the new party systems, created after the
democratic changes, is their “unimplantedness” in the society. This characteristic is
additionally complicated in “contractual transitions” where it had started talking at cross-
purposes between the anticipations of the society and the behavior of the political elite.
To a great extent it concerns Bulgarian political system. Constructed in the frames of
confronted strategies of the two main political forces, it started to contradict the
predetermined consensual character of the democracy. Its fast structuring did not allow
the political processes to fit the time’s logic. It turned out that the created party system
couldn’t control the social conflicts. The delay of the processes on the other hand
radicalized the contradictions in the society.
BSP succeeded to keep its unity in spite of all the shakings that it survived during the
period and continued its development in the framework of slow erosion and fractionating.
Amongst the opposition, however, occurred significant processes of differentiation.
Undisputedly, a big part of the split processes are caused by pure leaders’ ambitions, as
well as by the contradictions hidden in the Union’s formula, but the differentiation of the
group around BSDP, in contradiction to the one around DP (parties having the biggest 
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political weight in the Unity and the strongest ideological differences), had definitely
ideological character in its roots. After the success in imposing Left slogans in the first
UDF platform, BSDP had more and more difficulties in handling with new-appearing
leaders, who raised typically Right demands (restitution and so on), expressing the
interests of the new-appeared society group (ex-owners who saw in the change a chance
to restore their status quo). On the other hand, after the delay of the transformation
processes, the force of the representatives of the more and more radicalized public
opinion was increasing.
Gradually a part of UDF became radical carrier of a new project for system change.
The announced date for the passing of the Constitution (12.07.1991) was the motive that
finally split UDF. A part of its MP left the Parliament and went on a hunger strike
demanding pre-term elections. Later they didn’t sign the Constitution. According to us
this was the most significant split of the Union.
Actually it was then, when first started the structuring of the party space outside the basic
axis communism-anticommunism. But as this dilemma was not solved by the first
elections, it was underlying in the election strategies of the parties in the Parliament
election, hold on 13.10.1991.
After passing the Constitution, the Parliament was closed and pre-term Parliament
elections were promulgated in October 1991. The contractual transition ended. In the pre-
election competition were included 48 parties and coalitions and once again there were
exotic names as “Movement for Protection of Pensioners, Unemployed and Social-Weak
People”, “Organization of the People with Heart Diseases and Social- Weak Citizens”
and so on.
This time in the election competition participated the parts of the split UDF – UDF-
Center and UDF-Left, BSP, MRF, BAPU (e), and BAPU – PP. The parties’ strategies
were based once again on the polarizing axis communism-anticommunism. Especially 
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strong it was expressed in the strategies of BSP and UDF-movement. Their programs
were clearly divided by the axis socialism-liberalism.
MRF didn’t change considerably its election strategy. The new item in it was its openness
towards the political space, something that made it relevant to the government
negotiations. It changed the accent in its economic program, including in it some Right
messages too (as restitution), but it definitely inclined to the Left. That duplicity –
valuable orientation to Democratic forces and Left-orientated economic character
allowed it to be equally relevant to Left and Right parties, which ensured it not only the
place of the third party in the structuring of the Parliament, but also the same role in its
restructuring. Only the partners were changed.
The Agrarian Unions made an unsuccessful unification attempt. The strategy of the so
unified Union was structured by the axis communism-anticommunism, but without
openness towards other political partners. The coalition potential of the so organized
Agrarian parties, from the point of view of size and ideological distance (they are against
BSP and against UDF) is zero.
On the political scene appeared Bulgarian Business Block (BBB) – a party that openly
announced Right-Centrist platform and was looking for electoral support in the business
circles. It tried to formulate national and economic values. Its problem was that at this
moment it was “on the verge of its representation”49, which it would have to leap across,
on the contrary of the other competitors. A specific feature of this party, or at least of its
leader, was its self-isolation from the election, parliament and government bargains. This
fact gave the party a constant place outside the corridors of the executive power,
something that would probably marginalize it gradually.
The party space was characterized by the constant presence in its structures of
Monarchist Unions, which have total electorate about 2%. In 1991 the Monarchists in the 
                                           
49 M.N. Pedersen,  The Dynamics of European Party Systems & Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility,
EJPR, vol. 7, 1979
54
person of “Confederation Kingdom of Bulgaria” won 1.82 %. These formations must be
categorized as anti-systematic – their appeals are directed towards restoring the Tarnovo
Constitution or returning of the Tsar. But the public opinion legitimized them and the
main political parties often include them in their election bargains. In 1991 there were
Monarchists in UDF. In 1994 they turned to be official partners in the Union for National
Salvation (UNS).
As a result of the Parliament elections in 1991 in the Parliament were included UDF with
1 903 567 votes-34.36% - 110 mandates-45.80% of mandates; BSP – 1 836 050-33.14% -
106 mandates-44.20% of mandates. With so received votes UDF that received the most
of the votes, didn’t have the majority allowing it to form a Cabinet. As we already
mentioned, the pre-election strategy of MRF allowed it to play successfully the role of
the third party. Government of UDF was formed with the help of MRF.
The internal restructuring in UDF (more on personal, than on any other base), as well as
the contradictions between the coalition partners led to the fall of the Phillip Dimitrov’s
Government after demanded and ungiven vote of confidence.
The public anticipations however, were once again very different from the political status
quo and Bulgaria was again on the threshold of the serial elections. In the Parliament
elections in 1994 were registrated for participation 48 parties, movements and coalitions.
The model of the party competition was not so strongly confronted and the pre-election
fight was definitely economized. The accents were the attitude to ex-Government and
representation of their own programs for government.
UDF had recovered after the structural shakings but it directed its attention to internal
organization problems, which appeared to be a serious obstacle for its functioning. With
the more and more differentiating political space its unnatural party structure of a
coalition-movement and the problems underlying in its structuring from the “parties-
labels” didn’t allow it to adapt to the changing competition rules. Its bitter experience
with the coalition relations with MRF withdrew it into itself. It suggested a clear right 
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alternative for government, but the processes of identification were still obstructed by its
organization problems.
BSP staked on its opening to pre-election coalitions and this time it made efforts to be
more precise in the choosing of  “coalition images”. Characteristic for BSP was that
although it declared to be ready for a coalition it was still not accepted as a relevant
partner by the other political players and this made it “create its own partners” – pseudo-
parties without ranks and structures. A successful point was the attraction of BAPU
“Alexander Stamboliyski” (a leader of the Agrarians, Prime Minister 1919-1923), that
helped BSP to attract the agrarian votes. It suggested Left alternative for government.
In the political space BAPU were transformed once again, relying on their reserved
perimeter. Beside the “label-party” “Al. Stamboliyski”, which in the above-mentioned
coalition served to the interests of BSP without drawing positive points for it, there was
registrated the coalition People’s Unity – Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Unity –
Democratic Party. This coalition succeeded to establish itself, using the fact that both
constituting parties passed the thresholds of representation and organization.50 Their
strategy was directed to a tolerant pre-election fight and relationships with mother-party.
Their platform was Right-Centrist, including specific agrarian program. They didn’t want
to come in election coalitions, but wouldn’t refuse to participate in parliament-
government coalitions.
MRF didn’t change the character of its strategy, but includes more Left demands in its
platform.
BBB kept its line of representing in the society. They were once again closed for
coalitions, coming from the position that they are the best of all. Their platform was
Right-Centrist with definite nationalistic accents.
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The social-democratic space was organized by the Political Unity “Democratic
Alternative for the Republic”. However, their messages were dressed more in political,
than in economic terms, something that was out of the imposed model of competition,
constructed around the economic alternatives.
8 parties and coalitions participated in the elections. 5 of them were represented in the
Parliament and two of them were new for the party system.
UDF-1 260 374 – 24.3%-69 mandates-28.75%; People’s Unity (BAPU, DP)-333 478-
6.51%-18-7.50%; MRF-283 094-5.94%-15-6.25%; BBB-245 849-4.73%-13-5.42%;
BSP, BAPU “Al. Stamboliyski”, “Ecoglasnost”-2 262 943-43.50%-125-52.08%.
BSP won the absolute majority and formed single-handed government. This fact as well
as the fact of the presence of more than one small party did not allow anyone of them to
take the place of the “third” party.  Parliament relations were realized between UDF and
PU (BAPU-DP). These relations created a new pre-election coalition in the next
elections.
MRF that lost its role of the balancer directed its attention to a total change in the party
strategy.
BBB remained in the role of eternal opponent
During the government of Jane Videnov the country was caught by a deep economic
crisis, which caused parliament crisis and new pre-term elections were promulgated.
The whole pre-election situation was formed by the circumstances of the ex-
government’s falling and by the hold in 1996 President elections.
During these political processes was born the coalition formula Unified Democratic
Forces (UDF) in the President elections, which kept functioning after the withdrawal of 
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MRF before the Parliament elections. Basic partners there were Union of Democratic
Forces and PU – DP. Inner Macedonian Revolution Organization (IMRO) pretended for a
special place in this coalition. It is a nationalist party, with local meaning, which used the
political situation, when a small party joining a big coalition multiplies its votes, and
succeeded to accumulate positives and to show bigger coalition demands in the next
moment. The joining of PU (BAPU  - DP) to UDF was realized according to the
traditional coalition rules, which meant that PU was not absorbed by UDF
As we already mentioned, MRF was directed to a totally new party strategy, trying to
escape of its ethnic image. For this purpose it used the BSP tactics of attracting “label-
parties” partners, and created the Union for National Salvation (UNS).
In the Parliament entered the Democratic Left – 937 242, UNS – 317 067; UDF – 2 208
305; BBB – 209 274; Euro-Left Party – 208 219. UDF received a full majority and
formed single-handed government.
The party identifications and strategies in the competition leaded to the conclusion that in
Bulgarian political space were differentiated some ideological-political fields concerning
the building the parties and their structural wishes. There can be defined a moderate Left
space, which UDF – organized as a Right Christian-Democratic party before the last
elections – was trying to fill by gradual adapting of its ideological image and practical
strategies to that space.
After the delay in the processes of inner differentiation and organization in BSP, it
continued the search for its place (after the restructuring) more or less on the Left from
the Center.
Euro-left Party, detached from BSP, won recognition as a left-centrist party, which could
move Left and Right from the center with equal success.
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MRF totally changed its strategy and was trying to represent itself as a national party, and
in negotiations for the local elections it showed political preferences to definitely
nationalist slogans.
Interesting are the claims of IMRO. From its development will depend how this cleavage
will be extrapolated in the political space and what will be the consequences for the
doctrine and political behavior of the big parties.
BBB was slowly going to its drop; their strategy of demonstrative reluctance of
government-cabinet or other coalitions isolated it from the party system.
Significant is the appearance of Movement “Gergiovden”, which is trying to play in the
field of protest vote.
As a whole if we use the categories, characterizing the static character of the party
system, we can define the party structure as multi-party with a dominant party (changing)
51or, using other qualification, as a multi-party system of the big parties (the
categorization includes the cases where big parties receive more than 80% in the
elections, and the small – less than 20%)52. In so structured system it is possible to exist
many small parties, some of which in a certain party configuration could become a
special “third” party, so important for forming a government.
The system is moderately polarized and was extremely polarized in 1990. The
dominating style of inter-party competition is gradually axologically confronting, and
economically pragmatic. The consensus about the Bulgarian membership in EU and
NATO prevented the “Euro-skepticism” and “Euro-optimism” from becoming new
ideological paradigms in the society. The exceptions are the new nationalist parties
(IMRO) and the ethnic pretentions of MRF that will stake on axiological values. The 
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electoral moods will be more and more concentrated around the economical messages,
because of the deteriorating economical situation.
The parties underlie in their strategies a policy that would ensure enough coalition
potential for them, which is a factor for system stabilization.
The system hasn’t finished its structuring and it is possible in its development to allow
some of the new and to marginalize some of the old subjects. It is still early for
categorical prognosis to be given. But according to us the party system will continue its
development in the frames of the moderately polarized multi-party system with a
dominating party.
2.3. The Bulgarian media environment in evolution process
2.3.1.Institutional frame
The introduction, or to be more precise, the revival of the multi-party system in Bulgaria
inevitably gave its reflection on the changes in media life. One of the first decisions of
the National Assembly in 1990 was to close one of the most powerful institutions for
ideological influence created by BCP - The Committee for Television and Radio. Two
new media institutions were created - The Bulgarian National Television and the
Bulgarian National Radio. In December 1990 the National Assembly adopted a document
entitled “Fundamental principles for the temporary status of BNT and BNR”. This
document constitutes the first attempt for reg lamenting the activity of both national
media institutions, which nevertheless stays far away from the idea of mass media. Both
institutions are controlled by the Parliament Committee for Radio and Television, which
appoints their General Directors. This temporary status continued to be in effect till
13.09.1996. 
In February 1990 the Round Table between the representatives of the Communist party
and the opposition an agreement has been reached for the issuance of newspapers of the 
60
newly emerged parties and democratic formations. The first newspaper to come out was
the one of the Union of Democratic Forces - “Democracy”. Right after it there had
emerged the newspapers ‘Svoboden Narod” /BSDP/, “Podkrepa” etc. 
The first private media in Bulgaria emerged in one form or another under the
guardianship of the State. The emergence of the press group “168 hours” was related to
the granting of huge credits, which were remitted later on by the state to the owners of the
group. During the period 90-91 the former syndicate body “Trud” turned gradually to the
private group “Media Holding” - owned by outstanding journalists from the former
management of the newspaper and syndicate leaders. In 1991 two other national
newspapers emerged “Standard” and “Continent”. From 1992 started to be published
“Wirtschaftsblatt” - the first German language newspaper in the entire Eastern Europe. In
1992 by decision of the parliament committee for radio and television together with the
committee for Posts and Telecommunications a state body was established “Temporary
council for radiofrequencies and television channels”. After approving a concept and a
program schedule the new council granted licenses for the broadcasting of the first
private radio stations that had been restricted on a territorial principle. The first private
radio station in Bulgaria started broadcasting in October 1992 in Sofia. A few months
later in the capital started broadcasting the radio stations “Express”, “Tangra”, “Vitosha”,
“Darik”, etc. In Plovdiv started running “Kanal Kom”. During the period 1992 -1995 the
Temporary Council issued licenses to several dozens of private radio stations and some
regional TV companies. In the summer of 1993 radio “Express” was awarded the bid for
national frequency, but a national private television has not been licensed till the present
moment. 
During the time of the socialist reign of Jan Videnov the first media law has been adopted
and therefore it has been established the first open attempt for exerting control upon the
media.  
It was closed the Temporary Council and a state body to the KPD “Hudojestveno-
Tvortcheski otzenki” was created. By this act it has been stopped for two years the
issuance of licenses for private electronic media and a new more complex bureaucratic
procedure is implemented concerning the grant of concessions to the electronic media. 
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Only with the votes of the socialist majority in 1996 the Law for the Radio and
Television was adopted, the first law attempting to reg lament the media space in
Bulgaria. There is a strong counteraction against this law since through it the socialists
govern directly the electronic media. The law has been passed back for further
consideration by the President and upon the request of the opposition the Constitutional
Court rejects sixteen texts. 
In contrast to Poland, Czech republic and Hungary where foreign investments in the
media entered early in 89-90 in Bulgaria they enter scarcely in 1993 when the Swiss
group “Riugie” issued the business weekly “Cash”. This first manifestation of foreign
interest has been followed in the same year by the purchase of the main lot of Radio
“FM+” by the British company GWR. Nevertheless, the biggest investment amounting to
50 million DM was made by the German Newspaper Group WAZ, which in the summer
of 1996 purchased the press group “168 hours”, and in February 1997 - the newspaper
“Trud” Due to this reason the group acquired 80% from the daily newspapers market in
Bulgaria and 41.7% from the entire advertising market. By this act WAZ fall under the
blows of the antitrust legislation and the Committee for Competition Protection. Some of
the decisions are at the moment brought about in court and in the nearest months it is
expected the decision of court concerning the deal of WAZ with the newspaper “Trud”. 
In November 1997 the majority of the United Democratic Forces adopted in the
Parliament amendments of the texts of the media law of the socialists in the rejected parts
by the constitution Court aiming at the faster election of a National Media Council for
Radio and Television. The council has been elected at the end of the year and in January
1998 there was elected a General Director of BNT and BNR. At the same time the
governing majority adopted a new media law. In the summer of 1999 new National
Council for Radio and Television was elected. And in 1999 there has been opened a
procedure for issuing licenses of a national private television. 
This is, in general, the chronological and institutional frame in which the changes in the
Bulgarian media space evolve. 
2.3.2.The assumptions of change
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The evolution in the media environment of one democratising country, as it could be
supposed, nevertheless the suspects in the truthfulness of the process, supposes
reintegration in the information filed of tabooed by the censure, pressured out of the
sphere of official publicity zones and intensification of information processes and
interactions, free of restrictions, scheme. Indeed, the intensification itself means mostly
intensification of the deideologization and supposes the cancellation of limitations and
prohibitions, as well as of all into information article as well as its immediate inclusion in
the flow of information consumption. The real subject of this intensification is the
necessity of information, free of restrictions, but its guarantees and rights originate from
the democratic law to be informed, but also to be source of information. 
The Bulgarian media environment before the changes was ideologically stagnated and
represented one imposed acting mechanism for defecting each potential information into
restricted set of ideological applications, once again confirming the communist content,
which was limitless and maniacal in its pretensions of historic mission. This obligatory
set of ideological applications, which did not rejected its consideration, was inevitable, as
its absence automatically render the statute of event and message of whatever piece of
news and disqualified it to informational disabled value. The message of newly
constructed supermarket, we could say, was burdened by the impression of exclusively
successful policy of party, taking care of people’s welfare and thus adding another
reasoning to the numberless evidence for her leading role. It could be said that almost
none new existed concerning this point de vue. These, who emitted such pieces of news,
cared only about the stoned ideological dimensions, but the beneficients have developed
protection mechanism to avoid excess message mass and bring it to any defined
minimum. Of course, there were messages, in which such a minimum lacked – the party
issued the consecutive signal for its unbelievable gains.
The information volume was tied by the ideological imposture and planned production of
unreality, through processing of messages into medium of ideological substances, having
their own value solely on the stock exchange of communist bien-étre. The impression that
the political change in its reflexes of information level shall appear and reconstruct in
considered attitude of the prospective messages and enclosed ideological values, which 
are inevitable.
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In the Bulgarian media environment immediately after the changes the illusion for
absolute immediacy of messages existed and was stimulated. The rejection of obligatory
markers of party saint, solely through the elimination of rational content of message,
supported the enthusiasm of false, free of ideological fill immediacy. Not implying that
the events have no liable to deprivation and redirecting power of immediate influence,
but the establishment and taking into consideration with it is complex phenomena, which
is not obligatory related to explosive public evolution and illusions, created by
themselves. 
2.3.2.1.Chronology of change. Pure message
Indeed one of the protests against the communist regime, immediately before the change,
referred to the media curtain, imposed by the authority because of the pollution and
radiation, resulting from the Tchernobil’s accident. No one found appropriate to inform
the people about the relevant protection measures in a situation of intensified radiation.
Later one, it was proved, that the communist elite during this period has eaten imported
vegetables and drunken cautiously imported mineral water. The protest against the
information rideau implied the right for pure messages, beyond the ideological reasoning
– we have been radiated, it has happened, but hidden from us. Nevertheless the
grounding, the actually happened event should not be screened.
Behind the rejection of the first socialist president after the changes – Petar Mladenov,
again a media scandal was situated: an audiocassette, which evidenced the president’s
words “Let the tanks come”, observing the effervescence around the parliament’s house,
caused by the party’s invulnerability to cancel the article in the constitution, stating its
leading role. The recording was a pure message.
The first media acquirement, encompassing the change, was the incorporation of multi-
party press – it, comme dit, sanctioned the difference in the political platforms of
multiplied political subjects. Appearing on place, carefully and jealously reserved solely
for the party-mastodon; they naturally were condemned to message similarity, originating
from its common hate of communist ideology. The party authority of communist party, 
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named hereinafter as socialist, discretely changed its name; the rather endangering,
proletarian “Workers’ affairs” was renamed to the shiny “Word”, which proclaimed the
return to the moderate basis of social democracy. Only one episode of the mimicries of
the party in the new conditions. “Democracy” newspaper appeared as a body of the
Democratic Forces Union. As the socialistic newspaper characterized the change in the
light of one innocent internal-party necessity of return to the untouched, stable grounds of
its own ideology and willingly used artificial phraseology, while the democratic forces
deemed as nihilists, revisionists and even fascists, appositely the newspaper, which has
chosen the profound democratic name, provided abundant information concerning the
criminal activity of the communist regime. It also published a map, on which the places
of the communist concentration camps were marked by sculls and bones. Both
information sources contested in their mutual exposures and self-powered by the
irreconcilability of own extreme objects against each other. Their followers read them
absolutely separately, although one certain group was formed, which read both for
additional eager – it sought the stereophonic effect of comparing the unconditional
democratic truth with the unconditional communist lie. It is strange that the
recommendation-requirement “The whole truth for things!” existed in the media
environment as if the whole truth was bearable for us or at least it could be said in the
sphere of dailies or TV-news. In fact this truth was implemented in peace of arts and
publications long ago the communist regime collapse, it was also declared by the
Bulgarian emigration abroad, even more not in the shape of ideologically imposed
finding long before collapsing of the regime.  (This increased more our puzzling why
after the changes exactly the “Fascism” of the Jelio Jelev was deemed to reveal this truth
concerning the communist regime.) It was also strange that this truth was not sought in
the form of one positive political formula, giving sense to the change. Thus in the sphere
of ideological rivalry the full mirroring of the ideological phraseologies was achieved, as
omitting at a whole the possibility of change is wasted in negative reproduction of failing
ideology, which continued to possess and its seemingly rejecting transcriptions. This was
communism in its most pure form, in its most perfidy look, this, which transfers the evil
into ominousness, looking from everywhere.
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Till now we remain in the sphere of ideologically unconditional, where, indeed,
unfortunately, the change absented.
During the same period the publications of press group “168 hours” – “24 hours” and
“168 hours” appeared, in which the risk of one information strategy on a larger scale was
undertaken. Nevertheless its properties, it was confirmed consequently and not evidently
was copied by “Democracy” as well as by “Labour” newspaper, also by the more
moderate and exquisite newspaper – “Standard”. We should precise here that the
mentioned herein above dailies did not state exactly their left, right or central position. 
And if the party issues observe certain quota of one relevant to the political engagement
eventfulness and reflect it with special notability, vice versa the free daily, or the
proclaiming as such, is promiscuitetive concerning the events, from which it lives and
which, consuming, terminates. The peripeteias of regime liberalization were naturally the
most general flow of stupefying eventfulness, but not this was the innovation. The
innovation consisted of one special tone of familiarity, which not only came to substitute
the ominous official tone of press of the communist regime with its solemn all
knowingness heroic pathos, but also realized one not very pleasant Bulgarian familiarity
affiliation and vulgar discussion without distance.
Actual piece of news and context.
In situation of quick and rather easy alternation of some ideological clichés with other
ones, for which change all sorts of precondition existed.
The very first substrate of these was this of radical anticommunism; its mastering was so
easy that many former party members malpractice as presenting themselves regime
enemies and raised new claim for power acquisition. Considerably more later, scarcely
after the rejection of the Videnov’s cabinet, the clichés for Euro integration and intentions
for NATO’s membership came, which although being grounded and strategic, reached a
degree of ideological formalizing and positive unconditionally, which made them in
senseless charms, but also in ambiguous axiomatic of new authority. Beyond this
legitimacy of new political elite axiomatic, requiring relevant considerations and which
on its transformation in a piece of news on the information tender maintained
unreasonable high price through dummies and credits, came out of the blend of
encompassing information material, which is self-destructive by its simultaneous 
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presentation. Here in the initial phase of democracy triumphed the former censored,
which was not admitted in the media environment and relatively inevitable quick
depreciation, because of superficial interest introducing it into the filed.
2.3.2.2.Media matière of past
At first the shameful secrets of former regime were used – this, which till this moment
only the gossip could touch, then was discussed with pornographic circumstantiality –
family of Jivkov, mysterious death of his daughter, known by its fatal passion for
jewellery of royal family, Danovism and frequent voyages to Paris; the exploits of his
son, the socialistic playboy, always creating the impression of certain insanity, spoiled
grand daughter with her shocking expression of unmeaning face and frequent travelling
to the basic printing-office for communist money Vienna and her new image of designer,
the residences of communist elite, its thefts and malfeasance The son-in-law Slavkov (the
present Member of The International  Olympic Committee and  chairman of the
Bulgarian   Football Union ) and his exploits and all this was mixed in one low quality
blend of respect to the former authority, to their present money and revanchism desire,
which was satisfied only on the level of one common publicity. Last, strangely why the
loving-nostalgic glance concerning the weaknesses and curvatures of the so called
“peoples authority”, in which the Bulgarian character was self-acknowledging in terms of
peoples psychology and even melting by this self-acknowledging.
After this popular song the attract of formerly prohibited for mentioning came, besides
the categories of judged, bourgeois past, third Bulgarian kingdom. Some journalists
specialized in hard breaking stories concerning former bankers, who have presented to
their mistresses ermine coats, for the bon viant prince Kiril, for the favourite maid of tsar
Boris, from who she allegedly has three children, for the homosexualism of the old tsar
Ferdinand, for the success of the business of the exile tsar Simeon and all sorts of idle
chatter. The strange thing is that all these “pieces of news”, the pieces of new as such,
were represented in participle voice, as if flown by the gossip and so attracting the reader,
creating the false impression for easy access, lack of distance, approximation as well as
relevant portion of mystery and shininess. The common misery was impressed, with the 
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devil blink of most fascinating collective image of Bulgarian character – Bai Ganio: you
can see, the things are as follows, not especially elevated. 
These tematizations from the past certified the languished and perverse interest
concerning the Bulgarian past and Bulgarian idea and impossibility for giving new
meaning in the context of change.
2.3.2.3.Advertising images of freedom
Because of the immense depreciation and malpractice of this topic and because of the big
integration of intellectuals and lecturers in the university, which were forced to write
articles against remuneration in newspapers, there indeed appeared not rarely an
extraordinary elegant and profound materials concerning our most modern history and
this of the kingdom. It could be admitted that the turbid flow, which encompassed them,
did not allow the encountering of quality differences. But it is almost inquisitive
certificate of ironic turnings, enabling this freedom, for which these have not reminded,
loudly proclaiming the external freedom. 
Indeed such as this it was consumed in huge quantities in the Bulgarian media
environment. The pornographic and criminal were celebrated as the biggest sensation.
But the real biggest sensation was the false of changes.
2.3.2.4.The failure of changes as media article
Because the changes issued one direction of unreality, of simulation, it was also liable to
presentation in the form of messages and consumed with great appetite. The false of
changes – real challenge of each journalism – the changes as conducted spectacle of
changes, which hides the efforts of communist elite to maintain its former positions. The
changes as sentenced to failure, in a permanent blackmail, executed by the secret services
of former party, which digs underneath the possibility to be legitimated as a subject of
political change through hinted dossiers, through former membership in the party,
through the “dark” sides of the private everyday life of the self-pronouncing decedents, 
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who suddenly proved to be paedophiliac or drug abusers, through the camouflage parties,
depriving the electorate and at least the difficulty of change itself, creating inevitable
nostalgia for communist past. After that other preconditions followed – some any Yalta
Conference, which decided for us to remain in the field of influence of former USSR, any
sanitary zone, in which our country belonged and which protected the West countries
from the disintegration and infections of East etc. Naturally all about the machinations of
old regime could not be known nor about the cynicism of post-war Europe. It was
possible something to be learned and a possible image for assumptions to be composed.
But as it is proved that out media environment could not bear and do not retain in
circulation anything, which could be pure message and which should have discipline to
protect from preliminary conclusions and speculations.
After the euphoria of terminating the relations with the former Soviet Union followed by
the dysphoria of West countries caution to integrate them to its own structures,
meanwhile absolutely grounded. Appeared, again remaining invisible, but clear capacity
of political infantility, of dependency, of lack of project, of one even in the Jivkov’s
époque hypertrophied inclination to useless discussions of this, which shall not be made,
of conceptions, which shall remain only on paper, of bad scientific activity, developed the
stiff upper lip fruitless closeness because of impossibility of application. But even at the
first years of change the certain inclination for forecasting the future was clear, while the
inertia force of change was depreciated and ambitious of one marked communist
sociology, as a consequence only on the statistic probing one could count on, combined
with the “immediate” reliability of media. 
2.3.2.5.Positions unclearness
In due course of this ill-fated fatal predetermination of Bulgarian changes, in which all
was demonised in one fearful ambiguity and even double-facing, the media registered the
strange effect of positions unclearness. This way, till the presence of ideological fire of
decedents with the followers of old regime, occupying the whole media environment, it
was proved that the communist has exported huge capital amounts in foreign banks and
all sorts of possibilities came out for their return through dummies and “foreign” 
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companies. I.e. the communist authority was transformed into anonymous economic
relations. This sentenced the Bulgarian decedents and at a whole the enemies of
communist regime to become mill-clacks, which noise did not certified nothing but
political weakness. Meanwhile, at this time only a few newspapers gave detailed
information concerning the reformulations of communist authority into economic one.
This was the first turnover.
After that the disappointment of corruption of new “elites” came out. But it was a
disappointment, mixed with content, because the processes of positioning of one state
system on rational and stable basis, was much more alienated for the common Bulgarian
person, than the sujet of illegal theft, of the human weakness, of the sense that the things
have not been so elevated, but rather simple – in confused times you should steal what
you could. I would rather think that the media environment did not differentiate the
statement that this criminal plot would not be possible, or would not be so desperately
prevailing, if in Bulgaria did exist a political elite, grounding on and one welfare, on
which it has sufficiently been accustomed in order to be protected from the excesses of
wasteful practices. Such a statement could not be differentiated concerning the execution
of power. At a whole the lack of aristocracy in Bulgaria and the almost entire termination
of entire Bulgarian bourgeois by the communist regime was proved crucial for Bulgaria
even in the light of modern events and implied the seal of plebation and low quality of
political intentions.
In the media environment event the most sad finding concerning the rather unsteady
carrying out of Bulgarian reforms was not differentiated – they were inert, without
conception and Bulgarian project as well as the followers made career, for which the
unconditional requirement for membership in the party was substituted by the
phraseology of democracy, of Euro Atlantic values and these of the Poparov’s open
society. Not little part of these having reached ministerial positions and diplomatic
careers in the first non-communist government after the changes remained in America or
denied to arrive from those pleasant and serene countries such as Sweden and Belgium.
The conclusions that may be drawn are two - that the positions have been used as
trampoline for the remaining in these countries or that the convincement in the failure of 
70
the reform has lead to the decision for termination of the political engagements: but both
conclusions lead us solely to the sphere of huge political resignation. 
2.3.2.6.The fault start of the reform and its information indemnity
The unperformed reforms grew into an endless discussion, a strange media travesty of the
Bulgarian parliament life. But if the same sight of futile parliamentarism and false
political activity before the war had lead to some coups d’etat and Tsar Boris to come to
the decision for establishing a personal regime and termination of the rights of the
parliament some time before The Second World War, now it proved to be impossible.
The illusion for parliamentarism has blocked the possibility for decision. It only remains
the possibility for endless discussions in which one can smell the ruin of the ideology of
pluralism. 
The media image of this replacement of reform may be caught in this, with which this
basic information flow of unsatisfaction has been added. The newspapers with their
structure of daily news give a very precise diagnosis. The newspapers as it is well known,
give a leading news, the accompanying comments, a pack of other information pieces,
distributed in editorial columns - sport, culture, economy, commercial additives,
advertisements, introducing the vast sphere of the seeking publicity private, inquisitive
peeping in more marginal themes, directed by exclusively actual interest, a little bit of
astrology, puzzles, the compulsory picture of a naked woman of the last but one page,
and eventually a feuilleton - the journalese version of literaturity. All this constitutes a
daily information picture of the world in motion, without substance, distance, and
resistance, structuring of actual in twenty or so pages with a full illusion for immediacy
and truthfulness 
This so consolidates structure, within some variations typical for all newspapers, and as
an information pack is an image of communicativity, and as far as the single message is
concerned, that is an accompanying value, relationship of potentially genuine message
and its possible cognitive representations in the media space. The daily newspapers
present approximately one and the same news, which are derived by the way from one
and the same information agencies.
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2.3.2.7.Configuration of daily newspapers 
The newspaper “24 hours” was a leading newspaper, the most read one, the most
provocative, which had it own even though questionable stylistics One may definitely
affirm that it was the fastest one to react towards unpredicted events, to which it
dedicated extra issues, foulletons and appendices. Its atractivity was undoubtful. The
newspaper “Standard” was considered more exquisite and calm. Here was formed the
journalistic core with very strong activities, which later on turned to Radio “Free
Europe”, the newspaper “Capital” and BNT.  Sometimes an underlined exquisiteness
however is considered very boring. The newspaper “Trud” with its daily, night and
yellow variants /”Daily Trud”, “Night Trud”, “Yellow Trud”/ was definitely
pornographic. This by the criteria of the modern Bulgarian journalism is presented to be
the true news telling. There was no disgusting news for crime, or a terrible picture of a
car accident, splashed blood and crashed bodies, which “Trud” to show with a cynical
satisfaction; this rouse its total print. Generally speaking, that was the disposition before
the buyers of “24 hours” and “Trud” by the German group WAZ. It froze and
standardized the already found consolidated structure of “24 hours” and poses it as a
model for “Trud”. Both newspapers suspiciously resembled each other already. As far as
“Standard” is concerned it lowered the guard. ”Trud” retained its rich pornographic
palette before the time of the German group. The old core of the press group “168 hours”
went in the newspaper “Monitor”, but this was merely the same newspaper. Now the
Bulgarian newspapers are embraced by the pathos of professionalism, often so elevated
and nuisance, and by the false pathos of unconditional news. 
2.3.2.8.Vulgarisation of media language 
What characterizes the language aspect of media message is a particular, stylised
vulgarisation of Bulgarian language, perceived euphorically as a drop off of ideological
restrictions. This is stylistics of the waste, of consuming the profaned and turned to 
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exoticism signs of bourgeois Bulgaria, of the populist jivkovistko-monumental
sentimentality.
In fact Bulgaria always lacked conditions for simplicity of message. It is invariably
accompanied by following ideological values to an extent of unrecognition. The growing
lack of public society is an explanation either. They like the notorious democratic virtue
remained in the sphere of wishes. Their information message has been displaced by from
their ideological instrumentalization as well as by a primary suspiciousness.
2.3.3.The situation in the electronic media 
If the newspapers explicated a scheme, which was affirmatively approved after their sale,
in the electronic media this sanction was announced through the establishment of a media
council. This could mean nothing else but return of censor as an observance of an
information policy ordered by the authority. But if the newspapers experimented
however, BNT and BNR were monumentally stable in their jivkovist boredom. On the
account of this and in a very suspicious balance the private radios and televisions threw
up entertainment programs, show, music, porno in quantities that one could never bear
within the frames of one human life. Only the popularity of the New Television leads
BNT to a weak attempt for copying the programs and schemes. If some program due to
an attractive openness and touching vulnerable items for the authority was thrown out
from BNT, grounding of course on its aesthetic incompleteness and legendary lack of
professionalism, it quickly appeared on the broadcast in some of the private, with
increased spectatibility, withholding from the prohibition enclosed. The reverse way was
not possible. It was very strange also, that merely all publicistic items, for which the
touching of political issues was not mandatory did that with great diligence: this way a
notification was given for loyal readiness for participation in the authority, which fourth
line, as they say, are just the media. After the changes BNT was a breeding-place for
governmental speakers, image-makers. With the due extent of conformism and
demagogy. Thus the National Television, which in the dawn of changes was merely
always besieged by people protesting again its information policy proved to be practically
unchangeable Here the authority economically disposed on the purely political perimeter 
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and in the other aspect wished to reserve the status. Which was at that moment very
convenient. As far as the television broadcasting of election campaigns and reports about
the legislative activity of parliament is concerned, a quote of BNT, they turned into a
political show, which amuses the entire nation, but in fact is very sad indeed. 
The Bulgarian National Radio did not undergo great changes. But stressing on the
sensitive updating of its best traditions, today it is almost worth hearing (which is
definitely surprising at his present ungifted management) in contrast to many private
radio stations, which broadcastings are very hysterical and infantile. A pleasant surprise
for the Bulgarian radio-ether are the broadcastings of Radio “Free Europe”, which
alternates its information blocks with the program of “Classic FM” Radio. The
combination of objective and calm voice of news and analyses, avoiding unnecessary
sensation with the ever lasting values of great European symphonic music ever
suggesting the one most precious in the European cultural space, which thanks God, is
not subdued to change, even at its touch with the media. In fact this is the most valuable
suggestion in the context of Bulgarian change - that no change is to be beneficial if one
does not know that ought to stay unchanged. 
2.3.4. Media and power. The power of media
As I already mentioned the fall of the Jivkov regime had its media correlation - the media
eclipse, imposed over the ecological problems. Naturally this was not the basic impulse
driving the changes, but gave the undoubtful signal for a very similar situation for
impossibility for complete control upon the media and bringing the authority into
compliance with their power. 
A media scandal brought down the Minister of Interior in the cabinet of Jean Videnov,
who was pictured by an energetic journalist TV-reporter to have fun in a beauty contest
in very improper moment. The Minister tried very awkwardly to dodge the cameras,
which made the scene even more comic. The picture was enough, as was the cassette tape
with the notorious phrase of Petar Mladenov, for the falling of the Minister. And for the
rise of the heroic journalist, who was included in the journalist group accredited to the
Council of Ministers and the President for the official announcement of their activity. 
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The media established their power - for an irrefutable exhibition of hidden truth or, the
boundary is hardly visible, for chantage through cassette tapes, records of events, lists
and dossiers, inconvenient pictures...
A true triumph of the power of media, as well as their very doubtful “serving” was the
falling of the cabinet of Jan Videnov, whose unceremoniousness with regard to the media
was inimitable. The siege of the Parliament, caused this long expected resignation, was
an event which was not to be expected to be broadcasted officially The whole event was
broadcasted in life by the private radio “Darik”, which ceased its regular program and
mixed the reports for the event with blitz-comments and suitable music. The events took
place in the capital and the news for them lead to similar unrest in the country. A part of
the people protesting before the parliament, equipped headphones and mobile radio
apparatuses followed this first attempt for media reflection of unrest. Other part from the
protesting fidgeted between the Parliament and the nearest television monitor to see how
the events were reported. Due to the official impossibility of BNT to report the events on
a market based principle its employees photographed in private with amateur cameras.
There, where ended the official prohibition for reporting began the market freedom and
risk to photograph and sale one information product. The television panel of the National
Television in the Parliament, who together with the siege deputies was unable to leave
the building, very unofficially photographed the chaos inside, the influx of protesting
men, the fire, the low-spirited socialists, very scared, even the chief of the media
committee of the socialists in the Parliament, who unknown why had began to sing with
her party fellows Bulgarian national revival songs. Later on it was constructed a film
from the various materials, which was something like a television epopee - a hit of the
“revolution”, like the famous Delacrois picture with the slight difference that the freedom
here do not wave a flag but carries a television camera in hands. This film was a court
witness for the socialist government and police having loosed their nerves, and beaten
some of the protesting. The audio and visual material was used in any way for the falling
of the socialist cabinet. 
The protests were entirely justified but it was merely not noticed how in the progress of
events the media report displaced the event itself, how the protesting very suspiciously
rolled around and popped in front of the cameras because the more important than the 
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event was its media reporting and the successive use of the ready media article. In fact
the authority has ever flirted with the media and complied with their power only in the
moment of its establishment. But it often rejected their right to report when it grew
stronger and stable and denied the possibility for pure information. It is inevitable to
some extent but should be kept within the limits of political and information culture. For
example, the Ministry of Ecology to the last cabinet, having replaced the one of Jan
Videnov, discretely retained to give information about the pollution and radiation from
the NATO bombings in the former Yugoslavia. As it stood behind the NATO’s actions, it
was considered that we should calmly accept the radiation dose since our membership in
the CMEA in the past urged us to keep silence about the accident in Chernobyl. Now it is
not the event that causes the news but vice versa...
As a powerful factor for public opinion formation and creating definite adjustment and
value ideas in the widest social strata, the medias exert significant influence on the
political culture. On the other hand they are still to some extent a reflection of its level
and stage of development.
2.4. Political Culture
By “political culture” we understand the system of accepted and anticipated political
values, predominant in certain society in a determined phase of its development. This
category concerns fundamental, deeply rooted values, which are decisive in the
estimation of the way the citizens get on and follow the rules of the political game. The
politic culture is a conservative phenomena and its acceptation by the society demands a
long time.
According to the researchers of the Bulgarian political culture, one of the historical
characteristic features of Bulgarian society is the indifference of public consciousness to
politics. They are looking for the roots of the division between politicized and apolitical
part of Bulgarian society in “the very base of the modern political life in the country”53.
                                           
53 Тодоров, А. Политическата култура в модерна България, 1993 г., стр. 8-16
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The political history connected with the destruction of the opposition   and the repression
over its members in 1994-1997 also gives its contribution to the formation of the civil
political culture.
Another peculiarity of the Bulgarian political culture is its deep anti-party character, a
fact that is in the base of the reinforced electoral mobility, accompanying the electoral
processes from the very beginning of the century. Totalitarian heritage inserts new
negative connotations in the term “party”. The painful transformation of the opposition
conglomerate UDF into party is connected to this cultural phenomenon.
It is difficult for the bulk of the electors to express their economical interests and to orient
rationally their behavior in accordance with them.
That’s not an obstacle for existing of valuable divisions in the society on the axis left-
right and for their being a motive for political behavior.
In November 1990 was made a sociological research by the Center for Analyses and
Innovations, trying to catch the politicizing tendencies in the society. The results of the
research permit the differentiation of three groups of opinions: the apolitical, the
politicized followers of UDF and the politicized followers of BSP. A confrontation model
of political culture can be observed, which connects the political opponent with the image
of the enemy.
Another research of the Center of Analyses and Innovations conducted in May1991
showed more clear differentiation of the groups concerning their valuable orientations on
the axis left-right in connection with social-economic values. On one side is the group
that accepts the ideas connected with the denying of the old, the acceptation of the private
property priority, and state withdrawal from the economy. These values are connected to
the wish for bigger activity and individual values priority. On the other side is
differentiated the homogeneous majority supporting typically left values: state regulation
of the economy, equality, control over the prices, unreligiousness, rejection of private 
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property. The opinions are divided in two groups – apolitical, left and right. In other
words on the ideological level we can talk about the existence of opposing between right
and left.
The two main parties in Bulgaria – BSP and UDF are identified not as social-economic
communities, but as separate cultures. BSP shares common values, common memories
for the past. The main body of this culture was built by old people, who remember the
anti-fascist past. For them the democratic changes are symbol of restoration of pre-war
political regime. The political contradiction is understood by this group in the light of the
fight against the restoration of fascism.
The UDF culture is structured around a common negative memory of the communism.
The key identification of this group is the term “communism”.
Thus the main contradictions and structuring in the political space are made on the base
of valuable adjustments, not of social-economic divisions.
The electoral behavior of the followers of MRF is also structured by ethnic-cultural
values. All the moves, respectively all the coalitions of the movement elite in the political
space (from the right, through the left and liberal), do not cause significant shakings
among the electorate, which considers MRF for a political presence of the ethos, no for
representor of the economic interests.
The predominating city electorate of the Agrarian parties is once again a sign for
ideological-valuable, not for economic interpretation. In independent representation
BAPU “e” receives 48% of its total votes in the cities. And the half of the votes of BAPU
“Nikola Petkov” (47%) is also from the cities. In this frame is also inserted the strong
position of BSP in the countryside.
We think that so formed ideological-valuable adjustment for election behavior hampers
the structuring of the social-democratic space.
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2.5. Demographic Development of the Present Bulgarian Society
2.5.1. Natural development of the population
Tracing back the demographic development in Bulgaria since the beginning of our
Century till now we can say that Bulgaria goes through the three stages of the
demographic transition pretty fast.
It is estimated that this process has last for about 60-65 years, when in most of the
European countries it has taken centuries. Since the beginning of the 90-es Bulgaria
directly started the forth stage of the depopulation. This process started in 70-es and was
growing until 1997. Thus in 1990 it is 3.4 thousand people, which is 0.4 per thousand. In
1991 it is growing deeper and goes over 14 thousand people, which is 1.7 per thousand.
In 1993 it is 2.9 per thousand, in 1994 - 3.8 per thousand, 1995 – 5 per thousand, 1996 -
5.4 per thousand, 1997 - 7 per thousand. Obviously this is a process of a deepening
depopulation which in absolute figures for 1997 is estimated to 57 thousands people.
During the last year for which we have information - 1998 - is reported a slight decrease
of the depopulation -53 thousand people or 6.4 per thousand. No doubt, this process of
depopulation decreases to keep going, but we are still far away from its overcoming for
reaching an effective reproduction. The absolute measure of depopulation for the period
1990-1998 is estimated to 292 thousands people. The depopulation in our country is due
to the natality decrease and the growing of the mortality.
2.5.2.Natality of the population
For the whole period after the Liberation for which we have population statistics, even
during the wars, neither the absolute nor the relative natality measures have been so low
and this would reflect over the forming of the manpower. Thus in 1991 the births are
about 105 thousands and the natality is 12.1 per thousand. In 1994 the births are 79
thousands and the natality is 9.4 per thousand, in 1997 the natality is 7.7 per thousand. 
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For 1998 is reported a slight increase of the natality which reaches 7.9 per thousand.
There are periods in our demographic development especially after the World War I
when the births have been over 200 thousands or three times more then now and in 1974-
1977 – 140 thousand or 2 times more. With this low natality level Bulgaria and Lithuania
are on the last place in Europe. When we study the Bulgarian natality through more
precise methods as the total natality factor, which for 1998 is 1.1 children, and through
the neto reproduction factor coming up to 0.54 the conclusion is that we are on a
considerably lower level in comparison with the Nordic countries, France, England etc.
The crucial effect of the socio-economic conditions cannot be denied. The low living
standard, which can be seen mostly in the young families, and the growing expenses for
the children alimony influence over the natality. The increasing unemployment and the
vague perspectives for realization of the youngs also have a bad reflection on the natality.
The policy in its up-to-date shape and especially in its latest purpose for shortening the
holidays of the young mothers for babysitting, the payment restriction and the symbolic
family allowances do not have positive effect over the natality.
Now, when the main goal of our country is its European integration it is necessary to
apprehend the most fitting model for conducting an effective demographic policy. The
most fitting in our conditions is the pronalistic policy, which was led non-stop after the
World War II in many European countries.
2.5.3.Population mortality
In the period after the World War I till the mid 60-es in Bulgaria was achieved a crucial
decrease of the mortality, which from 20 per thousand, and for some periods over 30 per
thousand, goes down to 7.9 per thousand in 1961-1964 – the lowest level in our
demographic history. Although, after the mid 60-es the mortality starts to go up,
especially during the last decade. Thus in 1990 it is 12.5 per thousand, 1994 - 13.2 per
thousand, 1996 - 14.0 per thousand, 1997 - 14.7 per thousand, 1998 - 14.3 per thousand.
The absolute number of the dead people in 1998 is coming up to 118 thousands people or 
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53 thousand more in comparison with 1964. According to the last data published by the
Council of Europe, Bulgaria has the highest mortality rate between the European
countries. Some of the most developed countries like Switzerland and Netherlands show
a level of mortality under 9 per thousand.  The children mortality is relatively high in our
country, which in 1988 was 13.6 per thousand and during the last decade is about 15.17
per thousand.
2.5.4.Average life expectancy
For the period since the beginning of the World War II (1935 – 1939) till the end of the
80-es (1988 – 1990) Bulgaria has achieved an increase of the average life expectancy
with about 20 years, and now for the men it is 68.1years and for the women it is 74.8
years. This is a significant success in the healing of the contagious decease and the
decrease of the children mortality (almost 10 times).
During this period the development of the hospitals net, the growing of the medical
personnel, the new healing methods, the educational improvement of the people and the
free of charge medical support as well, played a positive role for the mortality decreasing
and the growing of the life expectancy.
During the last decade the mortality increasing led to shortening of the average life
expectancy, which according to the figures from the period 1990-1997 is 67.1 years for
the men, or 1 year shorter, and 74.3 years for the women, or half a year shorter. Amongst
the European countries only Bulgaria and some countries in transition like Russia,
Ukraine and Romania show such tendencies. In the most European countries the average
life expectancy is at a level 7 till 9 years longer than in Bulgaria.
2.5.5.Population migration
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A crucial effect over the demographic development during the last decade gave the
migration and most of all the emigration.
The data about the immigration, which for 1997 is estimated to 190 thousands people,
show that we have a slight increase, and the migration from the towns to the villages is 10
thousand people more than the reversed migration. Thus after the urbanization typical for
the 50-es and 60-es we are in the period of disurbanization.
The significant lost of population during the whole period is typical for the Bulgarian
emigration. The period 1911-1926 is an exemption when due to the changes of the
national border refugees from Trakia, Macedonia, West outlying parts and Dobrurja
come to our territory.
The emigration wave is the most intensive after 1989 in the period of the so-called "big
trip". The emigrants leaving to Turkey are coming up to 218 thousands people. In the
next year the emigration wave is going on and accordingly to the National Statistics
Institute 640 thousands people have left the country for the period 1989-1996, including
Bulgarian population heading to Western Europe, USA and Canada. The most
concerning fact is the lost of our intellectual potential.
The basic reasons defining the emigration according to the sociological researches made
in 1991 are: the low living standard - 57.3 %, the growing unemployment - 31,0 %, the
political and economic situation - 28.6 %. We must note the basic meaning of the
production sales narrowing. It determines both the low living standard and the
unemployment which is about 500-600 thousands people annually. These demographic
processes, concerning the natural development and the migration, and leading to
depopulation and growing emigration, determine the decreasing of the manpower and
reflect negatively upon the demographic development, as well as upon the economic and
social processes in the society.
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The analyses of the age composition of the population show that we are in a process of a
rapid aging, or regressive type of age composition, where 33 % of the people are 50 or
over 50 years old. In these circumstances we have a huge demographic pressure, because
every person between 16 and 64 has to maintain a person over and under that age range.
Thus one employed person has to pay for 2.7 disabled or non-working people including
unemployed. In the future the generations included in the manpower will be sparser and
this will have negative effect over natality and the population reproduction.
In conclusion we can summarize that an accelerated process of depopulation produced by
the natality decrease and the growth in the mortality of the population are observed in
period after 1990. To these unfavourable tendencies can be added the emigration of large
contingents of people heading to the developed countries due to social-economic
circumstances. An accelerated aging of the population occurs as well. This leads to an
increase of the demographic and social-economic pressure over the active population. All
these processes form a quite disadvantageous demographic situation in Bulgaria after
1990.
2.5.6.Directions for leading an effective demographic policy
It is necessary without any delay directions for leading an effective demographic policy
for the demographic collapse overwhelming to be organized. 
To be effective the demographic policy must follow the requirements:
To be global - to measure the peculiarities of the life cycles and the social roles of the
family members.
To be complex - to include a set of measures for the demographic problems resolution.
These measures must be in accordance with conditions, factors and social processes
during the transition to market economy.
To be systematic - permanent and taking into consideration the specifics of the transition
to market economy to respond adequately with relevant social measures.
To report on peculiarities of the people considering the social groups that they belong to
and the places they live as well.
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To be created an effective national demographic policy is necessary in accordance with
the international practice and recommendations of the UN Mission working in our
country to be built the needed institutions which to organize and conduct this policy.
A permanent demographic commission under the auspices of the parliament must be
created which has the demographic development and family problems as the main object
of its activity. The coordination of the conducting of the population policy is suggested to
be taken by the Government through a creation of a state agency, which must coordinate
all programs having direct or indirect influence over the population. Informal consultant
group to be created of NGOs experts and scientists who can also give helpful information
and to make rational proposals on the population and family issues.
The work of these institutions must be based on systematic and extensive scientific
researches over the demographic development and the conditions and factors that define
it. This activity is especially helpful now when our country is in a transition and we have
achieved a proposal for negotiations for EU-integration and a number of the old decisions
are unacceptable. On the basis of this researches advisable proposals for new legislation
to be motivated in accordance with the European one and its conduction and coordination
with the help of responsible government and non-government institutions applying the
experience of the developed European countries like Germany, Sweden, Switzerland etc.
2.6. The Change in Minority Policies: The Bulgarian Ethnic Model
The circumstances in South-Eastern Europe and the interference of the Great Powers did
not give chance to the national idea to be realized in a way it was in the rest of the
continent. The borders of the states in this region were drawn along lines, which to a
great extent did not follow the boundaries of the ethnic entities. The fact that in the
Balkan states live many different minorities has lead to many ethnic, sometimes
religiously furnished, conflicts among the countries and inside them. That gave the
notorious fame of the region as the most violent and turbulent part of Europe. The
numerous wars, deportations, migrations, assimilation, expatriation that had taken place
did not change the ethnic diversity in the Balkan states. 
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As it was shown in part 1. in Bulgaria live several ethnic groups. By the mid 80-s the
country was known with the tolerance among them, with the lack of any ethnic tension.
Bulgarians, Turks, Gypsies, Jews, Armenians were well integrated in the society with
equal access to education, jobs, without serious ethnic discrimination. In some cases were
provided privileges for minorities to enter schools and universities, to carry out cultural
activities. But in the 80-s the ruling elite, disturbed by some new tendencies in the
demographic situation, by some attempts the minorities to be used from abroad for
exerting pressure on the regime, has put into practice a ridiculous policy of forcing the
people of the Turkish minority to change their names with Bulgarian ones. It was done
according to an approved by the authorities list of names. Restrictions on circumcisions,
traditional among Muslims, were imposed. The arguments were that the Muslims in
Bulgaria were successors of forcefully converted to Islam Bulgarians during the Turkish
rule. 
This policy could not win large support in society. The greater part of the Bulgarian
Turks opposed it. Their resistance received an internationally organized support. The
Bulgarian authorities opened the border with Turkey in May 1989 and let those who did
not want to change their names immigrate to Turkey.  Almost half a million Muslims left
Bulgaria. Many of them hoped that they will have a chance to immigrate to developed
western countries and that was the real motive to travel to Turkey. There were families,
relying on the support of their relatives on the other side of the border. Many left because
they could not bear the humiliation. Others simply were following the instructions of the
leaders of the resistance. Many of them were disappointed and later returned back to
Bulgaria.
The movement of that huge number of people caused a deep crisis in Bulgaria. Serious
economic difficulties had emerged. The official policy could not gain the support of the
Bulgarian people. The regime had fallen in an international isolation. The brinkmanship
had accelerated its rejection.
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Immediately after the changes on the 10-th of November 1989 the new government
condemned that policy towards the Turkish minority. Gradually the ethnic tension was
decreased. The relationship among the ethnic groups returned to the traditions, formed in
the long period of their co-existence. After the revival of the Bulgarian state there was
witnessed tolerance towards the Turks, who remained to live there. At the beginning of
the 20-th century Bulgaria opened its borders for the persecuted Armenians. During the
World War II Bulgaria was the only country of the Triple Pact, which managed to save
the Jews (50 000) from deportation. Obviously the adventurous attempt, undertaken by
the regime of the last communist dictator in Bulgaria, could not destroy the long lasting
traditions of ethnic and religious tolerance. The Bulgarian ethnic model was outlined
against the conflicts in other parts of South-Eastern Europe. As the Bulgarian president
Petar Stoyanov has put it “the Bulgarian ethnic model is a historic achievement, which is
a product of long living together of different ethnic groups”.54 The leader of the
Movement for Rights and Freedoms, considered as a political party mainly of the Turkish
minority in Bulgaria55, Ahmed Dogan has stressed that the Bulgarian ethnic model is the
best product of the Bulgarian transition, which deserves better international recognition.56
All main political parties in Bulgaria have given their contribution for preventing ethnic
conflicts in the country. Their policy did not give chance for negative influence from the
ethnic conflicts in the region. The Turkish minority was involved in the political process
in the country. In the period 1992-1995 the government of Prof. Berov was formed with
the mandate of that party. It is a policy of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms in the
local authorities where it has overwhelming majority to share the power with other
political parties. The rarely risen nationalistic appeals do not receive large public
response. 
There are difficulties in integrating the Gypsy’s minority in the political life. Their
traditional style of living, the low level of education, the very high percentage of 
                                           
54 “Демокрация” (Democracy daily), 25 October 1999.
55 Besides more and more Bulgarians ask themselves why it does not exist a legal Kurdish party in Turkey
or parties on ethnical basis in Western Europe here there is a compact mass of foreigners. Such parties
would be a perfect example for imitation and would facilitate the functioning of analogical parties on the
Balkans.
56Ahmed Dogan, Statement at a press conference on 16 October 1999.
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unemployment among these people and the related with it criminal activities is one of the
tough challenges faced by the Bulgarian ethnic model. One of the heaviest burdens of the
state is to provide social support for the normally large Gypsy families. This minority
remains isolated from the other ethnic groups. A special advisory body to the Council of
Ministers with Gypsy representatives was established in early 1999, but the results of its
activity are not very optimistic.
An important step towards implementation of the European principles and norms in the
ethnic policy of the political parties was the ratification of the Framework Convention for
the Protection of National Minorities. The preparatory work on this Convention of the
Council of Europe began in 1994, during the Bulgarian chairmanship. The result was a
compromise between two main views on providing protection for the national minorities
- one arguing that the rights of the national minorities can be protected through
guarantees for the individual rights of the people belonging to national minorities, and the
other insisting on providing collective rights for the national minorities. 
As any compromise, the Framework Convention suffers from some defects. For example,
it could not define what is a national minority. That gave room for different
interpretations. There was a public debate in Bulgaria after the president had signed the
Convention on 9 October 1997.  Particularly heated were the discussions in the
Parliament in the early half of 1999, when the Convention was ratified. It seems that the
problem was caused by the pressure, exerted from abroad, for its quick bringing into
effect in Bulgaria. Mainly countries from the European Union, even such that do not
accept the Convention, were insisting on that, some times neglecting the realities and the
achievements in Bulgaria57. The public opinion has got the impression that the
Convention was ratified not in search of norms and devices for improving the relations
between majority and minorities, but to meet the requirements of the countries and 
                                           
57 With a view to the actual events in the political life of Austria and having regarded the reinforcing of
extremely right-wing parties in some Western European countries, we must remark that the problem with
nationalism in Western Europe remains aside of the researchers view. An analysis of the laws for
restricting the access and sojourn of the foreigners, coming from non-EU countries would throw an
interesting light on the question.
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institutions, on which depends the attitude towards the Bulgarian will to join the
European Union. There are some doubts that the Convention is giving better solutions of
minority problems than the Bulgarian ethnic model. It deserves deeper insight,
particularly within the efforts to find solutions of minority problems in other South-
European countries.
2.7. Social and cultural aspects of Bulgaria’s integration into the EU structures
2.7.1.Social and cultural dimensions of Bulgarian transition
The status of Bulgarian culture after 1989 is characterized by a contradictory phenomena
and processes, which cannot be assessed unambiguously. On one hand, the transition
towards democracy and market economy provides a wide range of opportunities for the
development of the artistic culture (freedom of speech, lack of censure, various
opportunities for manifestation and sources of financing). On the other hand Bulgarian
culture suffers strongly from the economic crisis and the mass impoverishment, from the
lack of legislative basis and of clear and consistent strategy for national cultural policy.
During the socialist years this policy was characterized by total centralization in the
administration of the cultural processes. Since 1948 all cultural institutions became state-
owned. A Law of the Cinemafication and the Film industry was passed, which
guaranteed a state monopoly over the distribution of movies. During 1947 a Law of the
Book printing was promulgated; under its provisions all private book printing and
publishing houses were nationalized. The Decree of the Theatres (1949) legitimised only
the state-subsidized theatres with a constant group of actors. Any private initiative in the
sphere of culture was restrained. A Committee for Science, Art and Culture was created
in 1948, which completed the process of centralization in the administration and
financing of culture. The Committee exercised total control upon all areas of cultural life.
The so-called artistic unions, established in each individual art, pursued the same goal.
Culture was transformed into an instrument for achieving political, ideological, social and
propaganda objectives. For this purpose culture should have accessible for all social 
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strata. This was accomplished through artificially sustained low prices of tickets, books,
press and so on and through the establishment of a wide network of cultural institutes
throughout the country (reading-rooms58, theatres and cinemas, ”houses of culture” and
so on). In fact, no free market of art existed.
The changes in 1989 led to new tendencies in the cultural sphere. Deprived of the
ideological charge and stable financial support from the state, culture changed its place in
the social life. Art was liberated from censure and control, especially with respect to
publishing, theatre, production and distribution of movies, radio and TV programs and so
on. New cultural necessities emerged, which led to new directions and forms of
participation in the cultural life (private theatres, galleries, agent houses, producer’s
firms, publishing houses, radio and TV stations; interests towards advertising, show-biz,
fashion and design evolved). The opportunity of the common Bulgarian to access the
heritage and the current achievements of European and world culture was widening. In
this respect the rapprochement of Bulgaria and the EU would play an important role as a
factor for the liberalization of the international cultural exchange and the development of
the up-to-date means of mass communication.
After 1989 as a result of the structural reform in the cultural sphere (privatisation and the
development of the private sector and so on) the quality of performance and the economic
efficiency of some cultural institutes (galleries, publishers, music houses and others)
increased.
A variety of sources of financing in culture and art appeared – sponsorship, donor-ship,
independent associations, foundations and others. ”Open Society” Foundation stands out
among them. This Foundation finances projects on the following programs: ”Plastic
Arts”, ”Cultural Heritage”, ”Theatre”, ”Music and Stage Arts” and “Literature”. It also
awards scholarships and provides technical support. Foundation “St. St. Cyril and 
                                           
58 Reading rooms have a very important significance in Bulgarian culture. These are the Community centers, where
during the Renaissance started the struggles for Bulgarian enlightenment and public education.
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Methodius” sponsors the education of children and youngsters in the country and abroad,
finances concerts and festivals with international participation, theatre and music tours. It
performs publishing activity as well. Foundation “Concept for Theatre” aids the stage
arts. Its activity is directed towards organization and participation in international theatre
forums, seminars and other theatre activities.
Despite all the positive changes, however, the prevailing social and cultural situation in
the transition period is dominated by negative tendencies. As a result of the economic
crisis and other factors, the cultural “consumption” deteriorated in quality and quantity.
There is mass production, import and distribution of low-quality output (in the spheres of
music, literature, cinema, television, press and so on). On one hand, the access of the
public to the valuable peaces of art is limited by the higher prices of tickets, books and so
on. On the other hand a lot of cultural institutions restrict their activities due to constant
lack of funds (theatres, libraries, museums and others).
In spite of the measures, launched by the Government, the piracy in intellectual property
is still a problem in the sphere of culture. The acceptable level of governmental
intervention into the regulation of the market relations into the sphere of culture is not
determined yet. No serious measures are undertaken to counteract the invasion of low-
quality production from abroad and to protect the national art and cultural tradition. The
coordination among the cultural policy and the policies in economics and other spheres of
social life s still problematic (there are no measures for stimulation of investment in
culture, no tax relaxation, no legislative basis and so on)
2.7.2.Cultural industries and cultural consumption
Serious changes in the infrastructure of the cultural institutions and their participation in
the cultural life took place after 1989.The most drastic reorganization occurred in the
sphere of cinema: the cinema halls in the towns decreased in number and in the villages
they were closed because of economic inefficiency. After the privatisation a lot of
cinemas were transformed into commercial and playing centres. Now the variety in the 
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movie repertoire is provided mainly by the American cinema industry. Bulgarian film
production is shrinking – although there are over 160 registered productions, and the film
production companies are over 2059, the number of Bulgarian movies suddenly drops.
This is due to the fact that large part of the producers do not shoot movies, and those who
have working or ready production cannot begin another one because of the low level of
investments.
Number of premiers by nationality60
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Bulgarian 23 22 17 21 20 13 4 7 5 2
Dutch 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
French 9 8 3 7 6 5 21 8 6 6
British 3 2 3 3 2 3 1 0 2 -
Italian 6 5 7 7 3 0 4 2 3 2
Other
European
101 103 108 78 75 35 17 2 6 4
American 7 10 13 14 24 28 99 100 123 118
Other 19 23 13 13 19 6 10 5 2 4
Total 170 175 166 145 151 90 156 124 147 136
After 1989 he movie distribution passed into the hands of private companies, which
number more than 20.Nevertheless, consumption as a whole is decreasing. Although this
tendency is understood as a crisis in the Bulgarian film industry, it is actually a process
off normalization and compliance of culture with the market requirements. (For
comparison: Finland produces 3 movies per year on the average)
                                           
59  Data from the report “Cultural Policy in the Republic of Bulgaria 1990 – 1995”, published 1996.
60 Source: European  Audiovisual Observatory, Statistical Yearbook: Cinema, Television, Video and New
Media in Europe,p.78
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Book publishing adapted quickly to the terms of market. After 1989 the number of
private publishers rose uncontrollably – 1800 in 1998.The number of titles published in
Bulgaria bloomed till 1993,after that it began to decrease slowly. The average circulation
dropped significantly (a typical circulation was around 1000 issues). Now the attention of
the public is focused on the bestsellers and on the popular fiction. There are problems
with the book-distribution, which is taken over by the street vendors, because the state
bookstores vanished. The consumption in the book sector declines, as well mainly due to
the economic reasons – 86.1% of the population does not buy books61 
Data for Bulgarian book printing:
Book-publishing industry
Number of titles published yearly 4880
Number of titles published in Bulgarian 4712
Number of titles published in foreign languages 168
Number of publishers in Bulgaria 1800
Average sojourn of a book in the bookstores 1 to 48 months
Average price of a book 4 BGL
Value added tax 22%
VAT on original Bulgarian, translated and Bulgarian scientific
literature
0%
VAT on other literature 22%
Average price of a book (compared to an average salary) 4%
Total number of book vendors/ in Sofia / in the country 300 / 100 / 200
Number of permanent bookstores 100
Number of ambulant trading tables 500
Number of book exchanges 5
                                           
61  Data: Report of David Kingham “Bulgaria: a book sector in trouble”, p.65, Strasburg, 1998.
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Number of wholesale book vendors 30
The theatres in Bulgaria are in a peculiar situation. During the transition period 10 new
private dramatic theatres appeared. Simultaneously the number of the performances and
the visitors dropped significantly. The negative influence of the economic crisis,
combined with the increasing competition of the cultural industries and mass
communications led to a decline in the number of visitors into all theatres. Similar
changes occurred in the institutional infrastructure of music and its audience.
In recent years the leisure time factor has a strong impact on the cultural consumption. It
is influenced by the demographic crisis as well: the decline in the number and the
increase in the age of the population lead to a decrease in the participants into cultural
processes and to an increase of the people with passive social behaviour and passive
cultural engagement. On the other hand, a positive tendency can be observed – a
pluralisation of the interests, tastes and values of the young people.
2.7.3.Normative basis and legislative preconditions
In view of specific situation in Bulgaria it is necessary to build a normative basis for the
orderly functioning of all the cultural institutes and activities in the frames of the new
market environment. The purpose of he Law for protection and Development of Culture,
passed by the National Assembly in June 1999 is to determine the basic principles for
national cultural policy:
1.Democracy in the development and application of cultural policy
2.Decentralisation in administration and financing of cultural activities
3.Equality of artists and of cultural organizations
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4.Preservation of cultural and historical heritage, preservation of national traditions,
customs and folklore
5.Protection of the national cultural identity and of the culture of the national societies
abroad
6.Encouragement of the cultural variety in preservation of national culture
7.Encouragment for the development of the cultural industry and of the market for
Bulgarian products of art and culture
8.Openness towards the world cultural processes and integration into the European
cultural structures62
Beside the positive tendencies, however, this law has a number of weaknesses – it does
not provide for a stable financial and economic mechanism for supporting arts and
culture; it deals mainly with state subsidies and state structures on different levels (in
contrast with the basic principle of decentralization). No measures are provided for
encouragement of the private investments in culture. The law does not clarify the status
of author, the relationship between economy and culture; it does not address the problems
of the private sector in the sphere of culture, the role of the intermediaries in art (art
dealers, culture managers, agents and so on). The consumers of the cultural product, as
well as the mechanisms for realization of Law’s main goals are not mentioned at all.
These objectives are fundamentally congruent with the tendencies in the current West
European cultural legislature: variety of sources of financing, indirect aid from the state,
variety in the cultural organizations, tax relaxation, control over the import and export of
works of art and culture and so on. The Bulgarian law has mainly a wishing character and
in the future additional legislative acts would be necessary for the achievement of better
results.
                                           
62 Law for Protection and Development of Culture, chapter 1,article 2.
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2.7.4.The effects of integration
The integration of Bulgaria into European Union structures is a political priority for our
state, which increases the significance of our participation in the European cultural
structures and institutions. After the European agreement for association into the EU was
signed on 1 February 1995, the top priority of the Ministry of Culture became the
activities, connected with the cultural integration of Bulgaria into the EU. Pursuing this
goal a department “International Cooperation and European Integration” within the
Ministry was created.
Bulgaria accomplishes this kind of cooperation mostly through association to the cultural
programs of EU and to the “PHARE” program. This process began late in 1994 by the
incorporation of Bulgaria into the “Kaleidoscope” program, which encouraged cultural
and artistic initiative with European participation (such as international festivals “Varna
Summer”, ”Sofia Music Weeks”, International Theatre “Ecofest” in Sliven and so on).
Quite interesting is the “Raphael” program, which supports the efforts for preservation
and popularisation of the cultural and historical heritage of Europe. Under the aegis of
this program financial resources were granted for the restoration of the following
churches: “St. John the Baptist”, ”St.Georgi” in Sofia, the palace of the prince and others.
During 1999 Plovdiv was a capital of the European month of culture.
The inclusion of Bulgaria into the “PHARE” program, which aids the restructuring and
development of the cultural sector, is of great significance. An Euro-Bulgarian Cultural
Centre, which is the focus of cultural cooperation between Bulgaria and EU, has already
been built in Sofia under the aegis of this program. It provides also support for education
and experience exchange in the sphere of cultural administration and management. An
Euro-Bulgarian Foundation for support of arts is in process of formation.
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The integration of Bulgaria into the EU aids directly and indirectly and facilitates the
social and cultural processes of transformation from totalitarian towards democratic and
civil society:
-   Facilitates the integration of Bulgaria into international politics
-   Aids the development of stable and functioning infrastructure in the sphere of current
Bulgarian art and culture.
-   Creates an environment of forbearance and tolerance in regard with the ethnic and
religious minorities; efforts are made towards the integration of the minorities into the
social and cultural life of the country
-   In the sphere of education: affirmation of the European dimensions within the
educational system; reinforcement of the social and cultural integration of the young
people; access to a higher quality education; possibilities for travelling abroad and for
enriching people’s horizons; incorporation of the Bulgarian youth into the European
ideals; development of the community understanding and encouragement for the spirit of
initiative and entrepreneurship.
-   Encourages the decentralization of cultural exchange, the autonomy of Bulgarian
cultural organizations; the public and private initiative in the sphere of culture which
leads to an increase in the number of the participants in the international cultural
cooperation and in the number and variety of the sources of financing.
-   The cultural exchange programs of the EU encourage the artistic creative work; they
are directed towards establishing conditions for development of all traditional and new
spheres and towards creating better living conditions and social respect for the creative
work of the artists.
All these, as well as other, factors make the process of transition possible and ensure
reciprocity and equality for Bulgaria in the international cultural exchange.
2.7.5. The State of Bulgarian Culture
Within the framework of Accession Partnership, Bulgarian culture must adapt to the
requirements for membership in EU in this sphere. Bulgaria has concrete tasks for 
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solving in this direction and especially in setting the legislation in conformity with
European norms.
In addition to already accepted Law for Protection and Development of Culture
(1.6.1999) Bulgaria must urgently harmonize other Laws in force with the European
legislation. Extremely urgent is the alteration of the Media Law, which is reasonably
criticized by the Council of Europe and these evaluation have a reflection on the process
of negotiations for integration with EU. At the back of it all lies the main reason for not
closing the Culture and Media chapter in the negotiations for Bulgaria’s integration with
the EU63.
Bulgaria has started reforms in the cultural sphere. It is confronted with different
problems, which against the background of the deepening economic crisis, become tense,
and this will inevitably have its reflection on the negotiations for integration.
The withdrawal of the state from culture has led to a lack of institutions, which can
control the processes in this very sensitive sphere. In this way, not in the last place, we
cannot show resistance to the works of literature, music, cinema and others, with a
dubious value.
2.8.  Summary
It is absolutely clear for every sober-thinking man that the final goal of all the reforms
held in 90-ties, not only in Bulgaria but also in the other countries in transition, is a
substitution of the established socialist public system with the capitalist one, although this
is rarely mentioned in the press and even more rarely formulated officially as a goal of
the government. The author prefers to call the things the names corresponding to their
contents. By the way clearness of the terms in the sphere of policy as well as in the 
                                           
63 This is one of the two not closed chapters, which are still discussed in the negotiations. In February 2000
6 Chapters were opened for negotiations and in June 2000 4 of them were closed.
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sphere of economy, jurisprudence and culture is for preference. In the human history in
every organized change of the social system what stood out in the foreground was the
overthrowing of the political power, personifying the established social regime. Only
then are the measures on building and establishing the new social regime put on the
agenda.
Every single change of the existing social system has its price in the terms of human
sacrifices, destruction, material resources expenditure and privations for wide social
strata. This price depends on the methods of holding the change (revolutionary or reform)
and on the level of political and common culture of a nation. In the long run it is not
possible to give a synonymous evaluation of the changes in the demographic sphere,
culture, political thinking and party life in Bulgaria only ten years after the beginning of
the transition. Although there exists increasing social differentiation, and the term
“middle class” is in danger to be left in the history, the effectiveness of the transition
should not be reduced only to the sphere of the material situation of the bulk of the
population at the moment. Even for the single reason that the self-confidence of a citizen
is different under a dictatorship of an authoritarian regime and under the conditions of
democracy, although it defies quantitative measurements and can be notified only in
common order. 
The access to some cultural institutions such as cinema and theatre is on one hand limited
by the relatively high prices, but on the other hand the diversity is much wider compared
to the period till 1989, when the cultural life was to a great extent ideologically
controlled. The social position of some ethnic groups as Gypsies and Moslems has
worsen during last years, but the freedom of traveling and the free initiative give them the
possibility to find a realization in different fields and to search for their identity.
As a whole the common changes in the culture, in the public morality, the demography
and so on also should be notified in common order, although their expression is in many
cases negative, compared to the situation before 1989. The biggest problem, which can be
found till now as a whole, is that clichés (for example – laws) were and still are borrowed
(to some extent by auto-initiative or under outer pressure) from the most advanced
countries with the naïve faith that their automatic implementation will take out the
country vary fast if not right away to an equal level with the countries they are borrowed
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from. Usually the result is just the opposite for the simple reason that the specifics in the
Bulgarian development at the concrete moment are not taken into consideration, the
psychological moment is being neglected as well as the level of knowing the ways of
functioning of the west-type democratic system as a whole.
3. The Socio-Economic Transformation of Bulgaria
3.1.The Difficult Shift to Market Economy
 The former prime minister Jan Videnov admits that the main reasons for the structural
crisis in Bulgaria, for the financial destabilization in 1996 - 1997 and the loss of
confidence to his government were the huge debt, the long protracted restructuring of the
economy, the prices of important goods and services traditionally kept at very low level,
the inadequate banking system, the failure to use the advantages of cash privatisation, the
defects of reform program and the lack of firm political support for radical changes.64
These observations were quite correct, but they came too late, after long hesitations.
3.1.1.The Shock Therapy: pro and con
The political changes provided conditions for starting radical economic reforms, rejecting
the central planning and adopting the market principles. Practically the economic reforms
began in early 1991, with signing of the first Stand-by Agreement with the International
Monetary Fund and the implementation of a package of measures designed to bring an
anti-inflation effect and financial stabilization. As a result of restructuring of the large
state-owned enterprises a fast demonopolization effect on the national economy was
achieved. In 1990 - 1991 the prices of almost all goods and services were liberalized.  A
comprehensive liberalization of foreign trade policy was carried out in the period 1991 - 
                                           
64 Петев, Н. Отвъд политическия театър през погледа на Жан Виденов. Издателска къща “Христо
Ботев”, София 1998, с. 242-249. Nickolay Petev, Beyond the Political Theater through the eyes of Jan
Videnov. Publishing house Christo Botev, Sofia 1998, pp. 242-249.
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1995. Within a relatively short time in Bulgaria was established the legal and institutional
framework of market economy.
In that period there was a vigorous discussion on the rates of the economic reforms.
Many experts from abroad were involved in it. In 1990 two US experts, Rann and Ut,
worked out a program and recommended it to the government of A. Loukanov. It was
stressing on quicker liberalization of prices. There were some circles in support of the
Polish model of shock therapy, based on the big-bang approach. In 1991 L. Baltzerowich
was invited to visit Sofia and it heated the discussion. But in the mid 90-s the high price
of the reform caused some hesitation in following the free-market policies and the idea of
shock therapy was rejected. The arguments for step-by-step reform prevailed. But
actually, a mixture of both approaches was witnessed in Bulgaria’s practice. In Bulgaria
neither the political elite, nor the experts drew final conclusions from the reform debate
and commonly accepted answer to the question ‘where should reforms begin?’ was not
given. The advocates of step-by-step reform recommended creating the legal framework
for the market as the first step and then open the economy to market forces. The Polish
model of ‘shock therapy‘ was based on the understanding that the reform should be
started by removing government control on prices and foreign trade. Bulgaria did not
follow strictly any of those approaches. The sequence of steps of transition in Bulgaria
was confusing considering the two main approaches.
3.1.2.The Slow Privatisation
 The process of restructuring the economy and mainly the privatisation were slowed
down. In the period 1992-1998 only 27.8 per cent of the state-owned enterprises in the
list for privatisation were practically privatised. In the list were 2288 enterprises, but only
636 had changed their owners.65 In the same period were privatised 4464 municipal
firms.66 In the last two years the rate of privatisation has grown considerably, but most of
the companies are in very bad condition and they are sold at a very low price, some for 
                                           
65Статистически  справочник (Statistical Yearbook) 1999, p.201.
66 Calculation is based on data from the same source, p. 200.
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the symbolic 1US dollar. Much trouble is caused by the obvious fact that many of the
new owners can’t bring modern technologies and management. They cannot provide
access to new markets. It is planned for 2005 about 80 per cent of GDP to come from the
private sector, but there is some doubt about the qualities the new owners and their
loyalty to the society.
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Top privatization deals during 1999
(ranked by negotiated price)
Enterprise Sold %
of
capital
Buyer Negotiated
Price
(millions
USD)
“Neftochim” 58 “LUKoil Petroleum”, Russia 101
“Petrol” 51 “International Consortium Bulgaria” 52
“Vulkan”-
Dimitrovgrad
70 “Siman France”, France 18.8
“Pharmacy”- Dupnitza 55 “Balkanpharma” (Deutschebank) 11
“Kauchuk” 75 “Kauchuk – 97” 10.5
“Alumina”- Shumen 51 “FAF metal”, Turkey and “Alumina Invest” 9
“Samokov – Borovetz” 80 “Samokov – Borovetz 21’ 8.51
“Trojapharm”- Trojan 55 “Balkanpharma” (Deutschebank) 7.35
“Sviloza”- Svishtov 60 MEC* “Sviloza” and “A.R.U.S.”,
USA
7
“Elenite” 60 MEC “Elenite – Invest” 7
“Antibiotic”- Razgrad 51 “Balkanpharma” (Deutschebank) 5.65
“Elacite med” 79 MEC “Elacite med” 5.45
“Vini” 79 “VSB – Vini Sliven Bulgaria” 5
“Radomir – Lekoko” 75 “Radomir – Lekoko-Invest” 4.75
“Ognianovo – K” 67 “Plena – Bulgaria” 4
“Lazur” 63 “Festa” 3.33
KRZ “Odesos” 25 “KRZ** – Invest” 3.26
“Vinprom – Ruse” 22.4 “Vinprom Holdings” plc. USA 3.2
“Hemushotels” 72 “Hotel Hemus” 3.02
“Interhotel Sandanski” 60 “Contract” 3.01
*   Manager Employee Company
** Ship-Repairing Factory
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Large Asset Enterprises Sold on Symbolic Price
Enterprise Sold %
of
capital
Buyer Negotiated
Price
“Kreikovtzi” 71 “Daru Metals”, Bulgaria $ 1
“Agropolychim”- Devnia 63 “Acid and Fertilizers”, USA 1 lev
“Chimko”- Vratza 57 “AB and Trans of New York”, USA $ 1 million
“Aviocompany Balkan” 75 “Zeevy Group”, Israel $ 150,000
“Yambolen”- Yambol 67 “Chimimport Fertilizers”, Virginia Islands 1.2 million
levs
The governments of F. Dimitrov, Professor L. Berov and J. Videnov could not gain clear
parliamentary support. In these conditions they could not be efficient. The transition
process in Bulgaria lagged behind the progress made in some Central-European states.  
3.1.3.The Foreign Debt
The most destabilizing factor in Bulgarian economy during the period of transition was
the relatively large foreign debt. It exceeded the amount of GDP. In 1990 the foreign debt
was about 12 billion US dollars. In early 1990 the Bulgarian government declared a
moratorium on debt payments. That meant exclusion of the country from the financial
markets. After difficult negotiations in 1994 was reached an agreement with the creditors
from the London Club on substantial (about 45 per cent) reduction of the debt. But after
that new debts towards IMF and the World Bank and others were accumulated. Now the
foreign debt is over 10 billion US dollars. In early February 2000 the minister of finance
M. Radev has declared in an interview on the national TV that the foreign debt amounted
up to 70 per cent of GDP. In the next three years, crucial for the economic reforms,
Bulgaria has due payments as follows:
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External Debt Payments67
Years Principal
Payments
(millions of USD)
Interest Payments
(millions of USD)
Total Payments
for the external
debt
(millions of USD)
Total Payments
as a percentage of
GDP
1999 420 463 883 6,9%
2000 584 486 1070 8,0%
2001 812 523 1335 9,5%
2002 566 479 1045 7,0%
2003 537 456 993 6,3%
2004 558 443 1001 6,0%
Every year in the period of transition the balance of payment is suffering a deficit. In vain
were the expectations for capital flow after the agreement with the London club.  In 1995
the foreign investments were only 94.4 million US dollars, while in Hungary they were
3500 US dollars, in the Czech Republic -2500 US dollars, in Poland - also 2500 US
dollars.68 In that year the government failed to fulfil the budget. In 1996 the Parliament
had to adjust the budget twice, but the national currency dropped in permanent crisis. It
put the banks in difficult position.  They lost the confidence of the economic agents and
population. Their attempts to draw out the savings could not be met by many of the banks
and a financial crisis burst out. The only source for supporting the balance of payment
were the transfers from IMF, but in 1996 Bulgaria received only the first one of 117
million US dollars.69 The other two transfers were refused by IMF. After this
development the collapse of the economy was unavoidable.
                                           
67 Source: Institute for Market Economy, Sofia.
68  Пехливанов, Л. Паричен съвет в България, Униерсутетско издателство “Св. Климент Охридски”,
София 1999, с.33. (Lyuben Pehlivanov,  Currency Board in Bulgaria, Sofia, p. 33.)
69 Ibid. p. 34.
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The three-year agreement with IMF in 1998 brought some relieves. With the assistance of
IMF and other financial institutions it became possible for Bulgaria to provide the needed
amount of money to meet the due payments. But the lack of economic growth and the
shrinkage of export are making the solution of foreign debt problem a difficult task. Our
calculations show that only in the year 2000 new 400 000 US dollars will be added to
Bulgaria’s foreign debt. Obviously for very long period in future the debt will make
Bulgarian economy highly dependent on decisions from abroad.
3.1.4.The New Start of Radical Changes
After the deep economic, financial and political crisis in the end of 1996 and the
beginning of 1997 a new start of radical changes was given. In  “Program 2001”, the
program of the government, formed by the Union of Democratic Forces in May 1997 and
now in power, is stated that it will privatise the state owned enterprises, will restore fully
the private ownership on farming land, will do all the preparatory work for Bulgaria’s
membership in the European Union, will make all efforts, needed for Bulgaria’s
affiliation to NATO.70 
Obviously the political changes and the introduction of a currency board helped
Bulgaria to overcome the most difficult crisis in the country since 1989. Without any
doubt the financial stabilization is a success. It has stopped the deterioration of living
conditions in the society. The following Table71 gives some overview on the dynamics
and effect of changes on the economy:
                                           
70 Program “Bulgaria -2001”: The Economic Stabilization. Sofia 1998, p. 118.
71 Source: Bank of Austria East-West Report 3/99, p.16 and national forecasts
*Forecasts
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Change in %
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999* 2000*
       1989=100
Gross Domestic 
Product (in real terms) 1.8 2.1 -10.9 -6.9 3.5 0.5 2.0
Industrial
Production (in real terms) 10.6 4.5 5.1 -10.0 -12.7 -5.0 3.0
Inflation 72.5 96.0 62.1 123.0 1082.2  22.3 1.0 3.0                      
On that basis in the last two years was established a relatively calm political environment.
There were not any serious social and other conflicts. The budget is well balanced. The
Central Bank maintains stable reserves, amounting up to 2.75 billion US dollars.72 The
monthly inflation has declined steadily from 243 per cent in May 1997 to 0 in the
summer months of 1999.  Bulgaria has no problems with serving its foreign debt. A small
economic growth (about 1,5 per cent) was achieved in 1999. These achievements cannot
be compared to the situation at the same period in the neighboring Romania, where it is
“characterized once again by negative growth in comparison to the previous years,
another rise in the unemployment rate, and the pronounced up-and-down swing in the
inflation rate”. 73  The pretty good parliamentary and popular support has given a chance
to the government to implement its reform policy.
Parallel to the financial stabilization was carried out the administrative reform. New laws
on State Administration and on Civil Servants were passed through the Parliament.
Efforts to improve the judicial system were made. The Bulgarian experience had proven
that such measures are indispensable part of transition to new social order.
                                           
72 В. “Сега” , 13 август 1999,  Now Daily, 13 August 1999.
73 S. Peter Wagner, “Romania” – paper, p.41
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A deeper insight of these optimistic trends shows also some unfavourable developments
and uncertainty. The global financial crisis in 1998 and the Kosovo conflict74 had a
negative impact on the Bulgarian economy. They have affected its most important
markets. The immediate result was an increase of the trade deficit. It led to unfavourable
trends in the current account. An outflow of portfolio investments was witnessed. By
global standards Central and East Europe’s success in attracting foreign direct
investments remains weak, but the case of Bulgaria is particularly alarming. Despite the
encouraging provisions of the Foreign Investment Act and the liberal privatisation policy
the amount of foreign capitals is very small and it is related to the unstable situation in
the region.75 
According to the official statistics at the end of 1997 the amount of direct foreign
investments was 821 066 000 US dollars76. In 1998 and 1999 the global financial crisis
and the war in Yugoslavia have caused shrinkage of the foreign capital in the Bulgarian
economy. It puts doubts on the forecasts of the World Bank that in 2001 the foreign
investments in the country will reach 1.4 billion US dollars.77 Bulgaria has no financial
resources of its own. It has to rely on the international capital flows, but the access to
them is very restricted. The hopes are connected with possible improvement of the
investment climate in South-Eastern Europe as a whole. 
                                           
74 See MAITRES DU MONDE? Ou les dessous de la guerre des Balkans, le Temps des Cerises, Paris 1999
75 ‘In the name of objectivity we must remark that the ruling classes in the person of administration are
considerably guilty for the lack of  foreign investitions in Bulgaria.”  В. Сега, 27 декември 1999.( Now
daily 27december 1999)
76 Статистически справочник 1999, с.106. ( Statistical Yearbook 1999, p.106) 
77 Програма “България – 2001” Икономическата стабилизация, София 1998, с.31. (Program “Bulgaria
– 2001”: The Economic Stabilization. Sofia 1998, p. 31. )
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Cumulative Inflow of Foreign Direct Investment per capita (in USD)78
Albania 120
Bulgaria 162
Republic Croatia 469
Romania 199
Macedonia 89
Average for the Central European
Economies – Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
681
Average for Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania,
Macedonia, Yugoslavia
236
Average for Central and Eastern European
countries (excluding Yugoslavia, Bosnia,
Herzegovina and Baltic states)
503
It deserves mentioning that in future fewer investments will come through privatisation.
At the same time Bulgaria has to rely more on private capitals and less on official
financial institutions.
The foreign exchange reserves are maintained mainly by the loans from the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The foreign trade deficit  (for 1999 it is about 750 
                                           
78The data are from 1989 till June, 1999
Source: Economic Survey of Europe, citing International Financial Statistics (published by IMF)
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million US dollars, for the next 2 years it is estimated to be not less than 700-900 million
US dollars per year)79 does not suggest much optimism. The year interests of the foreign
debt alone will be about 500-550 million US dollars in the next few years. That means
permanent deficit in the balance of payment. 
There are firm arguments that the 3-year Agreement with the International Monetary
Fund (1998-2000) will be fulfilled and that stabilization will continue, but still all
forecasts have to be accepted very cautiously. With much certainty difficult years for
Bulgarian people could be predicted; people whose living standards will be defined by
the restrictive policy, consistent with the Agreement with the International Monetary
Fund. The question is whether they will be patient and confident that such policy will
provide sustained growth and better living conditions. The results of the elections for
local authorities, held in October 1999 have prompted increasing disappointment among
the people. The ruling Union of Democratic Forces has lost the overwhelming support it
had in the parliamentary elections in 1997 and now for its representatives was given less
than 30 per cent of the votes. This political party has lost over a million of the votes it had
received in the parliamentary elections in 1997.  Without strong support in the next
parliament it would be difficult for any political party to carry on the reforms in Bulgaria.
The situation in Bulgaria is dramatic, because in spite of the peoples will for radical
reforms the recent developments are proving that they are unbearable. The indicated
income growth in 1998 was not sufficient to restore the purchasing power of incomes to
levels equivalent to that of early 1990s. About 75 per cent of Bulgarian households
persistently report difficulties in balancing their budget.80  A substantial number of
families rely on incomes, based on the home production of foods. For different items the
share of households that rely on such sources varies between 25 per cent (cheese) and 50
per cent (potatoes) and these values have been subject to minor seasonal fluctuations.81 
                                           
79 Икономиката на България до 2001 и отвъд – до 2010 година. Авторски колектив  с ръководител
проф. Иван Ангелов, София, юни 1999,с. 3. В. Пари, 5 юли 1999, Money Daily, 5 July 1999.
80 Annual Early Warning Report, 1998, Bulgaria. Sofia, 1998, UNDP, p.7.
81 Ibid.
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The majority of Bulgarians remain close to the poverty line, spending over 50 per cent of
their household budget for food. 
Main problems that Bulgaria faces82
(public opinion investigation)
February 1999 April 1999 September 1999
Unemployment 58,4 64,1 64,6
Low Incomes 51,3 49,1 50,2
Corruption 38,5 34,2 38,5
Poverty 31,6 32,9 37,1
Crime 45,4 39,1 32,4
The driving force of the market is still restricted by monopolies (energy,
communications, insurance, etc.) and license regimes. Over 70 per cent of the
manufactured goods and services depend on some sort of administering. The political
mediation between economic agents plays important role. The taxation system also stifles
the economic activity.
In the lack of sustainable economic growth the level of human resources utilization is
very low. The restructuring, privatisation and liquidation of state enterprises keep the
unemployment at a high level. At the end of 1998 the officially registered unemployed
numbered about 430 00083. The figures continue to rise. It is expected that by the end of
the year 2000 the number of unemployed to reach 650 000.84 The labour market in the
country is still underdeveloped and inflexible. There is relatively small number of part-
time employees. The labour demand is increasingly selective. The unemployment among
women and Gypsies is very high. In some regions the situation is desperate. That is the 
                                           
82Source: Monitoring System of Coalition 2000
83 Source: National Employment Service.
84 This forecast was given by the former minister of labour Emilya Maslarova during a discussion on
Bulgarian national radio on 13 February 2000.
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main reason for the economic emigration. It is estimated that only within the 1999
campaign about 300 000 Bulgarians have applied for USA Green Cards. According to
unofficial data during the last ten yeas 700 000 people have left Bulgaria. And they are
among the best-educated and qualified people. 
The acute social problems create favourable conditions for criminal activities. During the
rule of the totalitarian regime Bulgaria had relatively low level of crime. The reforms in
the transition period had a dramatic impact on crime records. The number of crimes per
100 000 population in 1989 had been 663 and in 1997 - 2898.85 In that crisis year
Bulgaria has surpassed Poland by that crime coefficient and approached the levels of
Hungary and Italy (4500 per 100 000).86 The personal and property insecurity in Bulgaria
has risen many times.
According to the public opinion research from October 200087, 91 % from the Sofia
citizens think that there is coalescence between the criminal groups and customs. 77.3 %
see coalescence between the groups and the court, 77.1 – between the criminal groups
and Prosecutor’s Office, and 76.9 – between the groups and the Police. 76.6 % o the
people talk about a narrow interaction between organized criminality and the political
parties. The results of the research convincingly disprove the statements of the Ministry
of the Internal Affairs that the banditism has decreased during the last years. 
The social and health security system in Bulgaria is at a crossroad. If it is functioning till
now it is because of the considerable international donor contributions. From 1.7.2000
Bulgaria is executing a vast reform in the Public Health sector. Its basic measures and the
strategic goals are as follows:
1.  improvement of the access to and the quality of the health services for the population;
2. optimisation of the cost of the public health and achieving maximum outcome from the
available funds ad resources;
                                           
85 Annual Early Warning Report 1998, Bulgaria, p.88.
86 Ibid. p.87.
87 MBMD Agency, quoted by Sega  Daily, 26 October 2000
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3. strengthening of the positive health and prophylactics of the socially significant
diseases.
In pursue of these tasks the Government and the Ministry of Health re-organizes the
Health service and it’s financing in a way that includes the system in the economic
turnover of the country and creates the foundations to establish a health industry. This
includes:
4. Public Fund – the National Health Security Institution that accomplishes a social health
security on the basis of solidarity;
5. Private Funds – a non-mandatory health security and health insurance, operating on the
basis of the calculated risk and profit;
6. Restructuring of the Health Institutions as companies and possibilities for subsequent
facilitated and fast privatisation;
7. Establishment of conditions for free competition within the system and utilization of
market management mechanisms on institution and process level;
8. Supporting the private initiative in the Health Sector, including the pharmaceutical
manufacturing, distribution and retail sale.  
In spite of all this the initial results of the Health reform are very contradictive.88
  In 1998 the minister of labour and social policy has signed the European Social Charter
but there is no prospect this document of the Council of Europe to be ratified by 2002
simply because the state does not have the resources to meet the requirements of the
European principles and norms in the social sphere. There was intention with the
beginning of year 2000 to be started a radical reform in the system of health security.
Grounded on the advice of IMF and the World Bank the government decided to postpone
it with six months. One can forecast conflicts between government and doctors and the
indignation of people will rise.
In attempt to cope more successfully with the problems in December 1999 the ruling
coalition made substantial restructuring of the government and personal changes. The
party activists had to step down from their positions in the government and to give 
                                           
88 Only the so called Government Hospital is functioning right, but the access to it have, as before, only the
governing  that inherited the privileges of the old nomenclature 
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chance to technocrats to deal with the difficult tasks of the economic reform. In March
2000 was revised the Governmental Program 2001. The cabinet takes the obligation to
help creation of 250 000 new jobs and to prevent any further price-increases of electricity
and central heating till May 2001. Obviously it is a sort of preparation for the next
parliamentary elections which have to be held in April 2001. A year earlier the
forthcoming elections are heating the political atmosphere in the country. A debate on
corruption has weakened the positions of the government and it is quite doubtful what
could be the configuration in the next parliament. That will determine the future of the
reforms in Bulgaria.
3.2.The Military Complex conditions at the moment of the change
3.2.1. Production capacity and specialization.
By the end of 1989 in the Military Complex (MC) structures are included business unions
“Metalchim” – Sopot, “Electron” – Sofia, Direction for War-time Bases and enterprises
of the Ministry of the Defense, 23 research institutes and 9 Bases for technical
development. The backbone of the Bulgarian MC was formed by over 100 enterprises
and leaders were as follows:
- Arsenal (infantry and artillery armaments)
- VMZ (ammunitions, rockets)
- Dounarit (ammunitions)
- Trema  (ammunitions)
- Arcus (detonators)
- Pima (mortars)
- Beta (MT LB multi-purpose armoured chain tug-carrier)
- Electron – progress
- Cherno more (radiolocation and radio navigation)
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Samel 90, Bitova electronica, Ecoel, Opticoelectron, NITI, Pirel, Struma, Musala,
Varbanovo, KPZ, Metfalic, Impuls.
The Bulgarian Military Complex was specialized in the frameworks of the Warsaw Pact
and the Economic Mutual Help Council to produce the following:
- Infantry and artillery armaments
- Guided and crusade anti-aircraft and anti-tank rocket systems
- Armored vehicles, tracked towers, self-propelled amphibians, howitzers and other
modifications.
- Optical, optic-electronic, laser devices
- Remote controlled air targets
- Signal, radiolocation and radio navigation equipment, nuclear devices, hidro-acustic
equipment
- The Bulgarian army technique and weapons maintenance, and service and repairs of
jet engines, including for foreign clients as well.
With such a structure the BMC has fully fulfilled the needs of the Military Forces for
technique and equipment. On the other hand by incomes from highly effective export, the
BMC has ensured the purchasing of expensive aircraft, armoured, radiolocation and
rocket equipment, which has not been produced in the country. As a result of this policy
the needed conditions for keeping high level of the Combat readiness of the MF and the
mobilization training of the county has been created.
Тable 1.   Bulgarian special production trade for the period 1987 – 1997 (in
million $ at the prices of 1997) according to Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Department of
State, 1998. *
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Year Special
production
import
Special
production
export
Total
import
Total
export
Share of the
special
production in
the import (in
%)
Share of the
special
production
in the export
(in %)
1987 915 784 22290 21770 4.1 3.6
1988 506 543 26520 25720 1.9 2.1
1989 353 292 18220 19520 1.9 1.5
1990 790 94 5516 9837 14.3 1.0
1991 0 125 2874 3653 0 3.4
1992 0 133 4953 4348 0 3.1
1993 5 86 5146 4025 0.1 2.1
1994 0 85 4435 4224 0 2.0
1995 5 145 5858 5544 0.1 2.6
1996 163 112 5099 4914 3.2 2.3
1997 10 120 4916 4924 0.2 2.4
• In the upper table in the data about Bulgarian weapons export the export for the former socialist
countries till 1990 is not included
According to this in the University of the Economy “Karl Marks” – Sofia, with a view to
the increased meaning given by the Government those days to the scientific development
in the field of the military production and the special production trade, in 1980 a
scientific trend “Economy of the Security” was created as a Problem research
laboratory89 in which the following problems concerning the military production are
scientifically substantiated:
                                           
89 Institutionalization of this trend was regulated by the State Committee for Science and Technical
Progress order № P – 38a – 728 from 08.08.1980, by the Ministry of People’s Education and Ministry of
the Chemical Industry in accordance with the Ministry of People’s Defense. From the preamble of the order
we can conclude that the aims of this specialized scientific section were developing of the theory and
methodology of the Security economy, realizing concrete researches, analysis and exploitations in this
field, education and training of cadres. According to this document, and for understandable reason, this
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- BMC analysis
- Economy and management of VMZ – Sopot
- Economy and management of “Arsenal” – Kazanlak
- Economy and management of  “Pima” – Montana
- Economy and management of “Beta” – Cherven briag, etc
One of the basic tasks, posed before the Laboratory, namely the organization and
conduction of education, is executed in cooperation with the Institute for the Post
diploma Education, The Ministry of Defence and The Ministry of Culture, Science and
Education (at that time). The preparation of the Military Economy specialists in 1986
became a speciality “Economy of the Security and Defence” in 1990. A department
“National and Regional Security” was formed, headed by Prof. Dimitar Dimitrov, Ph. D.
This gave the beginning of the organized cadres education on the economy of the security
and defence issues. It has prepared over 800 civil and military specialists on the issues of:
- Economy and management of the defence complex
- Military economy
- National security administration
- Economy of the security and defence
- Bank security
This is the place to remark that the creation of the scientific trend and the organized
education was made possible with the valuable help of the scientists and specialists from
the former DDR high economy school “Bruno Loyshner” – Berlin, Technische
Hochschule “Carl Scholemmer” – Mersenburg; FRG – Hochschule der Bundeswehr –
Neubiberg, and Poland – Warsaw Military Academy.
                                                                                                                                 
section functions under the name “Problem scientific-researches laboratory for development of the
production and settlement systems”.
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3.2.2. Trade partners
As a basic trade partners by the end of 1980 we must mention:
- The Warsaw Pact Countries
- Middle East
- Asia
- Africa
- Latin America
In the framework of WP Bulgaria produced production under strict defined nomenclature,
which was synchronized with and supplemented by the production capacities of the other
member countries (in close relation with the so-called “limited sovereignty” and
“Breznev Doctrine”). As a basic partner of course we had former USSR, which used to
give us, in some conditions, licenses in exchange of production. The development
activity of the BMC was reduced to the development and modernization of separate
already created (basically in the construction bureaus of USSR and Czech Republic)
components.
The market situation in the Close and Middle East, conditioned by the long-standing
conflict between Arabic countries and Israel, the war in the Gulf and the ethnic conflicts
created favourable conditions for realizing of a successful export of special production in
these regions. Especially important role for Africa and Latin America played the
ideological separation, the striving for imposing a different type of social-economic
relations, and here we have to mention the so-called “rebellion export”. It contributed the
opposing of the supported by the USA military regimes (for example Latin America), and
helped for the creation, confirmation and spreading of the Soviet influence in the
mentioned regions on the contrary to the American foreign policy. 
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Bulgaria, admiring the highest trust by the USSR, was realizing deals, which were
bringing economic benefit to the country and the WP member countries as well.
3.2.3. Trade size
The Bulgarian organizations, which were at a high level specialized in the realization of
the manufactured production, were:
- Kintex
- Elmetengeneering
- Armymex
- Teraton
From the distance of the past 11 years we have to summarize that the economy benefit
from the manufacturing and trade of military and special production was of an extreme
importance for the country and its conformation as an important part of the frameworks
of the socialist countries those days in that kind of activity. Collaterally BMC and the
economic realization of its production used to bring annually considerable financial
incomes for the state budget including currency, which was very important for
purchasing of avant-garde technologies and for modernization of a number of branches of
the national economy90. The given data on the eve of the changes placed Bulgaria among
the first 20 leading weapon exporter countries91.
                                           
90 See table 1.
91 On 03.03.1991 a number of companies from BMC were visited by General Charles Dike – ex
Commander-in-chief of American Armies in Europe and ex Deputy chief of the USA Land forces,
President of the International company for technological activity (ITTA). In his opinion: “ The Bulgarian
military production contains three important elements, that characterize the military production of all
developed countries: 1. High technological standards and high quality 2. The workers and employees have
high professional qualification and high motivation for working. 3. A considerable part of the equipment in
military production is well up to the world standard”.
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2. MC development conceptions of the separate post communist countries
During the mandate of the two Loukanov’s governments (November 1989 – December
1990) started the slow and painful conducting of the reforms in the planned until then
economy, aiming to put it in the railroad of the free market economy. Although Bulgaria
signed the declaration for the Mutual Aid Council dissolution, and officially announced
the denial of following the centrally planned economy at that time, a decisive step
towards the price liberalization was not taken. Those processes of course gave their
influence on the production sector, examined by us. Although the Warsaw Pact was still
existing, even formally, and earlier made agreements and trade contracts concerning
military and special production manufacturing were still in force, the need for the state
policy reformulating in that field was growing with a view to its adoption to
macroeconomic realities and geopolitical situation. The flexible use of the production
powers with dual functions came on first place. In contrast to the more clumsy and slow
changing production structure of the USSR, the BMC turned to the conversion more
gracefully as a first emergency exit of the given situation. This imposed some sacrifices
(from the most adequate quantitative and qualitative loading point of view) of often high-
tech and narrowly specialized machines and whole production units. A program for MC
conversions was accepted by a Government Decree92, which was conformed to the
productivity capacities of the enterprises. But it turned out that the new production for the
civil sector was unprofitable with a view to the price of the used production powers93
orientated to conversion, as well as with the view to specially prepared and narrowly
specialized cadres from the production and development sphere. This irrelativeness
between production powers and realized production in the state of narrowing market
perimeter, with the declining of the bipolar model in the world and the new economy and
political situation in the country, gave the beginning of a longstanding crises not only for
the BMC, with all the following social consequences. The military budget cut in the 
                                           
92 Government Decree № 54 from 29.05.1990
93 For example the Bearing factory in Sopot is fully equipped with the most modern Japanese equipment. In
the factory for armored tank technique “Beta” – Cherven briag there is 4000-tone press for cold stamping
“KRUPP” for $ 8 million. In “Arsenal” – Kazanlak there is a whole technological line, bought from
“Yamazaki” company for specialized details using Japanese technology.
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former socialist block reduced the supplies for Eastern Europe. The orders for the
Bulgarian Army were also reduced. They were engaging 10 – 12 % of the military
production at the beginning of the mentioned period and dropped down to 0.7% in 1998.
The difficulties with the military production brought to the accumulation of big amounts
in the storehouses of the producer. As a result of this the money flow slowed down.
That’s how the military enterprises were forced to limit their production volume. With
the prices and interests of the credits liberalization at the beginning of the February 1991,
during the ex officio government of Dimitar Popov, the MC enterprises that were forced
to use unlimited credits for production increase before changes (a part of which they were
forced to use for creation and maintenance of mobilization powers), with a view to the
priority of the considered sector for the national economy, made bigger debts. An attempt
to reform this debt as a state debt was made through the Law for the Bad Debts
Management, but according to this Law we couldn’t reform credits if after 1990 the given
enterprise have gained shares of other holdings. Most of the military enterprises
possessed small shares of other holdings. So a big part of the credits remained
unreformed.
A financial analysis of the MC companies and the formed debt was made on the basis of
the Government Decree № 136 from 12.07.1991. The analysis showed hat the bulk of the
debt  - 55%, are obligations on the needed combat readiness maintenance of the country.
The enterprises debts were run up in two ways: on one hand – credits for production
expenditures and interests given by the trade banks, on the other hand – the unsold
production in the storehouses because of the deals annulment.  As a whole the trade
unions and military companies bank debts by the end of 1991 was estimated to 2907
million. BGL. And at the end of 1992 this debt ran over 3 milliard BGL (about $
113207547). Here we have to once again underline, that this was the main reason for the
conversion estimation as a possibility for the sector survival.
The main merit of the D. Popov’s government (December 1990 – October 1991) for the
mentioned sector is the implementation of the license regime for military and special 
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production. A government commission was formed, which gave licenses to the
companies that trade with MC production and exercised control over the deals.
With the first UDF government coming to power (October 1992 – December 1993),
headed by Phillip Dimitrov, the state policy toward MC was totally changed. A number
of improvident statements, followed by some actions having nothing in common with the
market economy  (for example the officially posed under question moral reasons?! of the
weapon trade), as well as interventions in this beneficial business of people from the
closest President’s surrounding and the highest floors of the government, deteriorated the
country image unnaturally. The new overseas Bulgarian partners, who have always been
very sensitive to the weapons and special product trade and production, unambiguously
showed their interest in and expressed their opinion on the cooperation and MC
development. The first natural result was the Bulgarian companies push out from
traditional markets, gained for decades in the developing counties. Already conducted
deals, mostly with the Near East partners, were cut or denied, which brought to a forfeit
payment. Meanwhile representatives from American MC companies were one of the first
to have started active negotiations with branch and government representatives in
Bulgaria for joint ventures. The MC privatisation was seriously considered, even though
we had no clear conception for it. The cadres’ policy about the sector and the leading
trade unions were characterized at that stage by entering in them, under the pressure of
governing classes, of party loyal unprofessionals that don’t have experience and concrete
knowledge, and this additionally broadened the already existing problems. The first
massive project, characterizing this period was the blocking of the railroad Bourgas –
Sofia by the “Arsenal” – Kazanlak employees during the short leadership of Petar
Demirev, who is a trade union ”Podkrepa” activist.
It is remarkable that the first ministerial crisis of the Phillip Dimitrov’s government was
connected with Minister D. Loudgev, who was the head of the Government Commission
for control over the military and special production trade and production and who was
forced to resign.
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After the one-year leadership of DFU, a government leaded by the President’s Counsellor
Lyuben Berov was formed. Even though this government declared itself a “Privatisation
government”, and the Privatisation Agency Head those days didn’t conceal that the sector
enterprises were not included in the Agency program, the MC stayed out of the
privatisation. A decisive role was played by the Parliament Decision from 23.07.1993,
prepared by the few months’ earlier organized investigation Committee on the MC
problems, which posed moratorium over the MC enterprise privatisation for a period of
three years. From the structure of the Complex were extracted a number of companies
with secondary meaning, which had lost their significance for the military production.
Except this it was proposed to the Ministry Council to arrange with a priority the
companies’ bank debts and to accept them as a state debt. With the same Decision was
proposed to the Ministerial Council the creation of Interdepartmental Council on MC and
the Mobilization Readiness of the Country94. All this aimed to improve the MC condition
and it was preceded by widely announced in the media statement of the President that the
MC privatisation is equal to a great lose for the Bulgarian economy.
The “Berov” Government’s intentions to create a normative, legal framework,
reglamenting the MC activities in the new transition conditions have to be mentioned,
and a proof of them are the Regulations for the activity organization on the military and
special production control and certification95, the Regulation of the Interdepartmental
Council activity on MC and mobilization readiness, as well as the Regulation for control
over the regime of the foreign trade activity with military and special production96.
Nevertheless as a whole there wasn’t readiness and decisiveness, and it wasn’t the right
moment for cardinal actions in this so delicate sphere. Under these circumstances: the
state withdrawal from an active role in the MC as its owner   (although the efforts for
arraigning a legal base for its functioning) on one hand, and the intentional freezing of the 
                                           
94 Government Decree № 193 from 12.10.1993
95 Government Decree № 13 from 14.07.1994
96 Government Decree № 51 from 21.03.1994
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MC privatisation process on the other, the sector was brought to an inevitable
devastation.
Discrepancy, inconsistency and unequable temps of the reforms characterize the sate
policy toward the sector during the whole period after 1989. This was a result as of the
interests’ impact between different economic groups inside the country, as of the non-
systematic efforts of the different governments to lead the economy in the way of the
privatisation. At least over the state attitude to MC reflected the interests of outside
factors connected to the world special production market. Nevertheless 11 years were not
enough time for even slight improvement of the BMC.
During the ex officio Government of Reneta Injova (September 1994 – January 1995) a
Regulation on military articles assimilation and creation and development of powers for
the national economy in the state of war was adopted. This came as a positive signal that
the sector was not fully abandoned, with a view to its special production meaning for the
state security.
The government that came after the elections on 18.12.1994 of the socialist Jane Videnov
gave its application for general decision of the question about the ownership and the
future of the MC enterprises. In order to come out of this situation, caused by the
moratorium from 23.07.1993, Nikolay Dobrev, the Chairman of the National Security
Commission, proposed an Overall Conception, in compliance with which the enterprises
that do not produce final production and those that produce a small percentage of the
special production had to be equalized to all the rest enterprises, which were under the
direction of the Ministry of Industry, having in mind their following privatisation. The
rest 23 enterprises, after the relative financial analysis, had to synchronize their activity to
the accepted by the Videnov’s Government Program for Bulgarian Army Re-equipment
till 2010. This program provided also a renewing of the license with Russia and more
intensive search of strategic partners as a key to the successful position take back in the 
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world weapons market and the increase of the incomes in the budget. A full list of the
conventional weapons was accepted and was under state control97.
This government, which started the mass privatisation couldn’t make the conception for
sector restructuring, except the already mentioned part of 23 MC enterprises. Some of
them were put into the list of isolation as losers. The list was made by the government in
accordance with IMF agreements. The collapse of the bank system during the second half
of 1996 caused a financial collapse in the beginning of 1997 and a change of the
government. This gave no possibility for the MC development conception
implementation.
The ex officio government of Stefan Sofiansky (February – May 1997), the official
declaration proclaiming the will to join NATO, and the Currency Council, implemented
on 01.07.1997 for financial stabilization created a new financial and foreign policy
framework and in its context had to be considered the arrangement of the MC issues. The
problem for interoperability came out with the joining PCP initiative. An auction for
equipping BA with radio communication technique according NATO standards was
announced in 1998. It was won by the Italian Company “Marconi”. The price was $ 58
million, but afterwards the auction was annulled. Actually it is very important to think of
the future role of the BMC as an executor of such kind of orders, considering the
renewing impulses, which these orders could give to BMC. A new horizon in front of it is
the full right Bulgarian membership in Euro Atlantic structures and its real role in the
common European Defence Forces.
The approach of the Ivan Kostov’s government (from May 1997) about the military
enterprises was in accordance with the industrial enterprise privatisation. In 1998 was
developed and adopted a program for restructuring and privatisation and state share in the
military industry98. The document gives a short-term framework and the criteria for the 
                                           
97 Official Gazette № 57 from 1995
98 Decision of the Ministry Council  № 13 from 30.03.1998
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capital restructuring of the branch. The measures are directed to the market adoption of
the MC enterprises and the military structures Euro Atlantic integration.
The program provides a considerable decrease of the state share in the unions’ capital,
new structures development and the privatisation acceleration. All smaller unions in the
MC and the separate parts of the bigger companies, which were acting collaterally, were
proposed to be fully privatised. The state kept the blocking quotas in five of the leading
MC companies. These are “Arsenal”, “VMZ”, ”Dounarit”, ”Trema” and “Electron
progress”. In every one of them the state kept 34% in order to be able to influence the
decision making process and to defend the national interests. Those unions were put in
the list of 25 companies, which were proposed to be restructured by separating of some
productions, departments, enterprises, and their capital to be reduced when the separate
parts were fully privatised. The state strategy also stipulated the MC enterprises under the
Ministry of Defence (basically repairing enterprises which are still state owned) to be
restructured to trade unions according to the Trade Law. The state share in some of them
was also reduced, and later they were proposed to be fully privatised.
All the privatisation ways were stipulated to be used – privatisation of whole enterprises,
of separate parts, of shares and stocks, public sale in the stock exchanges, etc. Basic role
of the property restructuring was given to the department “Defence Industry” in the
Ministry of Economy and to the “Military Economy” Department, which is a part of the
military economy block in the Ministry of Defence with the cooperation of the
Privatisation Agency and the stocks commission.
The stipulated in the strategy production restructuring turned out a new step, which had
to be realized parallely in two spheres – special and civil production. The future
modernization and the restructuring of the military production are determined by the
already mentioned European and Euro Atlantic structures integration. On the other had
the new production trends are being developed, connected to the existing battle
equipment modernization, which possesses a considerable battle capacity. On the basic of
the shown interest by western companies in the MC unions capabilities it is provided that 
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in the following two or three years the adoption of centres and subsystems for defined
types of equipment for the NATO’s armies will be started. Equipment for the Bulgarian
Army needs will be produced with their cooperation. Weapons and ammunitions
according to NATO standards are already adopted. The new production issues in
cooperation with some NATO member countries are negotiated. Themes are also
declared for joint work with committees for industrial cooperation with NATO for navy,
air force, and land-forces unites.
The restoring of the bilateral military research and economy cooperation with former
partners is stipulated. Some basic trends will continue to be developed: Classic battle
technique (light self-propelled staff and artillery systems, light weapons, ammunitions,
etc), signal technique, radiolocation, radio communication equipment, systems for fire
control, etc. The state keeps and modifies its basic functions in he state capital
management. It will deal with them in the sector, by the manufacturers licensing and by
the state commissions. A state bank of licenses, patterns, standards, know-how, software
and other intellectual products of special industry will be developed. The state will
organize and ensure the financing for the researches and cadres training. The weapon
trade control, the control over the technologies with possible dual use over the defence
military equipment and the wartime planning is also a state obligation.
The program stipulates also the development of the normative package for the sector
restructuring. A project of a Defence Industry Law is about to be worked out. 16
production powers were also defined to guarantee the peace and wartime state production
capabilities, namely:
- Machines for artillery cartridges production, calibre 23 – 25 mm
- Press machines for projectiles stamps, cal. 100 – 155 mm
- Special lines for machining of projectiles, mines and details for them
- Machines for detonators, Igniters and percussion plugs
- Press machines for gear and ammunition equipment
- Gyroscope machines
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- Machines for recycling of thermo active and thermoplastic plastics
- Machines for cutting out and stamping of armour steel
- Machines for gun-powder and gun-powder fillers production
- Machines for production of cartridges, cal. 5.45 – 40 mm
- Machines for pyrotechnics issue production
- Machines for artillery gun systems and light weapons
- Unique installations, stands and labs for regulation, testing and standardization of
military dosimetric and radio-chemistry equipment
- Machines for equipment and battle technique repairmen
The military repairing enterprises are in a very interesting position - they are under the
Ministry of Defence supervision because their production is much more than the
Bulgarian Army needs, and on the other hand Greece and Turkey are interested in them.
They have received Russian standard weapons by KASKAD
In 1999 together with the smaller enterprises, privatised by the Workers-Managers
Unions (WMU) was privatised 51% of the biggest MC enterprise “Arsenal” – Kazanlak.
It was curious that the deal with the WMU for $ 2.1 million was made after the
government act of dividing by half the “Arsenal”’s debt. According to the sale contract
$657 million currency credits (capital and interests) would be cancelled. “Arsenal” Ltd.
took the engagement in the next three years till 2002 to invest $3 million and to reduce
the personnel from 9448 to 6200.
At the end of 1999 was formed a new DFU government and a new cabinet structure. A
mega Ministry was created – the Ministry of Economy, which in fact unified the Ministry
of Industry and Ministry of Trade and Tourism. In 2000 the Ministry of Economy sold
80% of  “Metalholding” capital (with shares in other companies, the most appetizing of
which is “Arcus” – Liaskovetz) to the WMU “Metalchim 2000” for $ 2.5 million, and the
buyer took all the obligations of the Union and took the engagement to invest $ 15000 (!)
till 2000 and to keep the personnel without changing its activity. In the Ministry of 
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Economy privatisation program with open privatisation procedure are included VMZ –
Sopot, “Dounarit” – Rouse, and the machine building plant in Doupnitza. 
During the given period Russia was interested in the enterprises privatisation in this
sector. Russian companies were interested in VMZ, “Arsenal”, “Beta”, etc, but they knew
that they wouldn’t be let to the MC privatisation. Large-scale western investors showed
no interest due to the unclear rules for privatisation and bureaucracy, the bad investment
climate, the region and country instability, and last but not least, the intractable
enterprises condition. The bulk of the Unions were bought by WMU. Part of the prices
was in cash and the rest they have to pay in the next 10 years in lighten condition
including with stocks. Because of the bad economic situation in the most of the
enterprises a strategic investor was not found. Giving them to the WMU showed some
defects as:
- lack of the needed financial resources for technological renewing and ensuring of
their competitiveness in broader scales
- lack of specialized technical team (research teams were destroyed during the
transition period)
- Technologies out of exploitation and loosing the world standards are being used
- Disability for developing of work at a modern level 
- A lack of flexible researchers and developments suitable as to the defence industry, as
for the public production needs satisfaction, etc.
All this is due in the most of the cases to the leaving of the highly qualified cadres and
workers.
The name of our country was involved in many weapon sandals in the last days –
supplies for UNITA, deals with Central Africa, the mystical planes with weapons for
Sierra Leone, earlier weapons sale from Bulgaria for Albania, etc. In some of the
scandals for the period 1992 – 1994 there probably has been something wrong with the
weapons export, but others are made on purpose, aiming clearly to ruin the BM and 
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weapon export. Together with the already mentioned American companies a more serious
competitor for Bulgaria became some specialized French producers and traders and the
Russian Company for combat equipment export “Rosvooruzenie” as well. Far more
disturbing is something else. Bulgaria can be blamed before the world community as a
violator of the international treaties for weapon trade and as a country with unreliable
control over special production export. Actually in November 1995 was accepted a Law
for Foreign Trade Activity with Weapons Production and Technologies with possible
dual use, And a Regulation for its application as well. According to this Law such an
activity can be executed only by trade unions with over 50% Bulgarian share, having
license for export, import or re-export of weapons. The license is given by the
Interdepartmental Council, dealing with the MC. For the license to be given, are needed
positive answers by the Ministry of Interior, the National Security Service, Foreign
Ministry and Ministry of Finances. The company, which accepts license, has the right to
deal with weapons for one year.  After it the license can be renewed, but in no way a
company can act beyond its rights. The control over the export is exercised by one more
Department – The Commission for Control and Permission of Foreign Trade Deals with
Weapons in the department of the Ministry of Trade and Tourism. Namely this
Commission gives the licenses for military equipment export and studies each deal
separately. The license for final client and document certifying that the contractor has the
right to trade with weapons are compulsory for the deal accomplishment. That’s how is
guaranteed that the exported production wouldn’t disappear somewhere before reaching
the final client and also that it wouldn’t go to a country under embargo like Iraq or Libya.
It is also compulsory the contract to have a clause to guarantee that the client wouldn’t re-
export the weapons without Bulgarian approval.
For violation of the Law and the International Treaties, in which Bulgaria is a side the
Interdepartmental Council can take the license for weapons trade. Ministry Council
exercises the control over the following of the Law and licenses. The trade unions are
obliged to give information for employees working over the deal, the foreign partner,
forwarding agent, transporters, technical characteristics, description of the production and
ways for payment. A penalty of two times the deal price is to be paid if there is a data for 
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violation by the exporters (If they are juridical persons). In case that this is a crime, the
dealers are set to prison up to 6 years and in the worst cases up to 8 years. Bulgarian
companies’ officials reject the possibility equipment to be exported illegally by changing
the code of the production or the receiving country code, given in the custom documents.
The question what kind of weapons does our country mainly export is also very
interesting. The main exporters are “Kintex”, established in 1966, “Teraton”, which is in
consortium with the electronic giants “Harris”, “NET”, and “Global One”, specialized in
the field of military electronics, and known by its contracts in the Near East, “Armymex”,
established in 1992 and including as share holders 23 companies of the MC. In the last
two years Bulgaria re-established the level of the sales of light weapons in the Latin
America and Africa – the Bulgarian “Kalashnikov” machine-guns are one of the most
exported issues. Anti-tank systems, anti-aircraft rocket systems are exported, as well. The
Bulgarian weapons are very attractive because of its high quality and low price in
comparison to other world producers. To whom Bulgaria sales and will continue toe sale
weapons is a question of the foreign policy, which has to follow the national interests and
not to let its name to be involved in weapon scandals.
3.2.4.Summary
As we already missed the most appropriate moment, strategically important for the MC
restructuring – right after the changes, when technological and technical equipment were
in a good condition, there wasn’t a specialists withdrawal and the deals for licenses
(received often thanks to the preferential attitude of ex USSR to us) were into force, at
the present according to us there is three opportunities for the MC development. The first
opportunity (optimistic) is connected to the opportunity of the new owners (WMU) to
attract capital inclusively by entering the stock exchanges, by researches and licenses and
to develop a joint production and to have access to markets. The second opportunity is
traditional for Bulgaria where the owners take all the money from enterprises, sale the
equipment and the property of the companies and after that declare themselves broke.
The third possibility for the defence production development in Bulgaria, where the
positive development is most realistic, is the joint-ventures establishment, which will take 
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as the repairing, as some of the production activities in accordance to the already
produced technique which is in armaments in neighbouring or relatively close
geographically countries. The aircraft maintenance enterprise is an example and the
Russian MAPO showed interest in it to make it base for the maintenance and
modernization of the high-tech Russian technique, used by the armies of the former
Warsaw Pact member countries, Turkey, Greece and Arabic countries. The responsible
for the Bulgarian policy factors saw in it a threat for the new political orientation of the
country and nevertheless it has undoubtful economic attractiveness for Bulgaria, this
opportunity wasn’t used. 
These problems are still not resolved from a legal point of view. The Law for the Defence
Industry failed because of the lack of clearness for its place in the legislation, which
poses the question for the need of it as a whole. The issues that it had to reglament are not
actual any more
.
Table 2.   Indicators for Bulgaria for 1997 according to Bureau of Arms Control,
U.S. Department of State, 1998.
№                Indicator    Value Place in the
world
1. Population (million people) 8.3 83
2. Gross National Product – GNP (in million dollars) 32140 65
3. State budget (in million dollars) 10340 63
4. Number of the Army (thousand people) 80 46
5. Gross National Product per capita of the
population (in US dollars)
3877 58
6. State budget per capita of the population (in US
dollars)
1247 57
7. Share of the state budget in the GNP (in %) 32.1 67
8. Military expenses (in million dollars) 949 67
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9. Special production export (in million dollars) 120 16
10. Special production import (in million dollars) 10 89
11. Military expenses per capita of the population (in
US dollars)
114 51
12. Military expenses for one military man (in US
dollars)
11860 78
13. Armed forces per 1000 people 9.7 28
14. Share of the military expenses in the GNP (in %) 3.0 61
15. Share of the military expenses in the budget (in %) 9.2 84
16. Share of the special production export in the total
export (in %)
2.4 7
17. Share of the special production import in the total
import (in %)
0.2 103
The traditions and the potentials that Bulgaria has can be used during the Euro integration
process, if there is a principally new approach, having in mind the globalisation processes
and the specific interests in the region. If we want to achieve a synergetic effect99 we
must unify the efforts, resources and the strategic investors organization, creativity and
efficiency of the Bulgarian qualified workers and specialist. Though, if we want to
ground concrete proposals it is necessary some researches to be made in the following
fields:
1.The legislation for creating a favourable environment and guarantees for business and
cooperation.
2.Analisys and evaluation of the MC privatisation and post privatisation processes. In that
way not only the tendencies will be revealed but also he MC future development can be
prognosticated
                                           
99 By “synergetic effect”  we mean the unifying of the efforts, resources, knowledge and know-how for
reaching bigger efficiency (2+2=5 )
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3.Analysis and evaluation of weapons trade, special technique and ammunitions. In this
field we have a huge experience and lots of problems have been accumulated.
4.The development of opportunities for highly qualified specialists use in the MC fields.
There is a huge potential for creating and development of high-tech parks, incubators,
joint ventures, common programs for adopting high-tech production, etc.
5.We have to specially research the traditional relations between Bulgaria and Germany
in the field of the scientific researches, training and production. They must be restored
and enriched in the new conditions and challenges of the time. Here are hidden
unexpectable possibilities for synergetic effect.
The geopolitical situation of Bulgaria must not be forgotten as well as its role on the
Balkan Peninsula and the Arabic world, especially in business aspect
 
Appendix 1 to a work document for restructuring and state participation in the Defence
Industry of Republic of Bulgaria during the process of property change
Information for the offered state capital quotas and organization forms of the companies
from the Defence Industry
№      TRADE
ENTERPRISE
RESIDENCE BASIC
CAPITAL DECREA
SE OF
THE
BASIC
CAPITA
L (IN %)
REDUCED
BASIC
CAPITAL
OFFERED
STATE
QUOTAS
ORGANISATIO
N FORM
NOTE
1
.
"Arsenal "
SPJSC
Kazanlak 2225 15.7 1875 34 Joined-
stock
Compan
y
Financial
isolation
2
.
"Arkus"
JSC.
Lyaskovez 465 456 0     JC
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3
.
"Beta"
SPJSC
Cherven
bryag
1077 21 850 0 JC Financial
isolation and
branch
privatisation
4
.
"Bitova
electronika"
SPJSC
V.Tarnovo 444 6.3 416 0 JC Branch
privatisation
5 "VMZ" JSC Sopot 10538 20.5 8379 0 JC
6
.
"Varbanovo
KPZ" JSC
Zareva
Livada
155 155 0 JC
7
.
"Dunarit"
JSC
Rousse 482 48.5 248 34 JC
8
.
"Ekoel"
SPJSC
Pleven 456 456 0 JC Financial
isolation
9
.
"Elecron
progres"
SPLTD
Sofia 104 103 34 JC
1
0
"Impulse"
LTD
Gabrovo 127 25.2 96 0 JC
1
1
"LOT"
SPJSC
Sofia 163 163 0 JC
1
2
"Metalic"
JSC
Gabene 49 49 0 JC
134
1
3
.
"Mehanika
&assembly"
SPLTD
Sevlievo 167 5.4 158 0 JC
1
4
"Mussala"
LTD
Samokov 37 37 0 JC
1
5
"NITI"
SPJSC
Kazanlak 144 144 0 JC
1
6
.
"Opticoelect
ron" SPJSC
Panagyur
ishte
581 5.5 549 0 JC Financial
isolation
1
7
.
"PIMA" 
SPJSC
Montana 509 73.9 139 0 JC Financial
isolation and
branch
privatization
1
8
"Pirel"
SPJSC
Gotse
Delchev
843 10.1 758 0 JC
1
9
"Samel-90"
SPLTD
Samokov 274 3.3 265 0 JC
2
0
"Strouma -
S" LTD Sandansk
i
302 34.8 197 0 JC
2
1
.
"Trema"
JSC
Tryavna 641 6.4 600 34 JC
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2
2
.
"Metalhim
Holding" 
Sofia 34 JC
Transformati
on into a
Trade
Company,
component
TC shares
invalidation
2
3
.
"Tcherno
more"
SPJSC
Varna 508 7.7 470 0 JC
2
4
.
VRZ -
Ministry of
defense
Sofia In process
of
transformatio
n
2
5
.
"Electronna
techika
Plovdiv 0 JC Finishing the
separation
from
“Periferna
technica”
PJC
3.3.The Bulgarian – German economic relations after 1989
Even as early as the period after the Liberation (1878) the economic interrelations of
Bulgaria are characterized by a high intensity of the business relations with Germany.
This tendency is preserved during the whole XX century, no matter what was the
character of the political government in both countries.
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3.3.1.Trade interrelations between Bulgaria and Germany after 1989
In the period after 1990 there can be observed a rising development in Bulgarian –
German relations. The Bulgarian export data analysis for the period 1992 – 1999 shows
that for the time from 1992 to 1995 Germany took the first place in Bulgarian export.
Although in the next period 1996 – 1999 Germany gave in its first place to Italy, the trend
during the last eight years shows a stable growth of the German export share in the total
export of the country, moving between 6.6 – 10.8%
In spite of the fact that in 1999 there can be observed a fall of the German export share in
the total export, it is hardly a stable tendency, but mostly a result of conjuncture
variations. The export for Germany for 1998 in absolute value was $ 446.2 million, while
for 1999 it was $ 393.9 million, i.e. the relative decrease for the last year compared to the
previous is 11.7%.100
The comparison of the data for the export structure for 1999 and the previous years
shows that in the export structure by countries there are practically no changes. Germany
keeps its leading role and together with Italy they form 25% of Bulgarian export.
The Bulgarian import structure for the period 1998 – 1999 by countries also shows the
significant role of Germany – it takes the second place after Russia for the whole
examined period. There can be observed a stable rise of the German import share in the
total import, especially during the last two years, when it reached about 15%. The import
from Germany for that period in absolute values runs up as follows:
- for 1998 - $ 689.2 million
- For 1999 – $ 817.8 million, i.e. there is 18.9% increase.   
As a whole the total import of Bulgaria for 1999 is 5.3% higher than the previous year
(from $ 4956.7 million to $ 5468 million). The changes in the import amount have led to
significant changes in its structure. The allocation of the import by countries showed the
weakening of Russian positions and strengthening of the German and Italian role in the
import of our country.
The analysis of the trade interrelations between Bulgaria and Germany for the period
after 1990 shows a stable tendency to increasing the value of the trade circulation 
                                           
100 The data are not final, calculated towards 30.03.2000
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between the two countries. There can be noticed a slight superiority in the absolute values
of the import from Germany over the export. During the whole examined period
Germany takes a front place as a first-rate trade partner of Bulgaria and it could be surely
predicted that in the future it would be the same way.
3.3.2. Investments
As far as the foreign investments are concerned, in the period 1992 – 1999 Germany
conveniently took the first place, as the amount of the realized investments for the
mentioned period runs up to $ 425.87 million101, and only Belgium, having $ 373.8
million invested, is coming close to that sum. The data analysis by years shows that for
1998 – 1999 are realized about 1/3 from the total amount of the German investments in
our country, and only for 1999 are realized about 22% of the capital investments. This
fact undutifully witnesses that the German investors show an increasing interest to our
country.
The German capital investments in Bulgaria are directed mainly to the following
economy branches:
- machine-building – 4 enterprises
- finances – 3 institutions
- trade – 3 enterprises 
- electronics – 2 enterprises
- tailoring industry – 2 enterprises
-  pharmacy – 1 enterprise
- building materials – 1 enterprise
- cement industry – 1 enterprise
- cellulose-paper industry – 1 enterprise
- textile industry – 1 enterprise
- transport – 1 enterprise
- poligraphic industry – 1 enterprise
- tourism and hoteling  - 1 enterprise
                                           
101 Data: Foreign investments agency
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The German participation in Bulgarian privatisation process is also significant. German
investors took part in the privatisation of 12 enterprises, and totally 89 were privatised in
the period 1993 – 2000. The amount of the invested German resources runs up to about $
141 million. It is remarkable that in 1999 German investors took part in the privatisation
of only 1 enterprise  - Rousse port, acquired for $ 1.615 million, while for the same year
the total amount of the German investments in Bulgaria runs up to $ 101.3 million. An
observable tendency is reorientation of German investors to build new industries in our
country, instead of acquiring already exiting enterprises through participation in the
privatisation 
As a conclusion on the basis of the prepared analysis we can summarize:
- In spite of the crisis, caused by the transition, the Bulgarian – German economic
relations are developing in a stable rising line
- Germany has a reserved front place as in Bulgarian export, as in the import of our
country.
- A stable increasing of the German share in our foreign trade circulation as a whole is
observable102
- Germany is a leading foreign investor in Bulgarian economy, having a significant
participation in the privatisation process
Thus described tendencies during the last years give us the reason to prognosticate that in
the future the values of the trade relations between the two countries as well as the
amount of the German investments in our country will increase.
                                           
102 According to data from Bulgarian Ministry of Economy, the expected Bulgarian export rate for
Germany is 8 per hundred and the German export is 13 per hundred. The German share in Bulgarian barter
is 13 per hundred. For the first eight months of the year our mutual trade is for $ 873 million, while for the
last year it was $ 1.2 million. 
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PRIVATIZATION TRANSACTIONS WITH GERMAN INVESTORS
1993 – 2000
№
Name of
enterprise
Date of
transaction
Subsector
Shar
es
sold
Revenue
(million)
Liabilities
undertake
n (million)
Investments
contracted
(million)
Name of the buyer
1
Gazobeton –
Sofia
Feb.11, 1994 construction 100 DM 5 BGL
5.361
DM 5.6 Ytong Ltd. - Germany 
2
SOMAT - Sofia Aug.2, 1994 Transport 55 USD
8.2181
USD
46.782
USD 48 Willi Betz GmbH -  Germany
3
Hotel Vitosha -
Sofia 
Dec. 14, 1994 tourism 80 DM 65 Ivan Zografski - Germany
4
Eltos - Lovech Sept.5, 1996 El.
engineering
55 DM
11.5
BGL 2252 DM 12 Sparky trading GmbH – Germany
5
Agromashina –
Rousse  
June 20, 1997 Machine-
building
70 USD
0.0525
BGL 708 BGL 1 500 Sparky trading GmbH – Germany
6
Vazhod -
Trudovets
Sept.29, 1997 Machine-
building
65 DM 1.6 DM 2.1 “Grammer” AG - Germany
7
SOMAT - Sofia Feb.20, 1998 transport 38 DM
24.867
USD 5 Willi Betz Group Germany
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8
Velpa 91–
Strazitsa
May 8, 1998 paper 26.4 USD
1.121
Norecom GmbH Germany
9
Metalsnab
Holding
June 26, 1998 trade 75 DM 12 Klockner & Co AG – Germany
1
0
Dunavska
Koprina-Rousse
Dec.7, 1998 textiles 68 USD
0.126
DM 1.5 A.Mueller&Soehne GmbH
Germany
1
1
Rousse Shipyard
– Rousse 
Feb.12, 1999 shipbuilding 80 USD
1.615
DM 14.4 R. Shipyard
Beteiligungsges,GmbH-Germany
1
2
Pharmacia
JSCo.- Dupnitza
June 23, 1999
pharmaceuti
cal
55 USD 11 USD 15.52 Balkanpharma JSCo/Deutsche
Bank JSCo. – London, UK
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3.4. The present State of the Socio-Economic Transformation
To reach economic stabilization in Bulgaria is one of the most difficult tasks and there
is no power to give firm guarantees for sustainable development. The restructuring of
economy is based on privatisation. That means profound redistribution of property.
This process is accompanied by unacceptable for the public phenomena such as fall of
production, closure of factories, high unemployment, impoverishment, corruption, etc.
The applied now model of fast privatisation, after the long delay, is causing
indignation. That puts some doubts on the prospects for the policy followed by this
government. Still Bulgaria has not worked out clear economic priorities. That may
cause difficulties in the negotiations with the European Union. Further steps in
restructuring the industry and agriculture, the financial sector and other services are
needed. In 1999 the Parliament approved an energy strategy but the whole
controversy around the use of nuclear reactors prompts a new debate on energy
policy. The functioning of the national economy is still facing many legal and
bureaucratic obstacles. Also, these obstacles are discouraging the badly needed
foreign investments. All the efforts should be focused on satisfying the Copenhagen
criteria for EU membership.
4. The Adaptation of Bulgaria’s Foreign and Security Policy
More than 10 years have passed since the dramatic day of the 10-th of November
1989, when, the then doyen of the communist leaders in Eastern Europe, Todor
Zhivkov fell down. A combination of international and domestic factors created
conditions for that. In the 80-s it became obvious that the Soviet block was losing
competition with the West, particularly in the economic and technological fields. In
the years of the initiated by Gorbachov “glasnost” all that came to be more evident.
Critics from different positions were directed to the realities in Bulgaria.In 1988-1989
groups of dissidents made attempts to organize opposition structures. The Communist
Party tried to hold the situation in more liberal manner than before. On the 10-th of
November 1989 at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
Zhivkov was let to step down. That opened the sluices of the changes in the country.
The euphoria of the next few months turned into a long and hard years of transition,
full of hope and disappointment, of dramatic political events and difficult economic 
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changes, of will to join the structures like NATO and EU, perceived to be the best
guarantee for security and well being and of course  against possible restoration of the
former totalitarian regime, and the lack of clear positive response from there. 
Bulgarian people, choosing a new social model, rejected the Soviet - style
communism as something holding back their progress, and adopted a course of
transition to pro-Western liberal democracy and market economy. However the
challenges of the transition caused much hesitation, strengthened by the evidence that
nobody is ready to share the heavy burden of the changes. The Western aid proved to
be insufficient to make endurable the difficulties of transition to another social model.
Unsure of the choice they have made, many people found shelter in nostalgia. The
illusive expectations stimulated by Western propaganda, that repudiation of
communism would immediately open the gates to freedom and abundance often
turned into frustration.
Transition from socialism to capitalism has no pattern in history. All countries from
the former Soviet block started political transition almost simultaneously. But their
attempts to reach the objectives of changes are not equally successful. “Regarding the
relation between EU and Eastern Europe and referring to EU’s strategy towards
Eastern Europe one can classify at least three different types of Eastern European
nations the winning, loosing, and in between Eastern European countries.” 1 Bulgaria
began fast legislative steps towards changes in the political system. In 1990 the
leading role of the Communist Party was abolished. A new Constitution was adopted
in 1991. It was based on the concept of pluralistic, multiparty democracy, division of
power, freedom of expression, and equality among all forms of ownership, excluding
ethnic, religious and sexual discrimination. The policy towards the Turkish minority,
put into practice in the late 80-s was fully denounced. 
All this steps won international recognition. In May 1992 Bulgaria became a member
of the Council of Europe - a precondition for which is showing a democratic political
system and observation of human rights. With that Bulgaria began joining the
Council’s main conventions, starting with the European Convention on Human Rights
in 1992 and ending with the Convention on national minorities rights in 1999. In
process is also ratification of the European Social Charter. All these prove that 
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Bulgaria has accepted the European values and norms of political and social life. It
was a promising momentum, but many other substantial steps had to be made.
Nevertheless, many peculiarities of the Bulgarian political traditions and of the
national economy, combined with timid efforts for structural reform and unfavourable
international environment 103, left the country far behind other Central European
states, which today are on the short list for EU membership and Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic already became full members of NATO. 
The changes, undertaken in the last 10 years, appeared very controversial, bringing
social insecurity, collapse of whole industries, losses of jobs, impoverishment,
increasing criminal activity, destruction of health-care and education. The transition in
Bulgaria has faced many difficulties and Bulgarians have suffered hard times.
Although a state with more than 13 centuries history in modern times it has
experienced only few short periods of democracy. That determines the shortcomings
of the steps towards liberal, western-style political system and market economy. The
young democracy emerged from a long lasting authoritarian regime. It had to
formulate its own national strategy, independent from the ‘Great brother’ (the USSR),
to organize its policy-making institutions, capable of facing the new challenges alone.
This task could not be solved only by radical changes in legislation. Beside the rule of
law democracy needs traditions, political culture, relevant institutions. For very long
time the Bulgarian economy had not been based on the laws, which market economies
obey. The changeover needed time and resources. The transition process was marked
by acute polarization between the main left and right political parties in the country
and it has blocked the possibilities for working out a national consensus on the main
objectives and principles of the changes in Bulgaria. The polarization was stimulated
to a great extent by the lack of clear vision on the future place of the state in the world
order. At that time there were many speculations on what was agreed about Bulgaria
between the United States and the Soviet Union in Malta in 1990. The initiated
changes were also slowed down by some newly emerging private interests, which 
                                           
103 Reimund Seidelmann, The European Union and Eastern Europe, Article in reference to the
conference From Capitalism to Capitalism Brussels, March 13-14, 1998 (updated version); See also:
Reimund Seidelmann (Guest-Ed), Special Issue des Journal of European Integration NR. 2-3/ 1997 “
Problems of Eastern Europe: Transformation, Nation Building and Europeanization” 
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were relying on preservation of the old state-owned economic structures. All these
make Bulgaria’s transition a dramatic experience. Those facts are almost unknown for
the rest of the world, because the transformations in that relatively small country do
not produce spectacular effect. They hardly reach the headlines of the news. Neither
Bulgaria nor Europe benefits from this obscurity.
However, Bulgaria is still a relatively stable place in the Balkans. The peace in the
country was preserved in those years of transition. Bulgaria is not a source of tension
in the international affairs, but a factor of stability in the turbulent Balkans. It
maintains good relations with all neighbours. Bulgaria was the first to recognize the
independence of Macedonia, together with the other former Yugoslav republics. The
joint declaration of Bulgaria and Macedonia from February 1999 played a rather
positive role in preventing a spread of the Kosovo crisis. Bulgaria had to take difficult
and risky decisions, related to the Kosovo crisis, but it gave full support to NATO’s
policy and actions against Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, our country is perceived as part
of the notorious region104, which turns out to be a powerful factor, keeping the
country undeservedly aside from the mainstream processes in Europe.
4.1.The Political Reforms
The changes in Bulgarian foreign policy would be unthinkable without the democratic
reforms after 1989. At the same time Bulgarians could hardly enjoy the flavour of
democracy without the profound changes in the international system. At the turning
points of history the interdependence between domestic developments and external
relations is most obvious.
4.2.Changing Bulgaria in Changing World
Geographically Bulgaria is situated in South Eastern Europe, in the Eastern part of the
Balkan Peninsula on a territory of 111,000 sq. km, bordering the Black Sea to the 
                                           
2As a Swiss diplomat has put it in1933 “The Balkans, with the tension among the countries and their
aspirations, always have been a threat for the European peace. While the inhabitants of the Balkans
have to rely on themselves there is no reason for trouble. But in case the Balkan states are involved in
the conflict of the Great Powers interests then the development of local aspirations is unforeseeable.”
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East, the Danube River and Romania to the North, Yugoslavia and Macedonia to the
West, Greece and Turkey to the South. The population of Bulgaria is 8.6 million. 86
per cent of them are Bulgarians, 9 per cent Turks, 3.5 per cent Gypsies and some
other ethnic groups as Armenians, Jews, Russians. The largest religious community -
around 85 percent of the population, belongs to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church,
almost 13 per cent are Muslims (Turks, Pomaks, some Gypsies). There are some
Catholics and Protestants.
Bulgaria has emerged as an independent state in 681 A.D. and in competition and
rivalry with the Byzantine Empire gradually has established its dominance in South-
Eastern Europe in the medieval times. In the same time on the most of the territory of
Western Europe have existed only barbarian states. Bulgaria was the first Slavic state
to adopt Christianity in 865 and soon after that the Cyrillic alphabet. Russia adopts
both of them later exactly from Bulgaria.  On that basis our country has played an
important role in the Orthodox and Slavic civilization. The well-developed original
culture has helped preserving the Bulgarian nationality after the Turkish occupation in
1396 when the Bulgarian sovereign state ceased to exist. Many attempts to overthrow
the dependency had failed. In 1878, as a result of one of the Russian-Turkish wars, the
Bulgarian state was restored. Until 1946 Bulgaria was a constitutional monarchy.
During that period it was involved in the Balkan wars (1912-1913), in the World War
I on the side of the Central Powers. In the World War II it has joined the Tripartite
Pact in 1941. In 1944, when the Soviet army was advancing to the west, an Anti-
Fascist Block, lead by the Communist Party seized power. Being placed in the Soviet
sphere of interests in the post-war period, Bulgaria, similar to the other countries in
Central and Eastern Europe, established a single party political system and centrally
planned economy. Bulgaria was a COMECON and Warsaw Pact member. That was
determining its place and role in the Yalta international system.
With the events in November 1989 were started democratic political reforms and
radical changes in the national economy. The changes in Bulgaria became an integral
part of the fundamental transformations in the world. Substantial changes in the
balance of power, mainly in economic and technological spheres, between the two
blocks in favour of the West provoked the experiment with the so called “new
political thinking” and “glasnost” in the Soviet Block after Gorbatchov took power.
The new atmosphere made possible expression of critics against the then existing 
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regime. A culminating moment was a letter from 24 October 1989 of the then foreign
minister Peter Mladenov, containing his resignation and disagreements with the
simulations of changes in Bulgaria. The most influential members of Politburo of the
ruling Communist Party supported Mladenov and asked Zhivkov to resign.  On 10
November 1989 at a meeting of the Central Committee of the party it was announced
that Zhivkov had resigned. For him it was a surprise, but actually this was the start of
changes in Bulgaria.
To great extent the developments in the country depend on and reflect the worldwide
trends. Now Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic, member of the UN, the OSCE, the
Council of Europe, the World Bank, the IMF, the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, the CEFTA, the Organization for Black Sea Economic Co-
operation and other international institutions. Bulgaria is an associated partner to the
WEU105. It is a candidate for full membership in the EU and NATO106.
Geographically and historically Bulgaria is a part of Europe. It is situated in the old
continent and deeply involved in the cultural, political and economic processes in that
part of the world. There is no basis for questioning its European identity. For more
than 13 centuries Bulgaria has been deeply involved in the events shaping the
European leadership in world developments. But a combination of circumstances has
determined for the country to remain apart from the industrial revolution in Europe in
the 19-th century, later, in the second half of the 20-th century, to be aside of the
process of integration in the Western Europe. All that had left important consequences
for the relations of Bulgaria with the advanced European countries and with their new
forms of institutionalised co-operation. Now Bulgaria is facing the challenges of
overcoming its backwardness and is in process of integrating in, the advanced and 
                                           
105 S. Panos Tsakaloyannis, The European Union as a Security Community, Nomos-Verlag, Baden-
Baden 1996; Christoph Lotter/ Susanne Peters (Eds.), The Changing European Security Environment,
Böhlau-Verlag, Weimar-Köln-Wien, 1996
106 Bulgarian public opinion regards the eventual membership in NATO as an inevitable result more of
outside decision than of a free choice of the country. It is not accidental that the now governing
coalition, counter to all logics, declares to be completely against a referendum about the question,
although the eventual membership will predetermine the life of the next generations.
On the other hand the membership in NATO has only instrumental character – it is good to that extent
to which it contributes the integration of the country in EU. Bulgaria would undoubtedly prefer the
Finland model (EU, not NATO) to Turkish one (NATO, not EU), if it faced this choice anyway.
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striving to revive its leading role in world’s development, Europe. For Bulgaria’s
presence in Europe’s economic processes the following Tables can give some idea:
GDP of the Central and Eastern European Countries for 1998 107
(1989 = 100)
Bulgaria 66.4 Poland 116.9
Croatia 78.1 Romania 76.1
Czech Republic 95.4 Russia 55.9
Estonia 76.6 Slovakia 99.6
Hungary 95.1 Slovenia 104.0
Latvia 55.6 Ukraine 46.2
Lithuania 62.6
Export from Bulgaria108
in million lev*
Country    1997        1998       1999
Total 8281386.5 7575806.4       7230.7
incl.:
Austria    90936.0       124158.3        124.0
Belgium    128070.9     270414.4        320.6
Czech Republic    31147.8       28156.8          27.9
France  223763.3     252364.2        328.3
FYR Macedonia  164414.6     171646.8        192.7
Germany  786284.0     788523.4        715.3
Greece        682497.0     664631.8        623.7
Hungary    39166.2       58998.1          44.9
Italy  968723.9     972878.7        1019.9
Netherlands    126957.5     140031.0        151.2 
                                           
107 Source: Business Center Europe
108 Source: Статистически справочник 1999, p. 168-169. (Statistical Yearbook 1999, pp.168-169.)
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Poland    49721.0       98717.7          53.8
Romania    110669.6       93491.7          101.1
Russia  658201.9     417507.0        343.6
Slovakia      25124.8       38098.6          14.6
Switzerland    47902.5       46675.0          82.1
Sweden    47579.8       33017.9          37.7
United Kingdom  219698.5     190358.8        183.1
Ukraine                                                            246433.4            201437.2            122.7
*Exchange rates:
1995 - 1$= 67.168Leva
1997 - 1$=1676.50Leva
1998 - 1$=1760,39Leva
Import in Bulgaria109
in million lev*
Country    1997        1998        1999
Total 8268462.2   8827515.3       9971.3
incl.:
Austria   200918.3     248411.4        297.8
Belgium   103903.1     156166.6        166.3
Czech Republic   106483.0     169517.5        180.8
France   265182.9     393125.6        521.9
FYR Macedonia   44608.9     67719.9        45.2
Germany   972408.7     1210914.1        1492.7
Greece   3481374.4     518997.7        564.7
Hungary   71878.7     66067.3        90.7
Italy   593382.9     675221.5        843.0
Netherlands   153759.5     181034.6        199.5
Poland   96223.5     74245.2
135.4
                                           
109 Source: Статистически справочник 1999, с. 169-170. (Statistical Yearbook 1999, pp.169-170.)
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Romania     81854.9       102178.9         131.6
Russia             2317230.0   1756337.2       2064.6
Slovakia 35468.8   46367.6       55.9
Switzerland 132342.2   126271.7       134.3
Sweden 68769.7   81065.4
136.5
United Kingdom     215861.3     214590.5         239.8
Ukraine                                                             305051.5           336609.8             239.1
*See the remarks to the former Table.
The political changes, initiated in 1989, have opened the possibility for Bulgaria to
become part of the European area of modern society, based on common values and
principles. The integration with the European structures depends to a great extent on
the success or the failure of the political and economic changes in the country. The
public opinion is well aware of the consequences of missing the historic opportunity
and shows high sensitivity on the rationality of the European orientation of the state’s
foreign policy.
4.3.From Dictatorship to Democracy
After the political changes in November 1989 Bulgaria has chosen to follow the path
of radical and speedy political and economic reforms. A crucial role in Bulgarian
transition played the organized in 1990 National Round Table. After five months
discussions (from 3 January to 15 May) the participants - representatives of the then
ruling Communist Party and of the opposition reached agreement on abolition of the
totalitarian regime and establishing a democratic political system. At the Round Table
was decided: 
1.to abolish article 1. of the Constitution proclaiming the leading role of the
Communist Party in all spheres of social life and defining the Bulgarian state as a
socialist one;
2.the political police to be disbanded;
3.to disband the party structures in the administrative system, in the army,
police, justice, diplomatic service; to stop any political activity in those institutions;
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4.to disband the party organizations in the state owned enterprises and also in
the cooperatives;
5.the State Council to be replaced by a Presidential Institution;
6.to organize elections for Greater National Assembly with a single task to
adopt new democratic Constitution.110
The new Constitution, adopted by the Greater National Assembly in July 1991, and
the numerous laws passed by the Parliament, gave the legal frame of a democratic
political system in the country. It was tested in the parliamentary elections in 1990,
1991,1994 and 1997, in which many political parties took part with changing
positions in the National Assembly. The main rivals in the recent 10 years are the
Union of Democratic Forces and the Socialist Party. Now in the Parliament are
represented also the Alliance for National Salvation (a coalition of the Movement for
Rights and Freedoms - supported mainly by the ethnic Turks, the Liberals and
monarchists), the Euro-Left Party (which unified the most careerist part of the ex-
nomenclature) and the Bulgarian Business Block. In alliance with the Union of
Democratic Forces is the Popular Union, while with the Socialist party - a small
agrarian party and Ecoglasnost. Among the achievements of the political process in
Bulgaria are the joint declarations of the parliamentary represented parties on peaceful
transition (1990) and on national consensus (1997). According to the last one the
MP’s (with the exception of the socialists) of the so-called “reformist majority” in the
38-th National Assembly agreed on: 
1. Support for the agreements of Bulgaria with the International Financial
Institutions, including the introduction of Currency Board; 
2. Just division of social burdens of the reform; 
3. Quicker effective restitution of farming land and establishment of
conditions for its effective use; 
4. A determined fight against crime and organized crime in particular,
regardless of its political colouring, on all levels and in all state institutions; 
                                           
110 Кръглата маса. Стенографски протоколи. Фондация “Д-р Желю Желев”, с. 5. (The Round
Table, Foundation Zhelyu Zhelev, p.5.)
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5. Opening up of the “dossiers” of politicians, high magistrates and
administrators, in order to neutralize their dependency from the former security
services; 
6. Full-fledged membership of Bulgaria in the European Union and all specific
efforts to this end; 
7. Membership of Bulgaria in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.111
The reached at this stage balance of power in the political life in Bulgaria, despite the
delay, provided conditions for such important steps on the way of reforms. 
4.4. The Transformation Efforts in Bulgaria and the Isolation from the West
One of the important factors for slowing down the reforms in Bulgaria was the not
quite successful development of contacts with the new priority partners from Western
and Central Europe. The very optimistic expectations for establishing intensive
contacts with the advanced democracies brought some disappointments. The last 10
years left the feeling in Bulgaria of being misunderstood. The lack of positive
response to the reform efforts from abroad discouraged the romantic enthusiasm of
the early 90-s.
4.4.1.The Prejudice
There is no doubt that the main factor in the process of changes in Bulgaria is the
West with its example to follow and with its ability to influence the events in different
parts of the world. From the very beginning of the reforms Bulgaria has chosen the
western model of liberal democracy and market economy. Usually the choice of an
alternative is a dramatic one, but the Bulgaria’s drama comes from the lack of
alternatives, or of not quite clear ones, whenever such exist. The attraction from the
West does not give substitute for the economic ties Bulgaria had before with the
former Soviet Union and with other COMECON countries. But with the collapse of
the communist block the relations with the countries, formerly belonging to it are no 
                                           
111 Bulgaria: Challenges and Chances.  Democracy daily, Special edition, October ’97.
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more an alternative, relevant to the new objects, set after the rejection of the
communist past. 
For the drama of Bulgaria’s transition the West also has its contribution. It is hidden
in the general reluctance of the “winners” of the cold war to share the burden of
restructuring the international system and the lack of clear strategy towards this
country in South-Eastern Europe. The vague western approach towards Bulgaria is
determined on one hand by the poor reform performance and on the other hand by the
bias, shaped in the communist past and sustained now a day. But the success of the
reforms in Bulgaria is needed not only for the sake of the country. It would have a
positive effect on the developments in the turbulent region and on Europe as a whole.
As the former Prime Minister Dimiter Popov has put it “the changes in Bulgaria take
place not only in her own interests. They mean something for the new status of
Europe. It should not only wish the reforms in our country, but it must share their
cost.”112
For Bulgaria it is not easy to overcome the image of the former Soviet satellite.
Among the people still exists anti-capitalistic mentality. Some bias was shown
towards the fact that for the most of the last 10 years the socialist party has dominated
the political scene in the country. Most of the western structures and particularly
NATO and to some extent the European Union were cautious, if not hostile, towards
Bulgaria in the time, when the former communists had the majority in the Parliament.  
In Catholic and Protestant Europe there is some prejudice about the possibility for an
Orthodox Christian country to join the western structures. It seems that the problem of
compatibility of religions and civilizations in Europe still exists. Still in the continent
exist doubts, apprehension, mistrust and suspicion. All these facts prevent the West to
work out a clear strategy towards Bulgaria. Probably that is the reason why the
countries from the European Union, and not only they, are in practice inaccessible for
Bulgarians. The people, who have to maintain the contacts between Bulgaria and the 
                                           
112  Д. Попов,  Да се затвори Козлодуи? Това би било лудост. В. Стандарт, 26 октомври 1999.
(Dimiter Popov,  To Close Kozloduy? That Would be Madness. Standard daily, 26 October 1999.)
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West, have to suffer unbearable humiliations in order to get a Schengen visa113. It is
not far-fetched to say that for the common Bulgarian Europe ends where the
Schengen curtain starts – the new shameful Berlin wall. According to Government
Decision 265 from 14 March 1997, Bulgaria does not demand entering visas for the
citizens of the European Union countries. In 1998 our country was visited by 873 116
people from the 15 countries-members of EU. The statistic doesn’t give information
for the number of the visitors from Portugal, Luxembourg and Ireland. According to
the information by Consul department in the Foreign Ministry, a single visa for
foreigners for one-month stay, until 1997 cost $ 30. If we accept as a basis 1998, this
would mean that Bulgaria loses $ 26.2 million annually from the abolishment of the
visas for the people of the EU countries. For the past 4 years the total amount of the
loses runs up to $ 100 million.114  Although the multiple assurances from the
chairman of the European Commission Romano Prody, that he will personally insist
on solving the visa question for Bulgaria, until this moment nothing concrete was
done. At the same time the efforts of Bulgaria for restraining the illegal border traffic
are much bigger than these of the central European countries.115
At the same time Bulgaria is expected to comply with western values and policy.116
The European Union and NATO are encouraging it to follow the path to membership
in them, without giving explicit signs that it fits with their views on Bulgaria’s role in
their concept for security in the Euro-Atlantic region and Europe’s unification. It will
be absolutely unfair Bulgaria to be packed with other countries, and because of their
weaknesses to be treated in a group in an unacceptable for us way.117.   The decision
of the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999 to invite Bulgaria to start 
                                           
113 The problem sharply concerns all social groups, but mostly businessmen and intellectuals.
Accepting the existing situation as a punishing regime. In the same time favorable conditions exist for
blooming of the corruption in the Western Embassies and connected to them Burros for ensuring
Schengen visa, announcing their guaranteed receiving by big advertisings in the newspapers. In an
interview for the National Television on the 30 October 2000 the Foreign Minister talked about the
discriminative attitude towards Bulgarian citizens
114 Trud Daily , 30 September 2000 
115 In 1999 Bulgarian custom-house officers caught 1540 kg heroin, compared to 1700 caught in all the
rest European customs: Democracy daily, 27 October 2000, Novinar Daily 27 October 2000.
116 If we want to be objective we have to point out that at the beginning of December a procedure for
Bulgaria’s taking out of the negative Schengen list was started 
117 In a statement before a science conference in Sofia on 26 October 2000, concerning the enlargement
of EU, the Premier Minister I.Kostov declared that the principle challenge facing the EU enlargement
is the way it is accepted – whether as increasing the number of the countries-candidates for assistance,
or as a way to raise the European competitive power in the globalizing world. According to the Prime
Minister, the Euro-commissioners have a problem with the way they speak for the enlargement.
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negotiations for EU membership leaves for now the first serious step to prevent
Bulgarians from blank despair.
4.4.2.The Cut Roads to the West
There is another factor, helping Bulgaria’s isolation from the West. That is the
Yugoslav crisis. At the time of desperate efforts to establish active contacts with
Western Europe Bulgaria faced the barriers of instability in former Yugoslavia. Its
ties with, the perceived as priority partners, Central and West-European countries
were hampered by the events in the western neighbour. Bulgaria was literally cut off
from her preferred new partners, on whom it has relied to conduct the reforms.
Particularly negative in that respect was the effect of the imposed by the UN Security
Council sanctions and the NATO’s air strikes against Yugoslavia in connection with
the Kosovo crisis. Simply the roads, connecting Bulgaria, including the Danube, with
the West were cut.  Bulgaria’s ties with Central and Western Europe, i.e. the changes
in the country, became a hostage of its geographic position. The lack of normal
contacts with that part of Europe, on whose values are based the reforms in Bulgaria,
makes the outcome uncertain. Bulgaria has suffered and continues to suffer severe
losses from the side effects of the actions of the international community for bringing
peace and stability in South-Eastern Europe and nobody cares for any compensations.
It was estimated on the basis of UNDP methodology that during the period of
applying the sanctions against Yugoslavia (1992-1996) as a side effect Bulgaria has
suffered losses, amounting up to 10 billion US dollars. 118 It had a terrible impact on
the reform process in the country. At the same time neighbouring to Yugoslavia
countries that are members to EU and NATO collaborated for violating the sanctions
against the country and by this they de facto supported actively the Milosevic’s
regime.119 
The prime-minister Ivan Kostov has stated that the international community has not
taken any obligations towards Bulgaria, with the exception of political declarations. In
an interview for BBC he has concluded that Europe is Bulgaria’s debtor for 
                                           
118 Round Table “UN Sanctions: the Case of the Former Yugoslavia”, Copenhagen, 24-25 June 1996,
p. 9.
119 See for example “Milosevic’s Friends Inside the EU and NATO” in: The Wall Street Journal,
October 13-14, 2000 
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Kosovo.120  During all those years of crisis in South-Eastern Europe Bulgaria has
behaved as a good partner to the EU and NATO, sometimes undertaking dangerous
risks. For that Bulgaria was receiving promises that it will enjoy the Western support
for stabilization and reconstruction of the region. Still, everything remains in the
sphere of good intentions. It is a shame that the countries and international
institutions of the West have done so little to encourage and help serious reforms in
one of the promising states in South-Eastern Europe.
By now the results of the reform efforts are quite doubtful. During the Cold War
Bulgaria, as part of the Eastern block, was respected as an integral element of that
system. Now, facing the conditions for accession to the western political, economic
and security structures, the country is likely to remain a part of the notorious Balkans.
There is a real trouble among the Bulgarians that instead of progress the reforms may
return the country back to the full of conflicts and left behind the modern times
region. The NATO’s military operations against Serbia in 1999 have caused a new
drama for Bulgaria and new difficulties for its relations with the western partners.
Only the Bulgarian merchant fleet suffers daily losses over 30 000 DM from closing
navigation on the Danube river. 
History shows that sanctions, organized on an international basis for attainment of
specific political goals have yielded controversial results. The yugosanctions have
overburdened the neighbouring countries and the United Nations failed to organize
substantial relief measures for them.
4.5. The European Objectives of Bulgaria and the Armed Forces Reform: the
Impact on the Society
The issue of civil-military relations appeared to be one of the basic problems in
Bulgaria's transition to democracy. The last decade was time for accepting and
implementing the values of civilian democratic control on the armed forces and on the 
                                           
120 Костов, И. Европа е наш длъжник за Косово, 24 часа, 26 октомври, 1999г. ( Ivan Kostov,
Europe is our Debtor for Kosovo. 24 hours daily, 26 October 1999.)
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defence policy-making. It was based on the understanding that the civil-military
relations are pan of the very substance of the radical changes in Bulgarian society.
The developments m this field w-ere influenced by the new security and defence
agenda of the post-Cold War Europe and also by the conflicts in the Balkans. The
support of the Western security structures and individual member-countries w-as a
crucial factor in both conceptualizing and practical transformation of the civil-military
relations in a country, where the armed forces had been built on the ideological bias
that they have to serve to the communist ideal. The activities of NATO, mainly within
the Partnership for Peace Program and the enlargement strategy of the European
Union contributed to the establishing of new type of civil-military relations in
Bulgaria The adoption of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and particularly
its Third Working Table gave new impetus in Bulgarian efforts. Bulgaria was
involved in a project, supported by the international community and designed to
create a climate of confidence and security throughout the region, including by
realization of defense planning and spending, the general demilitarization of societies
within the region, transparency in defense issues and other confidence building
measures, democratic control of the armed forces and paramilitary troops, effective
control and reduction of small arms".
The reorganization of the Bulgarian armed forces from typical totalitarian status to the
functions, size and structure, adequate to the new internal and international realities, is
a process of extremely political importance. It contributes to strengthening the civil
society and meeting the criteria for EE and NATO membership. However, the reform
is consuming a significant part of the country's limited resources and is causing real
social problems
The Bulgarian military traditionally perceive themselves as an important pillar of the
nation The campaign for establishing a civil control over the armed forces has given
the impression that somebody is considering them as a threat to the society. Therefore
strong political will and time was needed to make the democratic control of military,
as well as intelligence services and the police, indisputable and to turn it into legal and
ethical norm. Changing the role of the armed forces from political factor to a power
that has to serve the democratically elected institutions and to preserve their pride was 
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a difficult task Apparently it is not easy to achieve civilian control wile
acknowledging the military professionalism.
The whole complexity of transition, the slow economic reform and the turbulent
Balkan region - all that could hardly back up a radical reform of the armed forces. The
attempts at launching restructuring and cutting in the armed forces were facing
immature economic environment and strong arguments against it, related to the
permanent post Cold War next-door crisis.
The new civil-military relations in Bulgaria were shaped in difficult internal and
international circumstances. Still, the political parties demonstrated wisdom and from
the very beginning of the changes they have never tempted to involve the armed
forces in the political clashes. One of the significant agreements at the Round Table in
1989 was on excluding political activity in the armed forces. With the adoption of the
new constitution in 1991 the legal basis for establishing democratic control over them
has been set. According to it The Parliament (The National Assembly) is the
institution that has the supreme control over the security structures and the army. This
function is carried out through its legislative activity, budgetary allocation of
resources, ratifying international treaties, maintaining permanent parliamentarian
control and adopting decisions The National Assembly is the only institution that may
declare war or peace It has the final war on deployment and use of Bulgarian armed
forces abroad. The President is supreme commander in chief and it is of his
competence to appoint and dismiss the higher command of the armed forces and also
to bestow all higher military ranks. All those acts should be based on proposals from
the Government (The Council of Ministers). The latter is responsible for the state
defence and military policy. It co-ordinates the overall defence planning and controls
politically the armed forces. The Defence and Armed Forces Act, enacted in 1995 and
amended in 1997 and 2000, is based on the constitutional texts.
With the adoption of the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine in late
90-s the set of legal documents that define the role and the functions of Bulgarian
armed forces was completed. They reflected the policy aimed at reforming the armed
forces in compliance with the principles of maintaining democratic control over them 
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and also with the conditions of the international environment, the economic, financial
and demographic capacity of the country.
A serious step towards providing guarantees for the national security through
interaction and integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures was made by
adopting the Defence Reform Plan, started in 2000. Known as Plan 2004, it is
designed to make the armed forces:
adequate to the changing strategic environment;
ready to face the new challenges;
capable of reaching high level of interoperability with NATO no later
than 2002;
create potential for effective contribution in crisis response operations;
with realistic size in accordance with the defence resources of the
country.
Parallel to the political and legal steps towards establishing democratic control over
the armed forces, very significant was the role of the media and also of the emerging
structures of the civil society. The freedom of press gave its essential contribution in
defining the new role of the armed forces in the period of transition.
The implementation of Plan 2004 has brought the Bulgarian society closer to the real
problems of the armed forces reform. It appeared that for the most of Bulgarians
cutting the strength of the army from 110 000 to 45 000 is unacceptable. Apart from
the contradictions with patriotic feelings and considerations about the insecure
situation in the region, this plan is raising new economic and social problems The
attempts to achieve significant cuts in the armed forces are causing additional tension
at the labour market. The coincidence of the structural reform in the economy and in
the armed forces produced huge unemployment Officially it is about 18 per cent, but
the real figures are far bigger. The Government and some NGOs are making efforts to
manage in a less painful way this effect of the reform. Some financial support and
expertise from NATO and EU-member countries, Switzerland and others have been
negotiated and have made possible the implementation of adaptation program for 
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those who had to leave the armed forces, but still for them and for the society that is
not a satisfactory solution
Recently the recruitment of new soldiers has been facing disturbing lack of capacity
to cover all young men, who have to enter the army according to their constitutional
obligations (For every healthy male it is compulsory to serve in the armed forces by
the time he is 27 years old.) Waiting for indefinite time to be called in the army, they
have difficulties to find jobs. There is another problem with university graduates, who
would prefer to continue their education. For a modernizing army it is difficult to
provide opportunities for low educated people From there comes on the surface the
seeming that the armed forces are discriminating some of the ethnic minorities.
Particularly special attention needs the Roma minority. The armed forces reform has
to admit their very delicate role in strengthening the ethnic cohesion in the country.
To fulfill their social mission the armed forces have to generate feelings of security
and safety among the citizens, to contribute to the integration of the socially and
ethnically isolated groups. They have to play their role in educating and qualifying the
young people. All these considerations should not be neglected in establishing new
civil-military relations. In addition to that the armed forces reform has to contribute to
acceleration of Bulgarians integration in NATO and EU.
The last parliamentary elections in June 2001 and formation of the new government,
headed by the former Bulgarian king Simeon II gave chance to critical assessments of
the changes in civil-military relations. There are accusations that they have been
undertaken on the basis of very abstract understanding of the national security issues.
New arguments have been given against the radical cuts in the army, against the rapid
disarmament and the plans for replacement of the Soviet/Russian aircrafts with ones
manufactured in NATO countries The military establishment rejects the intensions of
the new civilian leadership of defence ministry to dismantle the missiles SS-23, on
which the United States of America are insisting very strongly Recently the head of
the parliamentary Commission on Foreign Policy, Defence and Security Stanimir
Ilchev has said: “It is unacceptable to have such imbalance between junior and senior
officers in favour of the latter”
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These are only few examples showing that the results of the armed forces reform are
not satisfactory. To great extent its defects came as a result from the lack of sensible
discussions on this important issue of Bulgaria's transition. Some of the steps were
undertaken under pressure from abroad, other were designed to meet the requirements
of some international agreements, but many of them were neglecting the severe
political, economic and social realities Therefore the new defence minister Nickolay
Svinarov is insisting on meaningful public debate on the prospects of the armed
forces. Obviously, a revision of Plan 2004 is forthcoming.
The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C. in September 2001 gave new
arguments for criticizing the armed forces reform. In the context of establishing
democratic control over the notorious in the past Bulgarian intelligence its role and
capabilities were degraded Now it became evident that it has to play crucial role in
fighting terrorism Bulgaria is situated very close to regions (Middle East, Caucasus,
Kosovo), where the state machine is lacking and the organized crime is executing its
power Bulgaria is on the road of drugs and arms trafficking, illegal trade, money
laundering, smuggling and migration from Asia to Europe.
The notorious Balkans revived their fame and now the region is not very secure place.
The asymmetric, in terms of military balances, environment is prompting the
necessity of responsible approach towards the armed forces reform in Bulgaria. Some
mistakes of NATO, regarding the events in former Yugoslavia, are also giving
grounds for accepting more cautious approach in executing the adopted plans for
reforming the civil military relations. The recent developments on the international
scene have increased the public opinions mistrust in the social and geopolitical
engineering. In addition to all that the policy-makers have to take into consideration
the fact that the country is in the strategic plans of Islamic fundamentalists (only in
the last two years the Bulgarian authorities have extradited over 150 Islamic radical
preachers. Under these circumstances many considerations should be recognized.
Therefore the initiated in September by President Peter Stoyanov debate on the need
of revision of The National Security Concept is winning political and public support.
It seems that the romantic euphoria of democratic changes has to give chance to
realism.
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4.6. Change in Foreign and Security Policies: Bulgaria’s Perception of the New
International System: Forces, Patterns, and Dynamics of Change
Shaping the new foreign and security policy was an important aspect of Bulgarian
reform process. In the years of changes were defined the new orientation, the new
objectives and priorities, the new principles and norms, the new style of making
foreign policy, the new diplomacy.121 The most devoted ally of the Soviet Union in
the period of Cold War decisively reoriented its foreign policy priorities westwards. 
In that period Bulgaria took part in the abolition of the political, economic and
military structures of the Soviet block. In 1990 was signed a trade agreement with the
European Communities. In 1991 Bulgaria joined the North Atlantic Council for Co-
operation. In the following year it became a member of the Council of Europe. In
1993 was signed the European Agreement on Associations. A year later Bulgaria
joined the Partnership for Peace Program, initiated by NATO. Soon after that Bulgaria
received a statute of Associated partner of WEU. In 1995 the Bulgarian government
officially applied for full-scale membership in the European Union and after many
controversial assessments in February 2000, negotiations were started on that. All
these steps changed the position of Bulgaria in the changing world.
Special attention was paid to the events in South-Eastern Europe. Bulgaria succeeded
in establishing normal relations with most of its neighbours. In February 1991 was
signed the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Security with Greece. On 15
January Bulgaria recognized the independence of the former Yugoslav republics
Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bulgaria was the first
country to recognize the Macedonian independence. That step dispelled all
apprehensions about possible nationalistic claims towards this former Yugoslav
republic, which is connected in a special way with Bulgarian history122. In that year
were signed the bilateral treaties with Turkey and Romania. Bulgaria also reached 
                                           
121 Желев, Ж. В голямата политика. Книгоиздателска къща “Труд”, София, 1998, с.9. ( Zhelyu
Zhelev, In the Big Politics, Publishing House LABOR, Sofia, 1998, p.9.
122 A Bulgarian MP gave a witty expression to the ethnical relationship between Bulgarians and
Macedonians: ’What will remain after giving a bath to a Macedonian?  -  Dirty water and a clean
Bulgarian’.
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Confidence-building agreements with Greece and Turkey. According to them the
troops on both sides of the common borders were withdrawn. Later were signed
treaties on the bases of the bilateral relations with Albania and Croatia. In this way the
Bulgarian foreign policy managed to provide a good net of bilateral agreements with
the other Balkan states, which ensured peaceful conditions for the reform process in
the country. But the relations with remaining Yugoslavia were not easy. To a great
extent the reforms in Bulgaria were victimized by the events in and around
Yugoslavia.123
The emerging new structure of the international system appeared to be a serious
challenge for the architects of the international security and co-operation and also for
the driving forces of the radical changes in Central and South-Eastern Europe. Its
layouts will include the inherited realities but they must also include the, still barely
outlined, new tendencies in world development, in the changing military-strategic,
political, economic and ecological environment. The Yalta epoch marked the
beginning of the, still remaining in the shadow of the East-West disagreements,
changes in the paradigms of the relations between the countries.124 The bipolar model
of international relations subordinated the interests of the state to the interests of the
system to which it belonged. Till now, all the restrictions on the independence were
connected with the confrontation of the two value-systems of social development. But
still, the genesis of a new tendency, which came out not only as a result of the cold
war, remains out of the attention of the people who analyse the post-war period.
During that period began the real restriction and denial of the idea of the sovereignty
of the countries in another context, connected with the advent of the clash between
national fragmentation (especially of Europe) and the requirements which the
Science-Tech Revolution and globalisation set for broad social organization in the
different spheres of life. The revision of the attitude towards the, still accepted as a
base of the international relations, principles of sovereignty will inevitably put its
mark on the ideas for a new security system and will challenge the political class
formed with the dogmas of the theoretical constructions of the nation-state paradigms. 
                                           
123 This view was expressed many times by Prime Minister Ivan Kostov. For example look at
Демокрация, 23 януари, 2000 г. ( Democracy daily, 23 January 2000.)
124 See: Eric Remacle/ Reimund Seidelmann (Eds.) Pan-European Security Redefined, Nomos-Verlag,
Baden-Baden, 1998.
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Particularly serious will be the challenges of its representatives in the countries
seeking their new role in the emerging new world order. The analysis of the new
dimensions and contents of the category “national security” will be very difficult.
The restructuring of the international system and the redistribution of the roles of the,
still existing and now emerging, factors will have a fateful effect on regions in which
a “power vacuum” appeared. The place of these regions in the new system of
international relations will be determined by the new trends in the relations of the
dominant powers. One of the main reasons for retaining conflict potentials and
turmoil in different parts of Europe is the practical preservation of dividing lines
between countries at different level of their political and economic development, with
differences in their culture, religion, with different images in the stereotypes of
perception and so. However, the existence of differences between the leading powers
on the concept of new world order and regional co-operation is crucial. In the new
conditions these factors are the European Union (after the Maastricht Treaty) with its
own common foreign and security policy, USA - seeking possibilities to preserve its
status of a European power with key role on the continent125 and, of course, Russia
which is seeking its new identity in the international system. The relations in this
triangle will redraw the political map of Europe. For the countries from these regions
the problems of security will become painfully sensitive. It is highly probable that
because of the difficult for analysis possibilities their foreign policy priorities will not
coincide with the variety of strategies and policies of the determining factors. In the
multi-polar system this lack of cohesion will become a source of tension in the
international relations.
With the end of the cold war began a radical restructuring of the international system,
which inevitably exerted influence on the ongoing regional and worldwide processes.
The last decade of the 20th Century will remain in the history as a turnover in the
developments in the changing entities and in the relations among them. Currently
there is a process of overcoming the diatomic character of the international 
                                           
125 See ,for example ,Richard N. Haass, What to Do With American Primacy, Foreign Affairs
,September/October 1999 p.37 – 49;Speech by the President of India Shri K.R. Narayanan at the
banquet in honor  of His Excellency Mr. William Clinton, President of The United States of America,
New Delhi  March 21,2000
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community and the, connected with it, ideological, economic and military-political
gap. In contrast to other turning points in the history of international relations, now
the change came without an outbreak of a global military conflict. In the frameworks
of the bipolar system the two opposing sides had mobilized enormous potentials
which, without being put into action, made their specific mark on the current events.
They forced the mankind to rethink the whole absurdity of the military-strategic
situation, which contains in it the possibility for self-destruction.
The main form of denial of the absurdity of divided Europe is the realization of the
idea of regional and continental co-operation. The idea of united Europe has never
been so close to its practical application. A step to that end is the regional co-
operation in the historically differentiated parts of the continent. The European Union
is the most impressive example. A kind of regional co-operation is organized within
the European Free Trade Association. Efforts are made to organize co-operation in
Central Europe, in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, on the Balkans. Stimulating the
efforts in that direction is the position of the European Union, putting as a
precondition to candidates for membership for starting talks on that the active
participation in other regional forms of cooperation.
The efforts to organize new societies have to comply with the notion for new world
order. Until now, the international systems were based on the national idea and the
states were their basic elements. Those states, large or small, powerful or weak, were
considered equal by the international law. Now we are witnessing abandoning this
concept. The idea of sovereign equality is jeopardized by the understanding that the
attitude to every state should be formed on the basis of its commitments to values as
democracy, market economy and human rights. There is something new in the
international atmosphere. The new world order perceives as threats to security and
well being any deviation from the mentioned values. This gives ground for
undertaking actions against regimes, responsible for establishing domestic order in
contradiction to the rules, pretending to be new international norms. They are
presented as accepted by “the international community”.  The need of action on its
behalf is measured by the humanitarian costs of failing to influence such regimes. The
case of Yugoslavia and the regime of S. Milosevic give good confirmation of such
conclusions, although it is difficult to consider for example China and Russia 
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members of this international community. But still Russia is something quite different
from the Soviet Union. Today’s China is also different from the time of Mao’s rule.126
Today, in the relations of the former rivals can be witnessed signs of partnership.
But in those conditions the SEE countries in transition are in some kind of hesitation –
which of the favorite models of social development (of EU or of the USA) to follow.
It appears that they came to the difference very late. The outcome will depend on the
interests and the policy of those important factors in the international system.
These are only few of the observations on the trends, shaping the new world and the
future of the SEE countries. Related to the adopted policies by the various succeeding
governments of Bulgaria in the period of transition it is difficult to trace signs that
they are based on such perceptions. For example, looking for its new place in the
world, Bulgaria attempted to capitalize on anti-Soviet and anti-Russian feelings. Years
were needed for the Bulgarian political elite in the whole spectre to realize that the
long dispute for pro-Western or pro-Russian orientation has been meaningless.
Bulgaria had difficulties to make sense of the new realities in South-Eastern Europe.
On one hand in the region dominates the transition to democracy and market-
orientated economy. There is a total orientation of all countries from that part of the
continent towards integration in the European political, economic and security
structures.  On the other hand some events on the Balkans still manifest their
notorious characteristics they have acquired in the early beginning of this century -
political crises, turmoil, military conflicts, involvement of non-regional powers.  The
clash between the tendencies of europeization and re-balkanization of the region
produces dramatic events.127
                                           
126Compare with: Achim Gussgen/ Reimund Seidelmann/ Ting Wai (Eds.), Hong Kong after
Reunification. Problems and Perspectives, Nomos-Verlag Baden-Baden 2000.
127 In a lecture before the Club of the World Politics in California in September 2000 (before the fall of
Miloshevich) under the title “After Kosovo – the perspectives for peace and prosperity of the Balkans”,
Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov pointed very correctly that the changes in Bulgaria ad Romania did
not bring the expected prosperity and in Serbian’s estimation both countries do not offer a reasonable
alternative to the communist nationalism of Miloshevich
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The development of the processes in this region is a function both of the local factors
and the policy of the main, out-of-the-region, powers, which have interests in this part
of the world. It is probable that they will find common formula for the division of
labour in this difficult region. The USA can remain a European power trough strongly
felt American presence in the Balkans, accepted by the European Union and Russia.
The crisis in Yugoslavia set the path for this way of development. The European
Union is not very enthusiastic about the acceptance of the countries from this
turbulent region as new full members. Russia, which lost a great deal of its influence
in the region in which the country is traditionally interested, would be pleased if the
European Union and the USA allow her to preserve its position in this concentration
of interests. This outlines the perspective of South-Eastern Europe becoming an arena
for compromises between the interests of the main factors on which depends Europe’s
security. This means that security and co-operation in this part of the continent will be
a resultant of correlation of powers among the three centres. And the ratio is destined
to be ever- changing. The redistribution of the roles between them, changing their
functions in the international system, global powers will have fateful effects on the
people from South-Eastern Europe. It is already discerned that the foreign-policy
initiatives for South-Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the region around the Black Sea
synthesize in themselves the new moments in the attitude of the European Union,
USA and Russia. On that will depend the direction of NATO’s and EU’s
enlargements and the way they will cover South-Eastern Europe.  Absolute support
for this conclusion gives the discussion on USA’s initiatives for the development of
the cooperation in South-Eastern Europe and recently, in connection with the Kosovo
crisis, on the so-called Stability Pact.128
The processes on the Balkans after the end of the cold war create conditions for the
synthesis of new formula of compromise between the two Atlantic power-centres with
a specified role for Russia. The events make the USA prone to strengthening their
presence, including military build up, in South-Eastern Europe as counterbalance to
the weakening reasons for US military presence in Western and Central Europe.
Meanwhile, USA’s engagement with the responsibilities of changing the notorious
fame of the Balkans gives chance to the European Union to set apart from the difficult 
                                           
128 www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/see/stapact/10_june_99.htm
167
problems in the region which can cause unpredictable effect on its ambition to
develop as an absolutely new entity in the international system. 
The intention of the new US administration to withdraw the American forces from
South-Eastern Europe provides conditions for new developments. It might engage the
EU with new role in the region. The peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo
is kept by foreign military presence.  In case of US withdrawal the EU will have to
increase its military functions. That might change the Russian attitude towards the EU
enlargement. Now Russia is against NATO’s enlargement in Southeastern direction,
but it never declared negative position towards accession of Balkan countries to the
EU. Changing the roles of the USA and the EU in the region may change Russian
position on EU’s enlargement with all the consequences for the prospects for EU
membership of Balkan countries.
Because of this division of labor between the USA and the European Union, the
efforts of the countries from South-Eastern Europe to strengthen the foreign
guarantees for their security will oscillate between the attracting force fields of the
two power-centers. The new conditions can give the countries from the region
unspecified, for them, place and role in the new system of international relations. This
tendency can set them apart from the European and Atlantic structures. This can be
unacceptable for the choice already made by the countries from the South-Eastern
Europe, but it is at least a variant for reconciliation of the interests of USA, European
Union and Russia. If the, overloaded with historical responsibility for the destiny of
their people, political class does not navigate well, considering  the new tendencies in
the restructuring of the international system then the region may find itself, for one
more time, a victim of the compromises in the “great politics”.
This situation gives chances for more active role of the neutral and non-allied
countries in South-Eastern Europe. They can give their positive impact directly and
through international organizations. Some of the Bulgarian foreign policy initiatives
could be of some interest for independent countries, but I would like to stress on the
fact that after starting talks for EU-membership Bulgarian foreign policy is
coordinating its steps with the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union.
Most of the efforts are aimed at the developments in South-Eastern Europe. 
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For example Switzerland has accepted the Bulgarian proposal for swap agreements
with some of its creditors on “debt for environment”. Based on bilateral arrangements,
a successful project is under way.
It is my personal view that independent countries could pay a special attention to the
proposal within the Stability Pact for establishing a special fund, accumulating part of
the foreign debt payments of the SEE countries and those financial resources to be
used for financing some of the approved by the Stability Pact projects. It is an attempt
to find solution of the problem, coming from the difficulties in raising capital in
support of the multilateral initiatives. I do not expect enthusiastic support for that
proposal from the creditors, but still it gives chances for Swiss banks and other
companies to play a role in realizing the idea, in case it is accepted.
For independent countries it might be of special interest to follow the steps towards
establishing regional Combined Joint Task Forces in South-Eastern Europe, in which
Bulgaria is playing a leading role. This is a new military structure and, although
initiated by NATO, Swiss firms could find some opportunities for supplies.
 Although in certain cases it seems that in Bulgaria the chances for more active role as
a neutral and for now non-allied country are neglected. It would not be an
exaggeration to say that in this period of changes Bulgarian decision-makers were
perceiving the new realities primarily through the old concepts of the bipolar
world.129 That prevented them from adequate assessment of the fast changing
international environment and the trends, shaping its future. The drama came from the
strong will for implication of Bulgaria’s development in the modern world, on one
hand, and the lack of clear understanding for the ongoing processes at global scale, on
another.
4.6.1.Overcoming the Satellite Syndrome 
One of the explanations of the drama of Bulgaria’s transition is based on its specific
relations with the former Soviet Union. For centuries Bulgaria has been fatefully
connected with Russia and after the World War II with the Soviet Union. After the 
                                           
129 As a Capital daily paper said “Bulgarian politicians salute before the order is given to them”. Here
we are coming to the political culture of people whose way of behavior and style of work, created in
the totalitarian period, have not changed. If it was not a pity, it would be funny.
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restoration of the Bulgarian state in 1878 with Russia’s help the relations with the
liberator have played an important role in the developments in the country and for
defining its position in the international system. A long range of historic, cultural,
political and economic reasons determines the whole peculiarity of the bilateral
relations. The oddity of Russo-Bulgarian relations reached its climax in the post-war
period, when the Yalta deal among the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain
gave legitimacy to the course of bilateral all-round rapprochement. For almost half a
century Bulgaria was the closest ally of Moscow. The Soviet Union was Bulgaria’s
main economic and trade partner. More than half of the Bulgarian foreign trade was
with the Soviet Union. In the 80-s it amounted up to 14 billion US dollars. The
Bulgarian economy was fully dependent on Soviet resources and its market. For the
Bulgarian political elite then this course was a synthesis of the way the world was
perceived by it and showed reconciliation with the predetermined position of Bulgaria
in the bipolar world.
At the turning point of history at the end of the 20-th century a process of moving
away in the relations between Bulgaria and Russia is witnessed. The bilateral relations
became a hostage of the changes in the international system. The rearrangement of
Bulgaria’s foreign policy priorities has acquired anti-Russian dimensions. With all its
problems Russia could not be chosen by Bulgaria as a reliable partner.  Bulgaria was
the first among the former allies of the Soviet Union to denounce the bilateral Treaty
for Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance in August 1991. The government
of D. Popov made a proposal to the Parliament for denunciation of the treaty and
stood against immediate signing of new one.130  With majority it was supported by the
National Assembly. 
 It seems that for a definite time Bulgaria was feeling awkward about keeping active
contacts with Russia. There were some apprehensions that they could be an obstacle
for establishing active interaction with the new priority partners. For a while in
Bulgaria the negative attitude to the out of tune “friendship for ever” has been
transformed into totally negative attitude to Russian goods, market, capitals, culture.
The supply of energy is dependent on Russia, including the fuel for the nuclear power 
                                           
130 Отечествен фронт, 31 юли 1991 г. ( Fatherland front daily , 31 July 1991)
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station. Nevertheless, one could trace a tendency of increasing anti-Russian
sentiments as a basis for getting more sympathy from the west. At the same time,
when Bulgaria was seeking more sympathy from the West for deteriorating its ties
with Russia, the western countries and Russia were establishing partnership in their
relations.
4.6.2. On the perspectives of the SEEC-Russian relations
No doubt Russia will stick to the traditions of its foreign policy to pay a special
attention to the developments in the Balkans. Of course Russia is not the super power
the Soviet Union used to be, but its role in International Relations is still quite
significant. The West itself bears this in mind by not excluding Russia from all the
important initiatives, concerning South-Eastern Europe. The most recent example in
this respect, of course, is the Stability Pact. So, Southeast European countries (SEEC)
must perceive the new trends in International Relations. Today’s system is different
from the one, established by the Yalta summit. The West already considers Russia a
partner, rather than an enemy. So, SEEC need not be hostile towards Russia. The
hostile attitude towards it won’t improve their chances in the aspiration to full-fledged
membership in the Euro-Atlantic structures. The acceptance of the norms and values
of the West does not enter in collision with the relations with Russia. Moreover, most
of the SEEC are dependent on the energy supplies form Russia. And this is something
that Russia can always use as leverage in its relations with the abovementioned
countries. To some extent Russia will predetermine what would be the role of the
region in transportation of gas and oil. It is of special interest for the SEEC to
facilitate transportation of the strategic energy resources through heir territories.  So
the relations of these states with Russia must get rid of the emotions from the past and
must be based on a new, modern pragmatic approach. In the recent years there was
enough evidence that Russia was encouraging investments of its companies in SEEC.
But obviously the authorities of the former Soviet allies did their best to prevent
participation of Russian capital in the privatization. The political emotions contributed
for deteriorating the trade relations and countries like Bulgaria had lost positions on
the Russian market.
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4.6.3.The Foreign Policy of Bulgarian Governments After 1989.
Every one of all succeeding governments, which have ruled Bulgaria in the 90-s, gave
its own contribution in paving the roads to the new Bulgarian priority partners.
Important factors in shaping the new foreign policy of the country were the three
presidents Peter Mladenov (1989-1990), Zhelyu Zhelev (1990-1997) and Peter
Stoyanov (after 1997). For 18 years (1971-1989) Mladenov had been minister for
foreign affairs and played a crucial role in letting Zhivkov step down. Becoming head
of the state he demonstrated his reformist views on foreign policy, stressing on the
need of Bulgaria’s opening towards co-operation with all countries.131 Zhelev, as
opposition leader, was more radical in establishing pro-western foreign policy
priorities. According to his understanding the first task of the new Bulgarian foreign
policy was to overthrow the dependence on the economic, political and military
structures, which were binding the country to the international communist system and
only after that could be undertaken constructive steps towards affiliation with the
European and Euro-Atlantic structures.132 Dr. Zhelev became a spokesman for the
aspirations of democratic Bulgaria. In a speech at the 45-th session of the UN General
Assembly he declared that Bulgaria is no more a communist state. Peter Stoyanov
stressed many times that the integration of Bulgaria in the Euro-Atlantic structures is
a top priority of Bulgaria’s foreign policy, based on the fact that the country is an
integral part of the European history and civilization.  Anyhow, the constitution
defines restricted role of the president in elaborating and executing the foreign policy.
It lies within the competence of the government. Therefore it might be useful to
outline some of the priorities of the governments, which had ruled Bulgaria in the
period of transition. 
From February till the end of 1990 prime minister of Bulgaria was one of the
architects of the changes in Bulgaria Andrey Loukanov. His two governments were
formed by the Socialist Party but he demonstrated will for involving the opposition in 
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discussing the new foreign policy orientation. Part of these efforts was the election
with the support of the socialist majority in the parliament the opposition leader
Zhelev133 for president. In May 1990 was signed the Trade Agreement with the
European Communities. In November 1990 Lyuben Gotzev (an ex-general from the
Intelligence service) was the first Bulgarian foreign minister to visit the NATO’s
headquarters in Brussels. Loukanov visited all neighbouring states, stressing on the
peaceful regional policy of Bulgaria. In early 1990 a meeting of foreign minister
Boyko Dimitrov with his Turkish counterpart Mesut Yalmas gave a new start in the
bilateral dialog, after their blocking in connection with the policy of the former
regime towards the Turkish minority in Bulgaria.134 
The rule of Loukanov’s government is associated with a rather controversial step. A
commodity crisis comes in the country.135 In early 1990 it declared a moratorium on
debt payments. That meant exclusion of the country from the international financial
markets. In that context were interpreted the three visits of the prime minister to Paris,
but obviously they were not successful. The authority of Loukanov in Moscow was
considered as an important factor in the relations with the Soviet Union. But the swift
changes there left little chance for such factors.
The next Bulgarian government was formed on the basis of compromise among the
main political parties. They shared the understanding that for overcoming the crisis in
the country a coalition government is needed. The coalition cabinet of Dimiter Popov
(December 1990-November 1991) had the important task to preserve the social peace
and it was not supposed to make radical changes in the foreign policy. But pressed by
the developments in the international environment it had to react to them. The
collapse of the Soviet Union brought disappointments for the leftist majority in the 
                                           
133 This choice is shrouded in mystery even to this day. There is some talk that Zhelev was recruited by
Security service before 1989.However the only thing for sure is that the boss of Intelligence service at
the time of his presidency today is a leading figure not elsewhere, but exactly in the socialist party.
134 The regime has put into practice a ridiculous policy of forcing the people of the Turkish
minority to change their names with Bulgarian ones. It was done according to an approved by the
authorities list of names. Restrictions on circumcisions, traditional among Muslims,  were imposed.
The arguments were that the Muslims in Bulgaria were successors of forcefully converted to Islam
Bulgarians during the Turkish rule. 
135 It is not accident that one of the most popular daily papers wrote: “The shelves in the stores are
empty like the heads of MP-s. Today the most of Bulgarians, seeing the already full shelves, comment
the progress of the passed 10 years as a substitution of the empty shelves for empty pockets. And
empty still are the heads of MP-s and politicians.
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parliament and encouraged further steps towards establishing active relations with
Western countries and organizations. In January 1991 the USA granted Bulgaria with
the most favoured nation status. In March 1991 a group of MP, representatives of all
political parties, initiated a campaign for dialog with NATO. That government had to
sign the Protocol for closing down the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.136
The Warsaw Pact ceased its existence formally on 1 July 1991.137  In the atmosphere
of prevailing pro-Western mood the government had to decide what would be the
future of the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with the
Soviet Union. Its term was expiring on 4 August 1992, but the parties had to decide,
according to the provision of its Article 10, a year earlier whether it would be
prolonged or denounced. The proposal of the government to denounce the treaty138
was supported by a majority in the parliament.
A success of the new European priorities of Bulgarian foreign policy was the Treaty
on Friendly Co-operation and Partnership in Europe with Germany, signed on 9
October 1991.139 In it was stressed on the readiness of Germany to provide support for
the economic development of Bulgaria.140
The Yugoslav crisis came as a great challenge for Popov’s government. Next to the
Bulgarian border began a military conflict. In that very complicated domestic and
international situation the government managed to formulate a sound position. It took
a stand against interference in the conflict. 
Popov visited Greece twice - in February and in October 1991. His government
managed to consolidate the positive trends from previous times in Bulgarian-Greek
relations in the changing environment. The bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Co-
operation and Security141, signed in November 1991 was a remarkable success.
                                           
136 The Protocol was approved by the Greater National Assembly on 25 June 1991 (Държавен
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137 That Protocol was signed in Prague by president Zhelev.
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The government of Philip Dimitrov (November 1991-December 1992) came to power
after the parliamentary elections in October 1991, when the Union of Democratic
Forces (centrist and right-wing parties) won a tiny majority of 1,5 per cent. At first
that government had the support of the Movement for Rights and Freedom, perceived
as a party of the Turkish minority. The prime minister declared the following foreign
policy priorities of his government:
1. Rapprochement and establishing friendly relations with the NATO’s
neighbours and respecting the sovereignty of all Balkan states and the right of self-
determination;
2. Search for international guarantees for border stability;
3. Participation in conflict resolutions within international institutions;
4. Activity for accelerated European and Euro-Atlantic integration.142
In December 1991 the foreign minister Stoyan Ganev formulated the strategic
goal of his government - integration into NATO in the context of a single European
security space.143 This orientation was encouraged by the West. With Italy was signed
a Treaty on Co-operation144, with France - a Treaty on Understanding, Friendship and
Co-operation145. In May 1992 Bulgaria became a member of the Council of Europe.
Soon after that were started negotiations for signing the European Agreement on
Association of Bulgaria to the European Communities.
At that time the Yugoslav crisis provoked a special attention of Bulgarian foreign
policy to the developments in the region. It was declared that Bulgaria has no
territorial claims towards Serbia and insisted on reciprocal step from Serbian side.146
Then was launched the Bulgarian initiative for “Balkan Helsinki”. It was based on the
idea that after the transformations in the region could be organized a conference of all
Balkan countries. It was a Bulgarian proposal at such conference to be signed a
Balkan Charter, confirming the existing borders and rejecting any territorial claims.147
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143 The statement was made at the Constituent Assembly of North Atlantic Council for Co-operation on
20 December 1991.
144 Държавен вестник, бр. 30, 1993 г.(Official Gazette, No 30, 1993.)
145Държавен вестник, бр. 94, 1993 г.(Official Gazette, No 94, 1993.)
146 Демокрация, 29 февруари 1992 г. (Democracy daily, 29 February 1992)
147 Демокрация, 1 март 1992 г. (Democracy daily, 1 March 1992)
175
The maturity of the declared new foreign policy of Bulgaria was tested when
Macedonia declared its independence. From Bulgarian side was demonstrated
readiness to recognize the independence of the former Yugoslav republics, but the
USA’s and European Communities hesitation discouraged such step. Nevertheless on
January 15, 1992 the Bulgarian government decided to recognize Slovenia, Croatia,
Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as independent states. Till then no one
country had recognized Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria was the
first to do that and the reaction abroad caused some tension among the ruling
coalition. On the day when the decision was taken the speaker of the parliament and
the foreign minister were abroad. The latter was for consultations in Bonn, Athens
and Rome. The advises were not to do that. Greece called it hasty step.  In that
situation officially was declared that recognition of the Macedonian state does not
mean recognition of Macedonian nation. Recognizing Macedonia the government
wanted to prove that Bulgaria had no territorial claims and was ready to accept the
new realities in the region. In that context were the treaties on friendship and co-
operation with Rumania and Turkey.
In June 1992 president Zhelev took part in the Conference on Black Sea Economic
Co-operation and together with other 10 heads of states signed the Istanbul
Declaration on co-operation in the Black Sea region.148
Bulgaria was visited by the Russian president Eltzin in August 1992 and then was
signed the bilateral Treaty on Friendly relations and Co-operation.149
The new course of Bulgaria in the international relations was stimulated also by the
election of foreign minister Stoyan Ganev to chair the 47 Session of the UN General
Assembly. But being away from the events in the country he lost positions in the
ruling coalition. That contributed for deepening the crisis in the parliament, where the
government lost confidence. 
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At the end of 1992 was formed a new government (December 1992 - October 1994),
with the mandate of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (which played an
important role in the losing confidence of the former government). Prime minister and
minister for foreign affairs became Prof. Lyuben Berov (an advisor of the president
until then).  His government had no clear support in the parliament. It was a non-party
government, which tried to gain wider support with attempts to take off the edge of
the political confrontation. Mainly it depended on the support of the Socialist Party
and the party of the Turkish minority. Its foreign policy program was very moderate
in comparison to the former one. In its policy statement was said that it would follow
a “policy of co-operation with all democratic states and international organizations”150
Nevertheless this government had the chance to sign in January 1993 the chemical
weapons ban treaty and in March 1993 the European Agreement on Association with
the European Union. During the visit of Prof. Berov in Moscow was reached an
important for the Bulgarian economy agreement on gas supplies from Russia. In 1993
Bulgaria was visited by the German chancellor, the Greek, Albanian and Yugoslav
prime ministers. In February 1994 Bulgaria joined the Partnership for Peace Program.
In 1994 the Bulgarian foreign minister Stanislav Daskalov chaired the Council of
Europe and had delicate but successful missions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova
and Albania. In October 1993 Bulgaria became a member of the French-speaking
Commonwealth - Francophonia.
Unfortunately the government of Prof. Berov had to cope with problems, caused to
Bulgaria by the UN sanctions against Yugoslavia. As a side effect of the collective
measures of the international community Bulgaria was cut from Central and Western
Europe and the Bulgarian economy suffered severe losses. The embargo increased the
criminal activity in the country. The government of Prof. Berov practically did not
take any efficient steps against it. The shadow economy blossomed. The isolation of
Bulgaria due to the sanctions let the government to be very active in discussing the
infrastructure problems of South-Eastern Europe. Proposals were made to Rumania
for construction of bridge over river Danube, and to Greece for opening three new
checkpoints on the common border. This issue was linked with the talks for 
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agreement on the waters of river Mesta. To Macedonia was proposed to connect the
railways of both neighbouring countries.
The government of Prof. Berov tried to stress on developing relations with Western
Europe, to maintain well-balanced relations with the Balkan countries and to revive
the contacts with the partners from Eastern Europe.
In October 1994 the government unexpectedly stepped down, the parliament was
dissolved and according to the constitution the president formed a transitional
government headed by one of his advisors Reneta Indjova (November 1994 - January
1995). In this period the president was more active in the international field. He
represented Bulgaria in Budapest at the CSCE, when the OSCE was established.
After the parliamentary elections in December 1994 a government of the Socialist
Party, led by Jan Videnov was formed (January 1995 - February 1997). As a result of
the conflicts within the party this government was not successful. In its Platform the
Socialist Party declared that it will seek “hastened integration of Bulgaria in the
European and Euro-Atlantic structures, equal in rights and more active relations with
Russia and the United States of America and restoring the Bulgarian positions in the
former Soviet Republics, the Middle East and Asia”. In February 1995 the European
Agreement was put in operation. In December 1995 Bulgaria applied for EU
membership. In December 1996 Bulgaria entered the World Trade Organization.  Still
the government of Videnov failed to formulate clear view on its relations with NATO.
That let the Western countries and institutions hold aloof. 
After the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina the Bulgarian government
managed to organize in Sofia in June 1996 a meeting of the ministers of foreign
affairs of countries of South-Eastern Europe. A special role in making this meeting
possible played the Bulgarian foreign minister Gueorgui Pirinski. In Sofia the
representatives of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania,
Turkey and Yugoslavia committed themselves “that every effort shall be made to
transform the region into an area of stability, security and co-operation in line with the 
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general developments throughout Europe”151. They stressed that these endeavours
were aimed at contributing to the construction of a new Europe - a Europe of
democracy, peace, unity and stability, thus enabling all nations in the region to live
together in peace with each other as good neighbours.152 The ministers agreed to
launch a comprehensive process of multilateral cooperation in enhancing good-
neighbourly relations including confidence- and security-building measures,
development of economic co-operation through cross-border co-operation, upgrading
transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructures, trade and investment
promotion, development of humanitarian, social, and cultural contacts, co-operation
in the field of justice, combat of organized crime, illicit drug and arms trafficking and
elimination of terrorism.153  Undoubtedly the ministerial meeting in Sofia was one of
the few foreign policy successes of the Videnov’s government. It gave chance to the
representatives of the Balkan countries to express their view on the regional co-
operation after the Cold War. It came after the launching of several initiatives for co-
operation in South-Eastern Europe, coming from power centres out of the region.
The relations with Russia and China fell short of the government’s expectations. The
hopes for establishing economic contacts with the two giants were in vain. Referring
his visit in China in 1996 the prime minister admitted himself that “the visit did not
reach the so strongly wished and expected results”154. Those attempts only hampered
developing relations with the West. The Videnov’s government lost the support of the
international financial institutions, which was badly needed, having in mind the big
foreign debt. The unsuccessful foreign policy detonated the financial system of the
country. The economic and financial crisis turned into political one and the
government had to step down.
The transition government of Stefan Sofianski (February - May 1997), appointed by
President Peter Stoyanov, undertook a decisive step towards NATO-membership. In
contrast to Ukraine for example, which still does not have “ made a permanent 
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strategic choice in its foreign policy”155 on 17 February 1997 it declared officially the
will of Bulgaria to become a member of NATO.156 
The government of Ivan Kostov (Minister of Finances in the governments of Dimitar
Popov and Philip Dimitrov) managed to make further steps in developing the relations
with the priority partners and mainly with the European Union, NATO and the Balkan
neighbours. It was a success to receive the invitation from the European Union for
starting accession talks. During the Kosovo crisis Bulgaria behaved as a member of
NATO. In 1997 was reached an agreement with Turkey on demarcation of the
common border along the river Resovska. There are good prospects for opening three
new checkpoints on the border with Greece in compliance with the agreement from
1996. The joint declaration with Macedonia from 24 February 1999 157gave new start
of the bilateral relations and brought a positive effect on the developments, related to
the Kosovo crisis. After long discussions with Rumania in February 2000 was found a
solution of the problems hampering construction of new bridge over river Danube.
The Bulgarian government has initiated a concerted action of the states neighbouring
Yugoslavia to achieve refocusing of the sanctions against the regime in that country
and to diminish the negative effect on them and on the civilians in Yugoslavia. As the
Bulgarian prime minister put it “the only sufferers from the sanctions are the
neighbours and the ordinary Serbs”158. That was the main topic discussed at the
meeting of the prime ministers of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia and Rumania on 22 January 2000 in the Bulgarian
balneologic centre Hissar. The seven governmental leaders declared that the economic
sanctions are an important political instrument, which has its high price and they
stressed on the negative effect on the region.159
The strong polarization of the political life in Bulgaria in the last decade did not allow
the governments in that period to elaborate and follow a consistent and sound foreign 
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policy. In the countries with longer existing democracy some balance is reached by
changing of left-wing and right-wing governments. A balance like this is very
difficult in countries in transition such as Bulgaria. The profound differences between
the Socialist Party and the Union of Democratic Forces, which dominated the political
scene, made the foreign policy continuity impossible. That let the priority partners to
refrain from establishing more active relations with the country.
4.6.4. Southeastern Europe Nowadays and Bulgarian Foreign Policy
In the 90-s South-Eastern Europe is gaining features of one of the regions with most
dynamic geopolitical, social and economic changes. They reflect the radical
transformations in the international system and give new dimensions of the regional
problems. On the eve of the new century the Balkans have the chance to brake with
their notorious past and become an integral part of united Europe. But the
Southeastern part of the old continent remains the most distant from the dominating
trends, shaping new Europe. In spite of their efforts, the people from this region
cannot overcome the fact that their countries are far behind in their development from
the rest of the continent, which keeps them apart of the modern international
structures. And after the end of the cold war the future of South-Eastern Europe
remains uncertain. In contrast with the triumph of the ideas of Jean Monet in Western
Europe, in South-Eastern Europe the unsolved national problem brought into being
new states. Inevitably they will have to pass a period of seeking recognition in the
old-style nationalism, stressing on sovereignty. All that brought the potential danger
of reviving the notorious fame of the region as the most troublesome places into
reality. For years, at the end of the 20-th century a war is carried out in Europe. The
collapse of the Yugoslav federation degenerated in many conflicts. The Bosnian one
grew into a serious international crisis, which needed great efforts of the world
community to find a temporary solution. 
A complex mixture of contradicting realities and myths brought the Kosovo problem
also to the stage of acute international crisis. Kosovo became good occasion for
letting the public opinion get better understanding for the radical changes which had
taken place in the international system. In the most obvious way was applied the new
right to intervene in sovereign country where internal violence was breaking the new 
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values. In response to the need to be stopped the ethnic cleansing in the Yugoslav
province, which earlier had proclaimed itself independent republic NATO undertook
a military operation against Yugoslavia in the form of air attacks. It was an
unprecedented action and that is why politicians, military experts and academics will
deal with it long time ahead. One has to bare in mind the discussions on how
successful was the NATO operation, supported by many other countries, including all
neighbours of Yugoslavia, and many international institutions. Still some lessons can
be drawn from the events, related to the Kosovo crisis.
1. The Kosovo crisis proved that any intervention in single country or region
in defence of the new values couldn’t be unilateral action, even of mighty structures
like NATO. The only way to overcome suspicions for pursuit of selfish interests in
such case is building a multi-state coalition with mandate from widely recognized
international institution. The initial attempt of NATO to neglect the United Nations
failed, because there was no alternative to legitimate the action.
2. One cannot expect that the regional co-operation should be fully subjugated
to the interests of global powers. Regional co-operation is possible only when it meets
the interests of the involved countries.
3. Regional co-operation can’t be organized against powers with declared
interests in the region. The nervousness in the Russian policy in the Balkans came as a
reaction to NATO’s disregard to its vision for the future of the region. The regional
co-operation in South-Eastern Europe can't be organized without co-operation among
the non-regional powers with important strategic, economic and political interests in
that part of Europe.
4. The reluctance of NATO and EU to enlarge in Southeast direction causes
the need to look for an odd solution of the problems in the region. There is some
doubt whether establishing protectorates (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo,
Montenegro and Macedonia may join the list) is more acceptable than enlargement of
structures of security and co-operation.
5. The Kosovo crisis gave evidence that South-Eastern Europe is perceived as
a peculiar entity (the Stability Pact, the observations of some politicians come to
confirm this perception).  George Soros is advising the Balkan states to unite their
efforts and insist on joining the European Union together. Regional co-operation can’t
give ground for one and the same attitude towards all co-operating countries in the
region from other international structures and states. Considering the Balkans as one 
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entity, without differentiation of the countries in the region, may lead to hampering
the process of enlargement of the European Union in that direction. That is
unacceptable for some of the countries in the region. They would not agree the
Stability Pact to replace their accession to the European Union.
6. Obviously the Yugoslav crisis is far from final resolution.160 Even after
Milosevic`s stepping down the uncertainty in Yugoslavia and in the region
emains. One could only guess what would follow in case of further desintegration
of that federatin. Steps of Montenegro and Kosovo in that direction would have
unpredictable consequences. That threatens the sense of Bulgaria’s pro-Western
orientation. Alternatives of more reliable communications with the Western
partners are needed. The destruction of the bridges over Danube in Serbia has cut
the main roads, connecting Bulgaria with Central and Western Europe. Those who
have bombed the bridges and closed the navigation along the river now do not
care for sooner clearing it.
The new conditions in the global system will seriously challenge the orientation to
co-operation in South-Eastern Europe. Avoiding the unfavourable effect from the new
configurations and tendencies in the relations among the global factors remains a task
for adequate analyses of the future development of the events for the statesmen from
the region. There is no doubt that a common political choice and acceptation of the
European values will transform the turbulent South-Eastern Europe into a
homogenous stable integral part of the continent with new identity. For the countries
from the region it is of crucial importance to harmonize their policy with the
comprehensive approach to security and co-operation in Europe and the ongoing
within OSCE process of developing a model for the 21st Century.  
Bulgaria stands firmly for building stability and cooperation on the basis of
international recognition and guarantees for the borders between the states in the
region. Any attempt for moving borders or proclaiming “pure” ethnic states is
dangerous not only for the region. In that context for Bulgaria Kosovo is part of
Yugoslavia.
                                           
160 The special envoy of UN Dienstbier yesterday qualified the activity of the international community
in Kosovo until today as a full failure, according to Reuters from 20 March 2000.
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After the end of Cold War the problems of regional co-operation in South-Eastern
Europe were addressed by several initiatives, but two of them worth mentioning - the
Royaumont Platform161 of the European Union (1995) and the Shifter Plan162 of the
United States (1996). These ideas for cooperation in South-Eastern Europe came from
outside the region. Then a Bulgarian initiative made an attempt to combine the views
of the European Union and the United States with the understanding for co-operation
of the countries from the region. A proposal for meeting of ministers for foreign
affairs of all states from South-Eastern Europe was made. To that meeting were
invited representatives of the United States, Russia, the European Union and
international organizations.
The countries from South Eastern Europe take a course towards creating a functioning
market economy and integration into NATO and EU, as well as other European
structures. Those events represent a favourable condition for economic development
of the region. In that context most of the SEE countries have undertaken serious
efforts towards democratisation of their political systems, restructuring their
economies, establishing civil control over the military structures. In many of them
new security concepts and military doctrines were adopted.
Till now, in the policy for regional cooperation of all the countries from South-
Eastern Europe dominates the European orientation. Though to a different extent of
certainty, they consider the co-operation among them a way to build in the common
European processes. This became a basis of the platform for regional cooperation in
the Sofia Declaration for good-neighbourly relation, stability, security and co-
operation on the Balkans, which declaration was adopted on the meeting of foreign
ministers of countries from South-Eastern Europe. On this meeting the ministers
analyzed the future opportunities for broad co-operation in European perspective, 
                                           
161 Royaumont Platform of the European Union for stability and good-neighborly relations in
SouthEastern Europe - a specification of the Stability Pact in Europe.
162 In March 1996 the special counselor of the US President and member of Council of National
Security Richard Shifter offered a plan for development of cooperation in this region which, in
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coming out as a result of the endeavor of each country to integrate in Europe. In this
context they declared their readiness to cooperate with other forms of regional
integration as the Central-European Free Trade Area and the Black Sea economic
cooperation. The ideas in the Sofia Declaration received further development at the
next ministerial meeting in Thessalloniki (1997), Istanbul (1998) and Bucharest
(1999), at the informal meeting of head of states and prime ministers on Crete in 1997
and in Bucharest in 2000. On 12 February 2000 the prime ministers of six Balkan
countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Rumania and Turkey) signed a
Charter on good neighbourhood, stability and security. This summit showed that the
countries from South-Eastern Europe could coordinate and harmonize their interests
and defend them in the international relations. The European dominant of these
initiatives can assure a strengthening effect on putting the regional co-operation on a
broader plan. There is no doubt that the countries from South-Eastern Europe show
firm will to gain from the advantages of regional co-operation.  But there is another
problem - how to make the co-operation of the Great Powers possible in the region.
A symbolic step towards putting the Balkans closer to the modern trends in
providing security was the first attempt for regional implementation of NATO’s
concept of Combined Joint Task Forces.163  In September 1998 the Defense Ministers
of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey have signed the
Agreement on organizing a Multinational Peace Force in South-Eastern Europe. This
Force (a brigade) will be available for possible employment in UN or OSCE
mandated NATO, or WEU-led operations for conflict prevention, peace support, or
humanitarian missions.164 The location of the brigade headquarters (HQ) will be on
four years rotational basis. The initial location is in Plovdiv (Bulgaria). The HQ of the
Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe was activated on 31 August 1999.
This Force is an essential precedent to generate security in the region by local sources.
For this breakthrough towards a comprehensive approach to security and defense
issues Bulgaria, as a serious applicant for full membership in the Euro-Atlantic
security structures, has played a leading role. This country in transition has assumed 
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the main burden of the common burden. Among all seven member-countries Bulgaria
provides 23.53 per cent of the Forces budget.
It is true that South-Eastern Europe is overwhelmingly occupied by its history. But
the people from this region cant live in its past. They have to cope with the severe
realities of transition to a new international system and to face the challenges of the
future. As the Bulgarian president Petar Stoyanov has put it recently in Warsaw at an
international conference “Partners in Transition” “the political instability on the
Balkans, caused by the conflicts in former Yugoslavia lets countries like Bulgaria,
Romania and Macedonia make twice bigger efforts for their economic reforms, than
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic”.165 He continued that the region badly
needs strategic investments, but the shadow of the events in former Yugoslavia lets
the potential investors restrain.166
On the finding the right way to co-operation in South-Eastern Europe depends not
only the future of Balkan people. Only europeization of the region can prevent
balkanisation of Europe. All attempts to exclude it from the prospective European
structures lay the risk for failure of the idea of United Europe - idea, which can revive
the crucial role of Europe in global developments.
 A promising attempt in that direction is the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe. It
is a joint effort of the international community to
1. Secure lasting peace, prosperity and stability for South-Eastern Europe;
2. Foster effective regional co-operation;
3. Give a firm European anchorage to the region, in which the European
Union will play a leading role.
4. Facilitate the objectives of the countries in the region to integrate into
Euro-Atlantic structures.167
5. The Stability Pact sketches out mechanisms and working procedures for
achievement of the stated objectives. The special coordinator is
responsible for promoting them within and between the individual 
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countries. Appropriate structures tailored to need have to support him. Their
special task is to prepare and forward work to the South-East Regional Table
and the Working Tables and to ensure the appropriate follow-up to the
decisions of these forums. The special coordinator has to be in regular contacts
with all Stability Pact participants, facilitators and observers, in particular EU
institutions and states of the region. The stability Pact office is in Thessaloniki.
The World Bank and the EU Commission have to co-ordinate the donor’s
activity. The Regional Table has to ensure that the Working Tables focus on
areas of work decisive from the point of view of stability in the region and
engage on issues where the Stability Pact process can create added value in
relation to other existing processes and initiatives. The Stability Pact sets up
three Working Tables: on democratisation and human rights, on economic
reconstruction, development and co-operation and on security issues.
The main strategic aim of the Working Tables is to:
1. Anchor democracy and respect for human rights throughout the region,
including by institutionalising OSCE commitments and principles in the
countries in the region, also through membership of the Council of Europe;
2. Promote greater prosperity and confidence throughout the region and
progressive integration into the European and global economy, including
by strengthening market economy and its institutions, rules and
regulations, promoting healthy business practices, contributing to the
sustainable re-integration of refugees and encouraging private investment
in the region, promoting economic co-operation, and progressively
creating free trade in the region and between the countries in the region
and the European Union;
3. Help create a climate of confidence and security throughout the region,
including by realization of defense planning and spending, the general
demilitarisation of societies within the region, transparency in defense
issues and other confidence building measures, democratic control of the 
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armed forces and paramilitary troops, effective control and reduction of small
arms.168
Bulgaria understands the Stability Pact as a mechanism for overcoming the risk of
isolating South-Eastern Europe from the processes in the rest of the continent. The
Pact can provide keeping the US and EU interest towards that region. Bulgaria stands
for deeper NATO involvement in strengthening the security in the region. In its
understanding the Pact should be a joint effort of many factors in the world
community - not only the European Union, but also the USA, Japan, the international
financial institutions. It is Bulgaria’s view that recipients of the assistance should be
all the countries in the region and the Pact should not be limited to liquidation of the
consequences of the Kosovo crisis. On its side Bulgaria does not want to be only a
recipient. It is eager to be a factor in the Stability Pact implementation. Supporting the
idea of organizing Working Tables, Bulgaria has already proposed:
1. To host a regional conference on democratisation of the region and
Yugoslavia;
2. In Sofia to be organized a Centre for Sustainable Development, or Centre
for Successful Models;
3. To be established a Fund for financing the development of the regional
infrastructure as part of the European infrastructure. Its resources to come
from the debt payments of the countries in the region to the creditors from the
Paris Club. This Fund can be an element of a swap of debts against
investments;
4. Within every Stability Pact project at least subcontractors from the countries
in the region to be involved and not less than 30-40 per cent of the resources to
be mastered by them;
5. A model for the law standards and the new legislation of the countries in the
region to be the Accession Partnership criteria.
 
 Bulgaria warns that the ideas and the projects, discussed within the Stability Pact may
cause jealous competition and relies on the new framework for cooperation to resolve
the problems, caused by the rivalries in the region.
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 In its contribution to make the Stability Pact a working mechanism Bulgaria pays a
special attention to the problems of the regional infrastructure. The arguments come
from the understanding that a modern infrastructure is a prerequisite for regional co-
operation. The political diversity of the region has led in the past to such kind of
infrastructure, which had to divide, but not to connect the countries in the region.
Bulgaria insists on fast opening of river Danube for navigation. Along the long border
between Bulgaria and Romania along the Danube there is only one bridge. The need
of bridge over the river on European corridor number 4 is quite obvious. The Pact
could help overcoming the differences between Bulgaria and Romania on that
problem. A promising step in that direction is the agreement between Bulgaria and
Rumania, reached in Brussels in February 2000 and signed also by the member of the
European Commission G. Verhaugen and the Stability Pact coordinator B. Hombach
on building a bridge near Vidin and Kalafat. Bulgaria is taking the responsibility for
providing the investment, relying on financial support within the Stability Pact. 
 
 Bulgaria and Macedonia are the only two European neighbours without a railway
connection. They are sharing a common will for solving this problem and the needed
capital could be found within the Pact. Bulgaria has made concrete proposals for
constructing new border checkpoints, a 400KV power grid connecting Bulgaria,
Macedonia and Albania, an oil pipeline from Ihtiman in Bulgaria to Koumanovo in
Macedonia.
 
 The Stability Pact has provoked hopes and expectations that at last the world
community will help South-Eastern Europe to leave its notorious fame in the past. But
the continuing discussions on different aspects of the Pact and the fact that still it
remains only a good idea causes some concern. It would be shame on the world
community to miss the chance for europeization of the Balkans. Another
disappointment would be too much and it would put doubts on the idea of United
Europe.
 
 A special concern for Bulgaria causes the possibility of replacing the idea of
European Union’s enlargement in Southeastern direction with the Stability Pact. If it
leads to isolation of the region as a special entity in the international system for some 
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 countries like Romania and Bulgaria it would be unacceptable. They have made some
progress on the track of accession to the European Union and would not agree the
Pact to be a reason for delay in their talks for full membership. The prospect of
remaining “Balkan” these countries would provoke in them a negative attitude
towards all the efforts within the Pact. Developments in such direction would have a
dramatic effect on the public opinion in Bulgaria with difficult to be foreseen
consequences. The chance the objectives of the Stability Pact to be achieved depends
on the art of the politicians to find the formula for stabilization of South-Eastern
Europe which is acceptable for all the participants. Otherwise the Pact will make no
difference and the Balkans will remain the Balkans.
 
 
 
 4.6.5.The New Foreign Policy Priorities
 
 Gradually the reforms in Bulgaria are providing favourable conditions for elaboration
and following a security policy, based on the national interests and eliminating the
satellite syndrome, deeply rooted in it in previous periods.169 The possibility for
establishing a new European defense and security system in which all European states
could aspire to play a part has discovered new opportunities for Bulgaria to provide
new guarantees for its national security. They are seen in the new roles of OSCE,
NATO, EU, and WEU.170 However, kept aside from the most reliable security
structures, Bulgaria suffers from a deficit of provided foreign guarantees. This severe
reality might be explained with the developments in the global system, in Europe and
in the Balkans, with the doubtful success of the reforms in the country, with the lack
of adequate perception for the surrounding world and with ineffective foreign policy.   
 
 Already the majority of the public opinion does not accept anything else but a single
Bulgarian foreign and security policy. The time, when the decision-making process
was paralysed by the partisan sole foreign policy steps of the different institutions, is 
                                           
169 For a very long time the basic weakness of Bulgarian foreign policy was that it was looking not for
friends, but for protectors.
170 See also: Christoph Lotter/ Susanne Peters (Eds.), The Changing European Security Environment,
Bohlau-Verlag, Weimar – Koln – Wien 1996.
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 in the past. Although with difficulties, but among the driving forces of transformation
was reached consensus on the country’s integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic
structures as top foreign and security priority. Since 1990 the European Community
and later the European Union is the preferred partner for Bulgaria. The signed in
March 1993 European Agreement is considered by Bulgaria as a basis for developing
relations, leading to its full membership. Although left in group “B” among the
candidates, Bulgaria is following its National Strategy for Accession to the European
Union, adopted by the Government in March 1998. The good progress made in the
recent years in the process of democratisation, financial stabilization and guaranteeing
human and minority rights gave ground to the European Council in December 1999 in
Helsinki to decide to invite Bulgaria to start accession talks. There is a pretty good
support for the view that already Bulgaria has made sufficient progress in satisfying
the conditions for membership defined by the European Council in Copenhagen -
namely: 1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and respect for the protection of minorities; 2) existence of a functioning
market economy and 3) ability to take on the obligations of membership, including
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.171 But there are
voices proving that Bulgaria is far from matching the requirements for starting
negotiations for membership. Most of them wage on the bias discussed above. 
 
 Bulgaria is doing its best to comply with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security
Policy. In this context and in view of the role of the Western European Union,
integrated to some extent according to the treaties of Maastricht and Copenhagen into
the new EU mechanisms, Bulgaria is paying special attention to its ties with that
oldest organization of European integration. Official contacts were established in
1991 and since 1995 Bulgaria is an associated partner of the WEU. Bulgaria is
maintaining special military forces, suited for participation in WEU operations.
However, Bulgaria may aspire for full membership in WEU only in case of acquiring
membership in EU and NATO.
                                                                                                                            
 171 Accession Partnership. Bulgaria. The European Commission, Directorate General for External
Relations, Information Unit (DG 1A F/6), p. 2.
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 Crucial for the Bulgarian foreign and security policy in the years of changes was the
attitude towards NATO. After a long debate in March 1997 was submitted the
application for membership in the organization. 172 Bulgaria is very active within the
partnership for peace since 1994. An important element of Bulgaria’s transition
became the transformation of civil-military relations, which has followed the line of
democratisation in the country.173 It led to changes in security planning, programming
and budgeting. At the end of 1995 the Law on the Defense and the Armed Forces of
the Republic of Bulgaria was passed through the National Assembly. It has
legitimised the civilian control over the armed forces. In April 1999 the new Concept
for the National Security of Republic of Bulgaria was approved by the parliament.
This document gives consideration of the real threats for the national security and
establishes revised policy priorities and gives the guidelines of the reform   of the
armed forces. In the Concept it is declared that Bulgaria has no territorial claims
against other states and does not recognize any claims of other countries against its
territorial integrity.174  Article 30 says that the Bulgaria’s security is guaranteed by the
worlds and Euro-Atlantic security structures.175 It is explained that the declared wish
for NATO membership aims security guarantees and that it is not directed against
third countries.176 The problem is in the fact that Bulgaria relies on these structures
without having their explicit obligations. During the Kosovo crisis the Government in
Sofia had to take difficult decisions. The Parliament gave permission for using
Bulgarian territory and air space by NATO’s forces for the operations against
Yugoslavia and logistic support was provided.  They had to prove that Bulgaria is on
her way to NATO-membership, but the public opinion has got the impression that the
Bulgarian gestures were not duly assessed. During his visit in Sofia in February 2000 
                                           
172 Compare with: Ivo Samson, Die Sicherheitspolitik der Slowakei in den ersten Jahren der
Selbstandigkeit. Zu den sicherheitspolitischen Voraussetzungen der Integration der Slowakischen
Republik in die euroatlantischen Verteidigungsstrukturen, Nomos-Verlag, Baden-Baden 2000
173 Georgi Stoilov, Democratic Management of the National Security System in Bulgaria, Groningen,
2000.
174  Държавен вестник, бр. 46, 1999 г.(Official Gazette, No 46, 1999.)
 
 175 Ibid.
 176 Ibid.
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 the Secretary General of NATO lord G. Robertson said that NATO did not succeed in
Kosovo alone, but with the support of all partners, including Bulgaria.177 
 
 Now Bulgaria is adopting a new strategy to meet the requirements for membership in
NATO. In October 1999 the government has approved the so-called  “Plan 2004”. It
is a framework for action in compliance with the priority objectives of the national
security policy. The Plan defines the risks and possible threats for the national
security, as well the new missions of the armed forces. It considers the political end
economic realities in the country and the future membership in NATO. According to
the Plan the now numbering about 80 000 the Bulgarian army should have at
peacetime personnel not exceeding 45 000. It foresees restructuring the ministry of
defense as well as the military forces in compliance with the requirements for
membership in NATO. Within the Plan were worked out two programs - “Security
Through Co-operation” and “Security Through Integration” and they were started
with the start of the new budget year on 1 January 2000. They aim at reaching
operational compatibility of the Bulgarian armed forces with those of NATO. 
 In the countries of our region there is a strong feeling for self-respect and dignity.
Thats why it is very important that there wont be even a trace of paternalism,
arrogance and mentorship in the outside influence. However most people are aware of
the right of the force, but not of the force of the law. And this is just one of the most
important elements of the civil activity of political culture in the long run.
 
 One of the serious challenges for Bulgaria’s transition is faced by its security policy,
which has to provide the possibly most favourable national and international
environment for successful political and economic reforms. It seems that the partners
on whom Bulgaria relies don’t care much about the real cost of the reform of the
armed forces that Bulgarian people have to pay. They are exerting pressure for
reforms meeting only their interests, neglecting the realities in the country and in the
region. The forthcoming cuts in the army are going to cause additional tension in the
society. The public opinion has some doubts whether the time of the crisis and 
                                           
 177Лорд Робертсън , Дж. Идвам да ви насърча за НАТО. 24 часа, 9 февруари 2000 г.(Lord George
Robertson, I am Coming to Encourage You for NATO. 24 Hours daily, 9 February 2000.)
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 neighbouring conflicts is the right moment for restructuring and reduction of the
armed forces.
 
 After the end of the cold war Bulgaria has got a chance to enter the structures defining
the European identity. In the period of transition Bulgaria has put on the top of its
priorities the accession to the European Union. Such will was expressed officially by
the Greater National Assembly in December 1990. The commercial part of the
European Agreement for Association Between the European Communities and
Bulgaria for liberalization of their mutual trade is applied since 1 January 1994 and
after the ratification the entire Agreement came into force on 1 February 1995. Now it
is the basis for the relations between Bulgaria and the European Union. Our
calculations show that the average growth per year of the bilateral trade between
Bulgaria and the European Union during the period 1990-1998 is 20 per cent. Now
the European Union is the main trade partner of Bulgaria. About half of its foreign
trade is carried out with the European Union member countries.  In December 1995
Bulgaria applied for full membership. In the Memorandum of the Bulgarian
government was stated that the membership in the European Union is a strategic
objective, reflecting the national interests of Bulgaria.178 The integration in the
European Union is seen as a way to overcome its backwardness and to secure
sustainable development. On the other side the membership in the European Union
could provide opportunities for Bulgaria to give its own contribution for enriching and
developing the European values. With its geographical position, with its intellectual
and material potential Bulgaria could be a positive factor in united Europe. Bulgaria’s
membership in the European Union would be a stabilizing factor in the Balkans and
that would have a strengthening effect on Europe’s security. But the above-mentioned
arguments are not the ones, determining the European Union’s attitude towards the
Bulgarian candidature. 
 
 The European institutions are demonstrating reluctance to accept it. Their prejudice,
based on perceptions from the past and lack of adequate idea for the real situation
now, has contributed for putting Bulgaria aside from the other Central European states 
                                           
 178 Memorandum of the Government of Republic of Bulgaria, handed to the European Council in
Madrid on 14 December 1995.
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 in their aspiration for accession to the Union. In early 90-s the main indicators for
Bulgaria were not worst in comparison with those for the Central European countries,
but they were favoured, Bulgaria was not. The European Agreement with Bulgaria
was signed later than those with the Central European countries and it was rather
discriminatory. All that in combination with other factors had determined Bulgaria’s
lagging behind the other former socialist countries, applicants for European Union’s
membership. 
 
 Only the meeting of the European Council in Luxembourg in December 1997 has
accepted the so-called “equal start” for the applicant countries. It is true that Bulgaria
had lost momentum in satisfying the Copenhagen conditions for membership, but
there is a feeling that its efforts are not appreciated properly and it seems that in front
of its candidature are raised additional obstacles. A clear example was the Opinion of
the European Commission from October 1999. It suggested Bulgaria, together with
some other countries, to be invited to begin negotiations for accession.179 However,
for Bulgaria to receive an invitation for starting accession talks there was a specific
precondition, having nothing to do with the Copenhagen criteria. Bulgaria had to take
obligation to close the first four reactors of the Kozlouduy nuclear power station in
the near future. For Bulgaria would be difficult to meet such requirements. This
station gives about 40 per cent of electricity, generated in the country. There are no
alternative energy resources. The earlier closure of the reactors means losses from not
generated electricity amounting up to 7 billion US dollars. The earlier closure will
need additional spending for conservation and still security problems can arise. The
Bulgarian reactors are similar to those of Slovak Republic and Lithuania, but they are
not facing similar conditions. Again there is a feeling that Bulgaria is placed at a
disadvantage.
 
 Bulgaria, encouraged to stress on its preparation for membership in the European
Union, is following that path, neglecting any other alternatives for participation in the
international processes. Now it seems that Bulgaria has accepted very optimistic 
                                           
179 See also: Reimund Seidelmann (Guest-Ed.), Special Issue des Journal of European Integration
“Eastern Europe: The candidates for the second round of Eastern enlargement”, 2001 ( in preparation)
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 approach, based on idealization of the European Union. Nevertheless, from there are
coming both encouraging and disturbing signals, prompting possible disappointments. 
 
  4.6.6. Summary
 
In the last decade of 20-th century Bulgaria managed to carry out a dramatic but
peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy. A pluralistic, multiparty political
system, with division of power among institutions, was established. Indisputable are
the achievements in reinforcing the rule of law and providing protection for individual
and minority freedoms. Although the difficulties of full integration of minorities are
still there, Bulgaria is following successfully an original model of solving ethnic
problems. In that period democratic control of the army, police and secret service was
assured. A reform in the civil service was started. The successful democratic changes
received international recognition. They were one of the arguments of the European
Council to invite Bulgaria in December 1999 to start negotiations for full EU
membership. In January 2000 the Council of Europe lifted its surveillance on the
country for violation of human rights.
The relations with the international entities and countries, proclaimed by Bulgaria as
priority partners, have caused some disappointments in the period of transition. Long
after the radical political changes this country was perceived as a pro-communist one,
sticking to its special ties with the former Soviet Union. The Yugoslav crisis helped
for preventing establishment of normal contacts with Western Europe. The UN
sanctions against Yugoslavia made physically impossible maintaining international
relations adequate to the new Bulgarian orientation. That turned to be a factor for
slowing down the rate of changes in the country and it lagged behind the other former
socialist states in the reform process and in integrating into the Euro-Atlantic
structures.
 In the period of transition the Bulgarian foreign policy orientation changed radically.
After 1989 the former Soviet ally is seeking security within the Euro-Atlantic
structures. Nevertheless differences among the main political parties on foreign policy
issues persisted. Those from the right see NATO-membership as the only guarantor
for successful political and economic reforms. The Socialist Party for very long time
viewed eventual accession to NATO as a risk of confrontation with Russia. Only
recently there are signs that pro-Atlantic segments of that party, now in opposition, 
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 are gaining stronger positions. The Bulgarian foreign policy was preoccupied by the
developments in South-Eastern Europe. Guided by the understanding that developing
relations with any of the countries in the region must not hamper developing relations
with the others, Bulgaria managed to be a positive factor, and not only an island, in
that part of Europe. There is wide spread conviction among the public opinion that
deepening cooperation and eventual membership in EU and NATO can help the
country to overcome the problems of transition and produce a stabilizing effect on the
Balkans.
 
 Having in mind the developments in Bulgaria in the last decade, its new foreign
policy orientation and its changing image in the international community, one can
expect different scenarios for the future. The trends and recent events are heralding
not calm prospects. Still the reform process in Bulgaria is a hostage of partisan
interests. The most typical features of the state administration are incompetence,
greediness and laziness.
 
In June 2000 the General Negotiator from the EU Rutger Wissels sent to Bulgarian
Government the following directions for development with the recommendation to be
widely announced in public and to be bring to the knowledge of all that are interested
in them.
In spite of that they were kept in secret by the government officials and is familiar
only to the representatives of the Delegation of the European Commission to
Bulgaria:
1. Strengthened institutional capacity in key ministers for policymaking and well-
informed public expenditure allocation
2. A coherent National Development Plan that actively informs Bulgaria’s own development
strategy, and is not simply used a basis programming EC assistance
3. A fully functioning, privatized, well-supervised and stable financial system that
efficiently allocates loan and equity capital and broad range of financial services on
appropriate terms to the productive sector of the economy, with particular attention to
alleviating the constraints of finance for small and medium-size enterprises.
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4. A functioning land market, in which reliable information on property rights is
freely available; sale, leasing and development of land can take place without onerous
transaction costs and delays; and without barriers for foreign ownership.
5. An effective and transparent commercial and contractual legal framework for
business, including streamlined procedures for bankruptcy and liquidation, and
appropriate mechanisms for enforcement and appeals.
6. An improved environment for the private sector and inward investment, with a
business-friendly tax, regulatory and licensing system that makes Bulgaria an
attractive place in which to start and develop business.
7. A support network for small and medium-sized enterprises that facilitates their
access to finance, management, know-how and information on administrative
requirements.
8. Appropriate market orientated sectoral strategies to promote the sector, in which
Bulgaria has, or could have, comparative advantage.
9. The adoption and effective implementation of key area of the acquit that contribute
to the environmentally sustainable growth of output and trade, with particular
attention to areas such as veterinary, phitosanitary and food safety and quality
standards, and high standards of environmental protection and pollution prevention.
Bulgaria needs to strengthen public administration at all levels including the judiciary,
and eliminating corruption. Further measures that would contribute to achieving this
objective include:
1. Further development of the properly trained and remunerated, accountable,
impartial, meritocratic and permanent civil service at central and local level.
2. Enhancing capacity at the centre of the Bulgarian administration (in the Prime
Minister’s office and Council of Ministers) for strategic and medium-term policy
development.
3. An effective and independent judiciary, capable of applying and enforcing the law
impartially and in a timely and transparent way.
4. Strengthen the fight against organized crime, money laundering and drug
trafficking, and implement impartial, timely and deterrent sanctions against all forms
of corruption.
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Bulgaria needs to nurture its fledgling democratic traditions and foster social
integration, with proper respect for human rights, adequate protection for vulnerable
groups, and measures to combat social exclusion. Further measures that would
contribute to achieving this objective include
1. Further development of an active and dynamic civil society with self-sustaining
non-governmental organizations, including business associations and employee
organizations.
2.  An integrated effective and fiscally sustainable social protection system.
3. High professional standards in journalism.
 
 Every serious business, which is not connected, somehow with the ruling classes is
doomed sooner or later to failure.180 The recent corruption scandals181 have come just
to prove that.182 The disappointments from that reformist government can have far
reaching consequences for the changes in Bulgaria and its integration in the European
structures. 
 
The record of a dozen of years or so of Bulgarian transition to democracy is five
elected and two caretaker governments. The newly set up, in early 2001, National
Movement Simeon II ruling currently the country in coalition with the ethnic Turks’
Movement for Rights and Freedoms, ousted the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the
Union of Democratic Forces as the two major players during Bulgaria’s transition, by
winning 50 percent of the votes for the National Assembly. Headed by former king 
                                           
180 A typical example in this respect is the only one in Bulgaria till now GSM operator MobilTel. With
support by high functionaries of the governing party and already former members of the Government
the company kept its monopoly position and thanks to the people’s manipulation by an expensive
advertising realized huge profits although abnormally high, even for the Western standard, prices. After
the withdrawal of the political support, now we can observe a decline in its activity. 
 181On 18 April 2000 the former minister of interior Bogomil Bonev accused the Prime Minister Ivan
Kostov for providing political umbrella for corrupted members of the government and political elite of
his party. В. Новинар, 18 април 2000 г. (Newsman daily, 18 April, 2000.) In fact he only gave an
open expression to what was known a long time ago. The difference comes only from the fact that  he
probably has a lot of evidences as an former minister of interior
 Against the background of these events, the well acquainted with Bulgarian history reader can easily
understand, to great extent the positive attitude of the wide strata of society to the coups in 1923,1934
and even in 1944 which at least for a start were directed towards restraining the partisan bias, the
corruption and serving anothers countries interests.
182  The names of outstanding representatives of the leading coalition and their relatives are involved in
corruption scandals, besides there is enough proving material for that in the most of the cases. The
problems here, however, are two: the dependence of the legislative power from the governing, and
giving the bribes abroad, which is difficult to prove. Most urgent is the cooperation with international
specialists and institutions
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Simeon II who returned in the country after long years of exile, the new movement
legitimised itself firstly through the authority of its leader, then through its
commitment to fight corruption and curb economic suffering, and finally - by
constituting itself into a regular party. Fading hopes, however, that the promised
changes will take place soon, have considerably decreased the popular support for the
Movement with speculations over prospects for new elections long before its mandate
expires. But by stressing continuity in its performance, the ruling party has managed
to stay in power. In February 2002, it adopted an Accelerated strategy for
Negotiations with the EU as if to emphasise again that external factors inform the
backbone of transition. It also became the first government to have launched an
information campaign addressing the needs and expectations of Bulgarian citizens
upon accession to the EU. The country’s President in a recent address to students, on
9 May 2002, once again voiced the importance of the foreign factor in Bulgaria’s
transition. He recalled that a double denial of Bulgaria’s membership in the EU and
NATO would provide a chance for eurosceptics and extremist groupings183. As
Wagner184 put it flatly:
the non-NATO participants, especially Bulgaria and Romania, clearly regard it mainly
as a further step on the road into the Alliance, sticking to what has been their
characteristic outlook all along. For them, membership in the ‘Euro-Atlantic
structures’ ranks first, regional integration is decidedly secondary and worth only the
additional effort if it can somehow support their Western aspirations. 
In Toto
The thirteen years of transition have brought about radical changes in Bulgaria’s
economy. The banking sector seems to be on a more sound footing and steps have
been made to build up the public framework by drafting and enacting market-oriented
primary legislation. However, it is not clear yet when the people will start feeling the
real benefits of change, i.e., those affecting their standards of living. A recent study
concludes optimistically that the 1989 GDP level in Bulgaria is most likely to be 
                                           
183 Standart daily, 10 May 2002.
184 Wagner, Peter EU, NATO and Romania: Beyond “Sultanism”, in: OSTEUROPABUCH, Part 2,
pp.1-87
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reached in the second decade of the century185. A series of reform incentives are still
ahead such as: to promote growth and improve living standards; boost private and
public investment; deepen structural reforms, as a priority. Further on, investment in
human capital and strengthening of the administrative and judicial capacity will be
needed with special emphasis on enforcement, ethics and accountability. Moreover,
corruption - still a matter of serious public concern - needs to be dealt with186.
Recent opinion polls in the country show that general support for joining the
European Union is extremely high. This may be quite well among the reasons for the
European Commission to conclude that ‘Bulgaria continues to contribute substantially
and actively to regional stability’. Nevertheless, people seem more and more inclined
to inform their pros and cons on specific issues rather than on generalisations. More
and more, it seems to be a well measured ‘yes’ against a well measured ‘no’187. 
That Bulgarian politicians may have started viewing transition and membership into
the EU and NATO as something ordinary citizens can profit from, is a beam of light
in the tunnel of peoples’ hopes188. In the sense of ‘the immediate context’ approach,
that would mean the establishment of new institutions leading to lessening of
corruption practices and corporate interests promoted by political privileges. Healthy
and stable institutions and enforced modern legislation will bring about new
investments and minimise fears from new recession. Faster and easier transition in the
future will be the most likely outcome then. More and more people will learn to
maximise their ends. A collision of freely expressed individual interests constrained
by a rule of law would probably mean a return to normality. This is an ideal scenario
to the extent that Bulgaria’s transition was poor-driven and eventually finished off
with the impoverishment of the greater part of the population. Thus a mechanism of
making the new rich richer and the greater majority of the people poorer replaced the 
                                           
185 Statev, Stati Macroeconomic Imbalances of Transition, Banki Investitsii Pari, 2:25-37, 2002
186 The World Bank The Dual Challenge of Transition and EU Accession, Country Economic
Memorandum, 2001
187As a recent report by Financial Times on EU accession concludes ‘the latest ideas [of the European
Commission] are certain to cause anger in the applicant states, which insist on equal treatment for their
farmers from day one.
188As Reuters reported, on 19 January 2002, ‘Bulgaria’s new president… vowed at his inauguration…
to try to speed the country’s entry into the European Union and NATO and improve the lives of
ordinary people.
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communist flat distribution at moderate but mass levels. Such is the new starting point
of Bulgarian society at the end of political and economic transition. However, one of
the most valuable assets of change is the rise in differing opinions on matters of
individual or corporate interest - a transition form the state of mediocrity and
acceptance to the state of critique and evaluation. Such inner transition in people’s
minds and hearts is taking place almost unnoticed. With no prejudice to Bulgaria’s
efforts to join the EU and NATO, it may be reasonably inferred that where
euroscepticism begins, a certain level of normalcy is accomplished. It may as well
signal the end of l’homme-masse, which may be the end of the transition era. But
whether it will be the end of change on the way to mature democracy and free market
competition, a hope remains that it never will. 
5. Bulgaria and EU and NATO
5.1.Bulgaria and the West. The Challenges of the Enlargement
Since Bulgaria relies so much on membership in the military-political and economic
organizations of Western world in order to develop its own democratic political
system and achieving quick economic growth, it practically ignores other alternatives
for its foreign-policy orientation. The selected priority directions in the development
of Bulgaria’s foreign relations determine the need for adaptation to those directions of
the political, economic and social systems of the country. The great enthusiasm of the
democratic spirit and the nurtured hopes for a final solution of the economic
backwardness on one side, and the impossibility for satisfying the criteria for
membership created a conflict, which practically destroys Bulgarian society.
The destruction, which is strongly encouraged from abroad, of everything even
remotely related to the Soviet model of development (i.e. single-party political
system, state ownership, cooperative agriculture, state monopoly of trade, financial
services, social security, security agencies and all other mechanisms for providing
total state control) does not automatically lead to membership in the Western
structures. People started realizing that they have to pay very high, if not unbearable,
price for membership in European Council, World Trade Organization, international
financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
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European Union and NATO. Following the “prescriptions” of West, most countries
reduced their productivity income as a result of which unemployment reached its
highest level in 50 years. Also the system of social and health care is completely
blocked and the redistribution of wealth reached morally unacceptable levels. All that
threatens social peace and stability. In these difficult conditions all former socialist
republics are required to satisfy high political, economic and social criteria in order to
be granted a membership in the above-mentioned structures. This creates an absurd
situation, because if those countries were able to achieve on their own all goals
required for membership, then they would not need that membership any more. Given
the deliberate lack of clarity in the framework and deadlines for the expansion of
European Union and NATO, it will be very difficult to sustain optimism and
enthusiasm among people. That becomes even more evident given the fact that people
already had to swallow the disappointment from the “bright” prospects of
communism.
The development of the processes after the end of the Cold War foretell in the
beginning of the 21st century the European Union to embark on new, unprecedented
enlargement, which will be radically different from the enlargement of the 70s, 80s
and 90s. The EU is getting ready for an expansion eastwards, as a result of which the
former socialist countries (with combined population of 100 million people) will be
accepted as members. Negotiations are in process for full-right membership of
countries with long-gone democratic traditions and obsolete economies. There is still
no answer whether current members of the European Union are ready to accept part of
the, obviously significant, burden of the countries willing to become new members of
this radically new community and international system.
Even if there is a clear determination about new enlargement and accepting 11 more
countries as members, the economic and social homogeneity of the EU will be
seriously challenged. The results of such changes are impossible to predict.
The new enlargement will create a new geo-political situation. It is quite probable that
the European Union will span over the entire Europe. That will also be a great
challenge for EU. Hence the question whether the European Union has the capacity to
be the main driving force of such unification of the mainland, without that 
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undermining its ambitious goals to become one of the primary factors in the new
international system.
  5.2.The strategy of Bulgaria for membership in NATO and European Union
NATO is the only organization that provides the transatlantic connection vital for
European security. NATO’s role is further strengthened by the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Western-European Union.189 The
transition to a new stable model of security is possible only through the integration of
the countries from the former Eastern block. Bulgaria understands the view about
“security through integration and cooperation” and is clearly against the formation of
regions with different degree of security and buffer zones. 
Even before his election as President of the country, Petar Stoyanov emphasized the
necessity for improved strategy for guaranteeing national security, fundamental to
which must be “accelerated practical (i.e. before the completion of formal procedures
and deadlines) and parallel integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures,
which will culminate into a full-right membership in both structures”190.
At the same time, membership in EU also fits the national interests of the country.191
In the Program for National Security of Bulgaria is written: “The process of joining
NATO and EU has positive influence over Bulgaria’s security. But only full-right
membership in both structures will unconditionally guarantee that security. Bulgaria’s
national priority is membership in NATO and EU, which also fits the long term
interests of the country.”192
                                           
189 S. Christoph Lotter, Die parlamentarische Versammlung der Westeuropaischen Union. Zur
Gewahrleistung demokratischer Kontrolle durch eine transnationaleVersammlung, Nomos-Verlag,
Baden-Baden 1997 
190Петър Стоянов, Годините до края на хилядолетието са преломни  за България,
в.”Демокрация”, 1 октомври 1996 г. ( Peter Stoyanov, The Years by the End of the Millennium are
the Turning Point for Bulgaria, Democracy Daily, 1 October 1996)
191Compare with:  Reimund Seidelmann (Ed.), EU, NATO and Eastern Europe. Impact on
transformation, problems,and perspectives, Nomos-Verlag, Baden-Baden 2001.
192КОНЦЕПЦИЯ за националната сигурност на България, Държавен вестник, 22 април 1998 г. (
Concept for National Security of Republic of Bulgaria, Official Journal, 22 April 1998.).
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In a Declaration of the Parliament from July 23, 1997 it was stated “Bulgaria’s
candidacy for membership in EU is a long term strategy, supported by a clear national
consensus to build a democratic country and social market economy, as well as to
increase the welfare of all Bulgarian citizens.”193 With a decision of the Parliament
from May 26, 2000, which was unanimously supported by all political parties (only 3
votes in objection), it was stated that together with integration into EU Bulgaria also
seeks membership in NATO and the Western-European Union194 and the
government’s so called Common Foreign and Security Policy in the negotiations for
joining EU received significant support from all political parties in the Parliament.
In accordance with Bulgaria’s candidacy for membership in NATO raised in February
1997195 also was accepted a National Program for Bulgaria’s Preparation and Joining
NATO196. In that program were formulated the key points of the strategy for
achieving that goal
1. Active and efficient participation of Bulgaria in the continuation of the intense
dialogue with NATO on the problems of expansion and membership.
2. Carrying out bi-lateral political consultations with current NATO members.
3. Increased cooperation with other candidates for NATO membership,
accompanied by looking for new opportunities to coordinate efforts and study the
experience of leading candidates in their preparation for membership.
4. Carrying out policies for improvement of the good-neighbor relations and
increasing the security and stability in South-eastern Europe.
5. Development of Strategy for National Security, fully compatible with the
philosophy and main principles for the Strategic Concepts of NATO and Joint
Concepts for Security of the 28 current members of Western-European Union.
                                           
193В. Демокрация, 24 юли 1997 г. (Democracy Daily, 24 July 1997.)
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6. Development of a Military Doctrine, in which the main principles of the
Strategic Concepts of NATO and its members will be used as a foundation.
7. Review of the national legal framework so that all legal obstacles for
membership can be removed.
8. Establishment and improvement of social control of the military forces and
development of social-military relations.
9. Education of experts for cooperation in the negotiations with NATO and
future participation in the military and political structures of the organization.
10. Improvement of the operational compatibility of Bulgarian military forces
with those of NATO members.
11. Training of special-task forces for participation in joint multi-national
operations under NATO’s command.
12. Clear commitment of NATO for Bulgaria participation in Joint Task Forces.
13. Adaptation of the national system for military research, military production
and delivery of military equipment under the standards of NATO and its members.
14. Organization of specific information activity in close cooperation with non-
government organizations.
15. Development of necessary government structures for coordination of the
national efforts for preparation and joining the Euro-Atlantic Union.197
In the last three years that program has been successfully carried out. The Military
Doctrine of Bulgaria was also developed. The reform of military forces is being
aggressively carried out. The Individual Program for Partnership and Peace is also in
action. 
The purpose of the National Strategy for Bulgaria’s accession to the EU is to put the
integration efforts within the frameworks of a consistent and elegant policy, as well as
to determine the priorities and identify appropriate tasks, to mobilize resources and
create organization for achieving the goal. The tasks for satisfying the membership
criteria formulated in Copenhagen in 1993 were divided into three groups – short
term, mid term and long term. The first task was to create prerequisites for positive
evaluation of the preparation for accession and subsequent invitation for membership
negotiations. Bulgaria received an invitation for membership negotiations and in 
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March 2000. 6 out of 31 topics were opened for negotiations. By the end of May 2000
the negotiations on 4 of the topics were successfully completed. Another 5 topics will
be opened for negotiations shortly.
In a mid-term perspective (by 2001) the reforms in Bulgaria must produce solid
results, which should bring the country closer to the Maastricht criteria for
membership in the economic and currency union.
In long-term perspective (by 2006-2008) the negotiations for Bulgaria’s full-right
accession to EU should be successfully completed.
Integral parts of the National Strategy are specific programs for development of
different branches of the national economy. Those programs contain measures for
carrying out the recommendations pointed out in a statement of the European
Commission for Bulgaria’s candidacy for membership in EU.
The National Strategy is a subject to frequent reviews and further improvements
within the frameworks of the mechanism developed for government bodies’ activities
in regards to the country’s preparation for accession to EU. Bimonthly the
government holds special meetings to discuss questions of European integration. A
special committee was established at the Parliament to deal with Bulgaria’s accession
to the EU. The Foreign Ministry has been endowed with specific functions and tasks
for the inter-department coordination. The person in charge of the negotiations has at
his disposal a team of highly qualified experts. The endeavour to maintain active
dialogue about those matters with non-government organizations and business circles
is strongly emphasized.
The cooperation with other candidates for membership is also one of the priority tasks
of the Strategy. In that direction, Bulgaria was greatly facilitated by the multinational
cooperation within the frameworks of the Accession Partnership.
The fact that Bulgaria is a candidate for membership in the Euro-Atlantic structures,
which assumes support from all current members, determines the importance in
closely monitoring the relations among those members. They are not immune to the 
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influence of national instincts in that new community. It is imperative that Bulgaria
remains neutral in conflicts between separate countries, as well as in conflicts
between countries and the supranational institutions of the EU.
 5.3.The attitude of society towards the strategy for NATO and EU integration
All major political parties in Bulgaria declare their support for the country’s
membership in EU and NATO. In regards to membership in the EU the consensus
among the political parties was established as early as 1990. However, there was a
difficulty in achieving a single opinion about membership in NATO. The first time
Bulgarian Socialist Party declared that “Bulgaria will be in better position to protect
its national interests if it is a NATO member, then if it is not, and Bulgaria will be
better off if it participates in taking the decisions rather then dealing with them post
factum”198 was on its 44th Congress in May 2000. The Bulgarian Socialist Party, The
Green Party and The Political Club “Ecoglasnost” insist that the question of
Bulgaria’s membership in NATO must me solved through a national referendum199.
In the years of transition the Union of Democratic Forces demonstrated greater,
sometimes even naive, optimism while the Bulgarian Socialist Party was more
sceptical about the perspective of the country’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic
structures. The positions of both parties reflected to some extent, and also influenced
the formation of a social opinion.
According to the National Centre for Research of Social Opinion, which was carried
out after Bulgaria received invitation for starting accession negotiations in December
1999, about 77% of the population clearly supports EU membership, 16% are hesitant
and about 7% are clearly against200. About 60% declare support for accelerated
integration as means for faster transition and overcoming the economic crisis.
However, about 36% state that Bulgaria must be accepted as a member after it solves
its transition problems.201 The most optimistic opinion comes from people with good 
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living standard, entrepreneurs, intelligentsia and the younger generation. Men are
more sceptical then women. By the end of July 2000, after the European Parliament
approved the European Commission’s proposal for taking Bulgarian out of the list of
countries with visa restrictions, about 88% of Bulgaria youth declare support for EU
membership.202 The majority of students support Bulgarian membership in EU, but
more then 30% are hesitant. The weakest support for EU membership comes from
retired and poor people. Most of the sceptics are supporters of the Bulgarian Socialist
Party.
Dreaming of EU membership, Bulgarians still remains realists. They view the
problem in the context of their specific interests, personal endeavours and intentions.
About 36% claim that accession to the EU is extremely important to them; about 40%
claim that the accession is somewhat important, while 15% declare that the accession
is not important to them at all203. When the Institute for Marketing and Social
Research MBMD asked the question “Do you agree, that EU membership requires
sacrifice and deprivation, but is worth in the future?” about 24% answered strongly
positive, 65% were hesitant, and 12% were strongly negative204.
- 55% of the population relates EU membership to the idea of unrestricted travel
in Western Europe;
- 32% expect increase of income as a result of the membership;
- 50% expect financial support for the country as a result of the membership;
- 32% expect sudden surge of the economy.205
People relate EU-membership mainly to the opportunity for professional
development, as a guarantee for human rights and a key prerequisite for successful
business. Without any doubt, most Bulgarians relate EU membership to their hopes
for better living standard.But according to a research of “Sova 5”Agency only 11% of
the population accept as a membership requirement shutting down the Atomic Power
Generator at Kozloduy206.During the negotiations for Bulgaria’s accession to EU
without any doubt people will have to rethink their interests more carefully and will 
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overcome the abstract optimism. The slow pace of negotiations and the difficult
criteria for specific topics will probably lead to increased scepticism among people
about EU membership.
A bit more different is the attitude towards NATO membership. About 57% of the
voting population declare their support for Bulgaria’s candidacy, but 24% are
decidedly against it, while 19% are hesitant207. However, there is no social group
(determined by age, profession or education) in which there is a prevalent negative
attitude towards NATO membership. Despite the fact that there is already a consensus
among the political parties about NATO membership, most of the supporters of the
Union of Democratic Forces and the Euro left Party give their support. About 48% of
the supporters of the Bulgarian Socialist Party are against membership208. At the
beginning of July 2000 a Committee Against Bulgaria’s Accession to NATO was
created, which consists of three members of the Parliament, some ex-ministers,
writers. However, there is no significant difference in the evaluation of Bulgaria’s
readiness for membership among the supporters of the different parties. About 47% of
the voting population declare that Bulgaria is not yet well prepared for membership in
both NATO and EU209.
Bulgaria’s accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures enjoys relatively strong social
support. This ensures conditions for consensus about Bulgarian foreign policy
priorities among the major political forces. Gradually, those priorities lose their
importance as instrument in the inner political struggles. At this point supporting or
being against NATO/EU membership cannot exert serious influence on election
results. Cooling down the radical opinions about the country’s foreign policy
orientation permits a more pragmatic attitude towards the accession process.
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 5.4.How can Bulgaria’s membership contribute to the development of NATO
and EU
It is naïve to expect that both organizations simply accept new members without
evaluating their own strategic goals and interests. In order to be accepted as a member
Bulgaria has to be able to contribute somehow to both organizations development. If
the membership is good for Bulgaria, it has to be good for NATO and EU in order to
be granted. This question has its own cultural, geopolitical, economic and other
dimensions.
Bulgaria’s cultural history is intricately entangled within the European traditions. As
one of the centres of Orthodox Christianity and local unique culture, with more than
13-century long history, the country has significantly contributed to the development
of European art, literature, music and science. A full-right accession of Bulgarian
cultural and scientific potential will enrich the European identity.
From a geopolitical point of view Bulgaria’s accession brings out serious questions.
Such accession will destroy the traditional understanding of some natural dividing
lines in Europe under religious-civilization, economic or geographic criterion, it will
shatter the “natural spheres of interests” and other opinions created by European
history. From one point of view Bulgaria lies in the heart of a strategically important
region and its accession will create new opportunities for influence of both NATO
and EU beyond South-eastern Europe. Bulgaria’s membership does not contradict the
political and economic interests of both organizations. The country has always been
an important political and military factor in the region. Despite the deep economic
crisis as a result of the restructuring of the national economy, the country has
considerable production capacity in industry, agriculture and energy. It is a major
transportation and communication centre. There are obvious natural and cultural-
historical prerequisites for the development of modern tourism, for which there have
been developed considerable resources. Thanks to the well-developed education
system Bulgaria has highly qualified labour, including modern information
technologies. Traditionally good is the presence Bulgarian production, engineering-
technical and medical specialists on markets of former Soviet and Arabic countries.
One should not underestimate the capacity of the Bulgarian market for accepting 
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production of the EU countries. As the director of the European Commission Romano
Prodi put it “Bulgaria can give a lot to EU”210. But in the perceptions of West about
Bulgaria there are two stereotypes that will greatly obstruct acceptance in the Western
mechanisms for cooperation.
 Bulgaria does not discuss the possible effect of EU expansion over Euro-Atlantic
relations. There are no supporters neither of the opinion that EU membership is an
expression of Euro centric tendencies and that is has anti-American context, nor of the
evaluation that following common defence policy threatens the transatlantic relations.
In Bulgaria the prevalent opinion is that in the future Europe and USA will continue
to realize that they will need each other, which opinion is close to the position
expressed by the secretary of foreign relations Chris Patten in June 2000.211
Bulgaria is one of the most advanced (probably second after Hungary) in the
harmonization of its legislative system in accordance with the European one. In the
last couple of years the discipline on the borders was put in accordance to the criteria
for foreign borders established by the EU. Unfortunately, Bulgaria’s sincere efforts in
its preparation for membership remain largely unnoticed and the country is still
viewed on the basis of old biases.
The unnoticed political consensus and efforts of the country in the preparation for
full-right membership, together with its strategic situation, cultural, economic and
military potential make it a very serious candidate.
  5.5.The price of the membership
 NATO’s capabilities to carry the burden of the transition of the newly accessed
countries are very limited. The experience so far from previous expansions show that
EU has compensated so far the losses accrued from the accession of new countries.
However, the current Accession Partnership does not promise such benefits.
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In Bulgaria major branches of the industry like heavy, chemical, electronic, machine,
military and agriculture were completely destroyed. The standard of living for most
people dramatically fell. Privatisation and bankruptcy of certain companies increased
unemployment to about 25%. Social insecurity increased greatly as well. Retired
people – about 2.5 million – live in poverty. The reform of the health care system
decreased the quality of medical service, which evidently has a very negative effect
on the health of the population. The dearth of financial resources is destroying the
education system. The transformations, which caused those results, are part of the
country’s adaptation to the requirements for NATO and EU membership. Certain
social groups view the crisis mainly as a result of the membership efforts. For
instance according to the Committee Against NATO Membership “…as a result of
Bulgaria’s endeavour for NATO membership our country destroyed completely its
military industry, ceased its relations with Arab countries and turned Russia into an
enemy”212. In the frameworks of social discussion about NATO membership
questions have been raised whether there will be military bases on Bulgaria’s territory
and whether nuclear weapons will be deployed on Bulgaria’s territory, which will
automatically make Bulgaria a target for nuclear strike; also whether the country will
be used for military actions against other countries.
One of the preliminary criteria for membership was that Bulgaria must shut off its
nuclear power generators. According to the agreement signed by Bulgaria and EU, the
country will start shutting off the generators in 2002. This contradicts Bulgaria’s
strategy, which aims establishing the country as one of the energy centres of the
Balkans.
During its preparation for EU membership Bulgaria compromised a lot its national
interests. Despite the fact that the mechanisms for trade liberalization in the European
Accession Agreement were built on the principle of asymmetry to Bulgaria’s
advantage, the interests of Bulgarian producers are not well protected. European
goods have already flooded Bulgarian markets, however European markets remain 
                                           
212 24 часа, 1 юли 2000 г. (24 Hours Daily,1 July 2000)
213
inaccessible for Bulgarian goods. According to the European Agreement there are
export quotas on some “sensitive goods” established for Bulgaria – metals, chemicals,
textile and agricultural products. There is almost no ease on the restrictions for
exporting Bulgarian wines – and that is major part of Bulgarian export. Bulgaria
received modest help from the PHARE program, but it is required to be utilized
mainly for restructuring of the economy, i.e. closing down unprofitable factories.
Most of that help is in the form of loans, which have to be repaid with considerable
interest. Practically, Bulgaria gets no help for stabilizing and developing its industry,
agriculture, and tourism. In order to be applauded by EU Bulgaria has to satisfy
criteria, which turn the country into a market for European goods, but on the other
hand the country doesn’t get any help to organize modern production, which can be
exported to Western-European and other markets, which on its turn will reduce
unemployment. This strategy is very shortsighted. It doesn’t lead to capacity increase
of Bulgaria’s market.
The EU accession negotiations determine future agreements that will put Bulgaria in
new position in the world distribution of labour through fixing the production quotas.
This will greatly affect agriculture, in which 25% of the productive population is
engaged. Also the heavy industry will get affected too, as well as the food, textile and
fishing industries, which give employment to a considerable part of the labour force.
Bulgaria’s accession to EU will put additional restrictions in its trade relations with
traditional partners. Given that, Bulgaria will no longer be able to develop relations
that are not convenient for the EU. For instance under the European Accession
Agreement Bulgaria is not allowed to create free-trade zones with Russia, Ukraine
and other countries without the explicit permission of EU. That means narrowing of
opportunities for marketing of Bulgarian goods in these countries. However, those
countries are the source for the Bulgaria’s raw materials needs. The serious trade
misbalance with Russia already threatens the normal functioning of the energy and
chemical industries. Until 1990 the value of the exchange of goods between Russia
and Bulgaria was as high as $14 billion. Nowadays that value is around $1.5 billion,
and of that value $1 billion is due to import of fuels. EU membership will lead to
restrictions in the trade relations with countries like USA, Switzerland, Japan, China,
India, Vietnam, as well as the Arab countries.
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Having paid such a high price, Bulgaria expects to receive certain benefits. As the ex-
minister of Foreign Relations put it “…through its membership Bulgaria will get a
greater security to realize it national goals”213. Bulgaria eagerly awaits the beneficial
effect in the consolidation of the political and economic reforms. The integration in
the unified European market will provide a stable and predictable economic
environment, in which the country can achieve more efficient specialization. This will
improve the investment climate in the country, which will present new opportunities
for realization of Bulgarian goods. The current quantity and tariff restrictions will be
abolished, as well as the current restrictions in the trade with metals; there will be new
opportunities for competitive Bulgarian textile industry.
Bulgaria relies on the pre-accession funds to prepare for full-right membership. But
the greatest hope is put on EU’s structural funds (European Regional Development
Fund, European Social Fund, European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund),
as well as the Cohesion Fund whose function is to finance projects in the environment
and transport infrastructure in the context of the Trans-European Network.
The unrestricted movement of goods, capital, services and labour should ensure
Bulgaria’s complete integration into the unified European market, with opportunities
for the country to enter the Economic and Currency Unions. Bulgaria’s accession to
the most successful integration model will mean accepting its common policies
(including the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the developed common
defence policy) and participation in the mechanisms for its regulation.
 5.6. Summary
The last 10 years were hard times for Bulgarian people. They have started radical
political and economic reforms. The whole reform process in the country is marked
by the European accent. In its foreign and security policy Bulgaria didn’t give chance 
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to any selfish tendencies. The country’s economy has suffered heavy losses from the
collective measures of the international community to restore the peace in the former
Yugoslavia. Its policy in South-Eastern Europe is dedicated to help introduction of the
European values in the region. The European priorities of Bulgaria have caused some
difficulties in its relations with traditional partners. The transformation process in the
country is gaining dramatic characteristics but it seems that its new priority partners
do not care much about that. An eventual failure of the reform in Bulgaria may
become a drama for Europe. Only some recent steps as the invitation from the
European Union for starting negotiations for EU membership and NATO’s
recognition of Bulgaria’s importance for the regional security214 in connection with
Kosovo crisis are inspiring some optimism. 
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The hardships of changes had provoked much disappointment in people. It would be
very difficult for the now ruling coalition to repeat in the next parliamentary elections
the victory from 1997. With much certainty one can predict that the new government
will be formed by a wider coalition, including centrist parties. But that would not
cause substantial changes in the foreign policy priorities. On the top of the scale will
remain the integration in the Euro-Atlantic economic and security structures. Any
other alternative for Bulgaria is unthinkable.
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APPENDIX 2
 According to you which of the Council of Europe’s membership criteria has
Bulgaria accomplished?
Source: Alpha research, 9-11 November 2000
The consensus in this direction comes from the fact that the current Law is too
liberal in the part concerning this point.
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APPENDIX 3
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS BY YEARS MLN USD
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5.7. New start in proving the European identity of Bulgaria
In June 2001 in Bulgaria has happened something extraordinary and very peculiar. As
it was written in New York Times the new premier is the old king.215  This country
got its deposed Czar (King) Simeon II of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha back, albeit as prime
minister Simeon Saxecoburggotski. Bulgaria gave the executive power in the hands of
ex-monarch. This has never been seen not only in the former socialist republics, but
also in the rest of the world. One of the influential aristocrats in Europe took the risk
to become the head of executive power in the country, which had exiled him. This is
the reason Bulgaria to step out of the shadow of disregard, with which the self-
confident and preoccupied with many other problems world leaders have covered it.
The phenomenal event in the country, “a haven of stability in the troubled
Balkans”,216 gives new dimensions of all the efforts to prove its European identity.    
The King's party, the National Movement for Simeon II, founded only in April 2001,
won exactly half of the 240 parliamentary seats in the National Assembly and joined
in a ruling coalition with the Movement for Rights and Freedom, perceived as
political party of the ethnic Turks, to ensure a working majority in the legislature.
For Simeon II, accepting the job is the culmination of a rush into Bulgarian politics
that began in April when he returned home to found the political movement that swept
the parliamentary elections. Simeon II did not run for Parliament himself,
campaigning instead on behalf of his movement's candidates, and never made clear
whether he intended to become prime minister. The slogans of his movement were
‘respectability in everything’ and ‘new time is coming’.
Simeon was proclaimed King by the Bulgarian Parliament after his father, Boris III,
died suddenly in August 1943. After breaking the alliance with Germany in 1944,
next year his uncle Cyril and the other two regents, who ruled in his name, were
executed by the Communist-led forces of the Fatherland Front. According to the 
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results of the referendum in September 1946 Bulgaria was proclaimed a republic.
Immediately after that 9-year-old Simeon and his mother and sister fled, first to Egypt
and ultimately to Spain, where he lived and worked as a business consultant.
He always avowed that the restoration of the monarchy was not on his immediate
agenda, though opponents say it is his long-term goal. When asked, he has said that
Bulgaria has more pressing problems than the question of the monarchy.
There is no doubt that the results of the parliamentary elections in Bulgaria in June
2001 are an event not only of national, but also of wider importance. It may appear as
a forerunner of changes in the vision of structuring and functioning of society. The
peculiar political change is an attempt of people to take away the power from the
irresponsible politicians and give it to men and women with a proven responsibility
for the fate of the people and the country.217 It was a reaction to the lost public trust in
Bulgarian governments in the years of transition. The main political parties, which
were supposed to carry out the radical changes in the country, are most responsible
for this. Nevertheless, the irresponsibility of the Bulgarian politicians is just one of the
aspects of the long period in the new world history, when the personal irresponsibility
for the society is cultivated, which arouses crisis in the modern times values.
The previous government of the Union of Democratic Forces was credited with many
reforms that brought financial stabilization and moved Bulgaria forward
economically, and the country has improved its international image for the last four
years. But voters were angry because living standards are still low, unemployment is
high and the badly managed economy remains the most pressing issue for Bulgarians.
They were fed up with corruption scandals involving members of Ivan Kostov’s
government and close associates.
The Bulgarians set out for political change not by violence. They chose the most
democratic instrument – parliamentary elections. Significant changes were made in
legal way. The merciless disappointment caused by the former governments prompted 
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for a change. People want a successful government with new faces in it, not burdened
with participating in ex-governments. Simeon II comprehended the people’s problems
and aimed right at them, suggesting solutions, which are adequate to the public mood,
and acquiring the support of the majority from all social layers, except the Turkish
minority, which traditionally supports the Movement for Rights and Freedom. 
People were tired of the utter politicization of transition, and of the abstract, but to the
detriment of the national priorities, contradiction between communists and anti-
communists, between “left” and “right”, between the two main political parties - the
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). As an
alternative to these realities, Simeon II suggested: “Let’s try to overcome the
politicization, to get rid of the differences between “left” and “right”, “blue and red”
(the symbol colors of the BSP and UDF, respectively). His movement tenaciously
refuses to be situated on the “left-right” axis. In the time of crisis in the “left” and the
“right” political fields the ex-czar struggled to form non-party government, which can
hardly be assigned to the traditional “left-right” scheme. The Simeon II’s movement
aimed its efforts at the current problems. While the governing parties in the last 10
years disputed about the past, no matter how strange it appears, the potential of the
Simeon II’s policy is not in the past.
The appearance of Simeon II on the political scene resulted in another strange looking
effect. As a carrier of the royalist idea he maybe succeeded to change the consolidated
with time stereotype for the monarchies in the Balkans as a symbol of personal power,
excluding democracy, or at least he managed to recede from this tradition. This
maneuver strengthened the contradictions between democratic parties about a
problem, which is not supposed to cause any contradictions among them – the
problem of the democratic system’s functioning. Aiming the weapons at each other,
these parties increased the chances of the ex-monarch to become a leading political
figure.  Not until the end of the elections campaign, UDF started a vigorous attack
against the movement for Simeon II, but it was too dishonorable and it provided a
reversed effect. 
During the elections campaign Simeon II made it clear, that he rejects the rude
intervention of the state in the religious matters. He did not accept the condition in the 
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Bulgarian Orthodox Church made by the former government. The Church has played
a historic role for the preservation of the Bulgarian nation, and in some of the most
difficult periods of foreign rule it has appeared as a substitute to the Bulgarian state.
UDF pretends to be a Christian-democratic party, but it has made a lot for the split of
the Orthodox Church and the weakening of its role as an important institution for the
Bulgarian society. With the pretext that it does not accepts Patriarch Maxim because
he took office with the approval of the communists, UDF actually hasn’t been
accepting the existence of an independent moral-defining institution.
The elections displayed the people’s will of breaking with the policy of decay and
downgrading of the national spirit. In the face of Simeon people see a personality,
which synthesizes their wishes. He, on his side, makes promises, which are closest to
these wishes. In this way the new political power in Bulgaria won the upcoming
protest vote against the “right” policy of the preceding government and took the place
of the anticipated “left” alternative. Dodging the question of the eventual monarchy
restoration, the ex-monarch took the risk and after some hesitation became head of the
executive power in Bulgaria. He did not have other choice, because at the elections
the majority of the Bulgarians voted not for a party, but for his personality.
The political responsibility for the activities of the new government was accepted by
National Movement for Simeon II and Movement for Rights and Freedom, but in the
new government, beside politicians from those two parties, were also included young
professionals educated abroad with working experience from Western Europe and
USA (e.g. the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Economy), businessmen,
professors from the academia, successful mayors. Simeon II attempted negotiations to
include in the government representatives from UDF, but that party denied the offer.
On the other hand, Simeon received the tacit approval of BSP by appointing two
member of the party as vice-premier and minister of regional development, and
minister of state administration. Another very prudent move of Simeon was attracting
to his side many of the local government leaders. The King’s movement has not
participated in the last elections for local authorities and his party does not have its
representatives in the local governments. However, the King appointed as members of
the government four distinguished mayors and thus assured himself the good attitude
of those circles.
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The leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedom and a coalition partner in the
government Ahmed Dogan stated that the foundations have been laid for “new
coalition policy that aims creating a government transcending party interests and
serving the interests of the nation.”218  The Bulgarian Socialist Party evaluated the
new government as put together single handedly by Simeon.219 Some political
observers have interpreted the moves of the ex-king as an attempt to weaken and
eventually get rid off the political parties (similar to his father in 1930s) by attracting
in his team experts from left and right political powers. Those interpretations might
become even more plausible after the presidential elections in November 2001. Still,
the Movement for Simeon II has not stated its official position and appointed its
candidate. If Simeon decides to support the candidacy of the current president Peter
Stoyanov, who is supported by UDF, the country will end up in a very peculiar
situation. If the ex-king’s party and UDF end up as partners for the presidential
elections, it will turn out that there is not real opposition for Simeon’s party. 
Despite suspicions that he is trying to rule the country as an independent leader trying
to unify the country and thus prepare restoration of the monarchy, so far he enjoys the
support of more than two thirds of adult citizens.220 The reason is not just his
personality but also his choice of people for the cabinet satisfies social expectations.
Only one out of ten people disapproves the government.221 The people supporting
Simeon most strongly are usually those above 60 years old, people living in villages,
less educated people. Those sceptical of the new government are supporters of UDF,
although so far supporters of the monarchy were those same people, or at least they
voted for monarchy during elections. Sceptical about the validity of the king’s pre-
election promises are also well-educated people and those in active age (between 25
and 50 years old).222 It is interesting to look at the attitude of BSP supporters towards
the government. Although this party denies affiliation with the government, many of
its members and supporters express direct approval for the cabinet and for the
participation of two BSP members in it. The strongest hope is that under this 
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government there will be an increase in average income and that the policy will be
focused towards the problems that ordinary people face. There are also strong hopes
associated with the promises for lowering the rate of unemployment and taxes. About
60% of the population believes that will happen. Almost the same number believes
that this government will manage to eliminate corruption. More than half of the
population believes that there will be improvement in health care. So far the criticism
and doubts of the opposition do not significantly affect public opinion. People believe
that the country finally managed to get a responsible government, rather than a gang
of “partisans” whose only goal is to get more power and personal benefits. The
majority of people give their support for what Simeon called a “transition from an era
of destruction to an era of reconstruction”223.
The National Movement for Simeon II came on power with big promises and even
bigger expectations. By declaring his intentions at the beginning of April 2001 to
participate in Bulgarian political life, Simeon promised that he would change the
country for good in the next 800 days. The ex-king won the elections by promising to
introduce new morality in politics based on “integrity in everything”224, to improve
life of people with low income and to immediately create incentives for private
business by lowering the taxes and making borrowing of capital easier. Simeon has
pledged to be more generous to Bulgaria’s poor and underprivileged. 
There are many issues that his government has to deal with, issues on which depends
the macroeconomic stability, real economic growth, lowering the rate of
unemployment, increasing the average income, lowering the level of corruption,
improving healthcare, providing acceptable living conditions for more than 2.5
million retired people, providing sufficient funds for the educational system,
satisfying the conditions for membership in NATO and EU.
In his first speech to the Parliament on 24 July 2001 King Simeon outlined in broad
strokes what he has called his 800-day drive for reform in Bulgaria. He promised a 
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speeded-up improvement in living standards, a fight against corruption, an increase in
foreign investment and the lowering of personal and corporate taxes.
After his election as a Prime Minister Simeon declared as major priorities for his
government to be “full-right membership of Bulgaria in EU and NATO, decisive
struggle with corruption, fast and maintainable economic growth”.225 After being
elected, the new government faces the problem of satisfying the expectation for
miraculous results and what will happen given the impossibility to fulfil those
expectations.
Bulgarian people voted with expectations for quick changes, but so far the new
parliamentary majority and new government demonstrate inability to determine a
starting point for work. Three months after the elections, the agenda of the
government is still not ready. The problems with finding professionals for positions at
different levels of the executive power are becoming more and more obvious. The
impressions that the new government is not prepared to rule the country so far create
only “charming chaos” but that innocent situation can easily transform into a feeling
of insecurity.
This government also faces many international issues. One cannot neglect the
historical burden that Simeon inherited from his dynasty. His grandfather Ferdinand
and father Boris III have questionable contributions to the international politics. The
period of Cold War blurred the facts, but one still cannot forget that the country, even
though under strong pressure, allied with Germany during WW II and in 1941
declared war to Great Britain and USA. However, the new Prime Minister
demonstrated convincing evidence that major priorities of his government will be
membership in NATO and EU. The ministers of his cabinet have undoubtedly pro-
Western orientation. Many of them have worked in Western companies and financial
institutions. The most outspoken proponent for Bulgaria’s membership in NATO –
the President of the Atlantic Club Solomon Passi – has been appointed as Foreign
Minister. There are symptoms already that the West will accept the new government.
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A big test for Simeon’s cabinet will be the future developments on the Balkans and
Bulgaria’s relations with neighbouring countries. The most delicate problem in
Bulgarian foreign policy – events in Macedonia – is considered by the Bulgarian
government as solvable in only one way – through cooperation with the main factors
EU, NATO and the other neighbours according to the already set norms of regional
cooperation.
Having Simeon as a leader of Bulgarian politics will probably introduce more
aloofness in regards to the events in South-eastern Europe. On the other hand, the ex-
king’s return in Bulgaria might revitalize the efforts of other ex-kings from the region.
The kings of Albania, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia might be presented with new
opportunities. This revitalization of the royal circles might bring a new element in the
Balkan reality.
The results from the Bulgarian parliamentary elections in 2001 are a phenomenon that
attracted the attention of political observers worldwide. An ex-king received a green
light to carry out a policy entirely of his liking and to single handedly choose who
gets to participate in the executive power. Ever since he took the reigns of the country
he has been receiving domestic and international approval. Which one of the
European monarchs can boast with such enviable position? Simeon has a unique
opportunity to overcome the problems, which slowed down the transition in Bulgaria,
and to ensure a full-right membership for the country in NATO and EU. As he has put
it in his speech to the Parliament "today we stand a real chance of being able to usher
Bulgaria into the new 21st century and take the place we deserve in united Europe"226.
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5.8. The future of the European Union: a view from Bulgaria. What is new in the
EU model after Nice?
In the second half of 20th century the launching of a series of intentional steps for
overcoming the partition of Europe became possible. The undoubted success was due
to the economic cooperation of countries from particular regions. The achievements in
integration in these regions changed the face of the continent. Up to now the most
successful is the method used in the European Union. Gradually, it became a model of
unification of whole Europe. The transformation of the European Union into
economic and monetary union, the highest level of integration known so far,
practically makes it brand new body in the world system. The consolidation of EU as
a major power centre lays the beginning of new European-centred phenomenon in the
international relations.
Gradually, after the Maastricht Treaty some major problems became obvious for the
European Union, i.e. improving its relationship with the citizens; increase the
efficiency of the Union when dealing with the challenges coming from the rest of the
world; adapting the Union to the prospects of its enlargement; reforming the structure
of the Union. In order to stimulate a broad social dialogue and to find solutions to the
above- mentioned issues, an inter-government conference was organized in 1996,
which went on until the middle of 1997. As a result of this conference a new
fundamental treaty for the European Union was signed on October 2, 1997. It was
ratified in the middle of 1999. According to the treaty, there is an increased possibility
to take decisions on institutional issues not with consensus, but simply with qualified
majority, which leads to more dynamic and efficient common administrative organs.
However, the conference abstained to take a decision on the issues of representation
in those organs and the procedures for taking decisions after accepting new members.
The solution of the problem of the balance of powers between large and small
countries, members of the Union, was left for the future, when the anticipated changes
in the membership would occur.
With the Amsterdam Treaty the EU attempted to adapt its ambitions, goals and tasks
to the real world. The imperative issues and the possible prospects for the
development of the European situation were taken into account, and special 
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consideration was given to the possibility of enlargement. A general consensus was
reached that the expansion, i.e. accepting new countries as full-right members, should
not depend entirely on the institutional development of those countries. The
Amsterdam treaty was an important step towards the development of the constitution
of the European Union as a new entity in the international system.
Another step in that direction was made with signing the Treaty of Nice at the end of
2000. The treaty was born as a compromise in the name of the common goal after the
most dramatic battle between national and supranational interests. Many issues about
the development of the EU were left for the next inter-governmental conference, but
the Treaty of Nice gave a key on how to proceed with the institutional reform, taking
into account the prospects for enlargement. Its parameters are presented in the
following table:
Countries Votes in the Places in the
- Council of the EU European Parliament
Member countries
Germany 29 99
France  29 72
Great Britain    29 72
Italy     29 72
Spain   27 50
Netherlands 13 25
Greece 12 22
Belgium 12 22
Portugal 12 22
Sweden 10 18
Austria 10 17
Denmark  7 13
Finland  7 13
Ireland  7 12
Luxembourg  4  6
Applicants for membership
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Poland 27 50
Romania 15 33
Czech Republic 12 20
Hungary 12 20
Bulgaria 10 17
Slovak Republic  7 13
Lithuania  7 12
Latvia    4   8
Slovenia  4   7
Estonia  4   6
Cyprus  4   6
Malta    3   5
The Treaty of Nice gives opportunities for more flexible application of new forms of
compromise among the countries after increasing by 29 the areas in which decision of
the Council of Ministers could be taken, which on its own narrowed the areas where
unanimous decision is required. The right of a veto was preserved in some sensitive
areas such as tax policy, social security, immigration and border control, culture,
education, and health care. The right to a veto on issues of immigration will be taken
away after common rules for this area are devised. From the possible 342 votes, 258
votes will be enough to take decision, and 88 votes will be sufficient to form a
blocking minority.
The prospects for expansion lead to restructuring the European Parliament. After 12
more candidates join the Union, the representatives in the Parliament will increase
from 626 to 738.
In 2005 Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and Spain will have to give up their
second commissioner positions. All member countries of the Union will have one
commissioner position until the number of members reaches 27.
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The euro-crates made advancement in spirit of Jean Monnet ideas by devising the
Treaty of Nice, but that will probably generate a new wave of euro-scepticism. A
confirmation for that were the results from the referendum in Ireland in 2001, which
in practice means that the country refuses to accept the decisions take in the French
resort. There is a very real possibility for a conflict between two ideas for the future of
Europe – the ideas of euro-crates with self-confidence of European elite on one side,
and the ideas of nations on the other. There will be an interesting discussion about the
different models of development of EU proposed by Germany, France and Great
Britain.
Although many issues for the development of EU remain unsolved, the Treaty of Nice
drew a clearer European perspective for the countries that have submitted their
applications for full-right membership in EU. The future of EU is closely tied to their
membership.
Bulgaria’s ability to assume the obligations of EU-membership
Since the end of the 80s, Bulgaria is searching for its place in the changing
international system. Maybe, for the first time in the new history of Bulgarian state,
the country faces the opportunity to determine the priorities in its foreign relations
independently and to make a sensible choice from among the civilization options. In
the conditions of fundamental changes in the system of international relations
Bulgaria confidently took on a course to embed itself in the European structures that
had proved their vitality surviving the Cold War. Among them, particular importance
is given to the European Union. There is a complete consensus among the major
political powers in Bulgaria that the country should join the Union. The country’s
membership in EU remains a major priority for the new Bulgarian government headed
by the ex-king Simeon Saxkoburggotski.
On March 8, 1993 the European Agreement For Association was signed between the
European Community and its members, and Bulgaria. At the end of the same month
an agreement was signed between Republic of Bulgaria and the European Free Trade
Association and its members. With the help of these two agreements Bulgaria,
together with other former European socialist countries, began a process of 
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association with the zones of free trade on the basis of the principles and rules devised
within the frameworks of GATT. In December 1995, Bulgaria submitted an official
application for full-right membership in the European Union. In December 1999,
Bulgaria received an invitation to start negotiations for full-right membership.
Negotiations were officially opened at the bilateral intergovernmental conference held
on February 15, 2000. In March 2000, substantive negotiations started on six chapters
of the treaty: science and research, education and training, small and medium-sized
enterprises, culture and audio-visual policy, external relations, and common foreign
and security policy. By August 2001 nineteen out of twenty nine negotiating chapters
of the treaty were opened and 10 of them were successfully completed.
The European Union faced the challenges of the epoch, but it seems that Bulgaria
tries to associate itself with those challenges intuitively, simply because everything
accomplished by that part of the world is admired. The pragmatic understanding of
the issues accompanying a membership in the European Union requires a deep
analysis of the core of this new phenomenon. Little attention has been given to the
different aspects of Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union. The prospects this
process offers are being evaluated with an optimistic model. However, the pessimistic
variant should be considered too. Associating with this new entity (EU) in the
international system requires the clarification that Bulgaria is joining supra-national
structure, which brings in qualitatively new aspects in the European reality. One has
to live with the understanding that taking on this course of development means giving
up sovereign rights and delegating them to common institutions. This necessity has
not been realized socially and that slows down the preparation for accession.
The European choice requires bringing together the priorities in the development of
the national economy and international commitments. For example, the disparity
between the declared priority in the development of agriculture and the prospects for
membership in EU is very disturbing. This membership will not affect well Bulgarian
agriculture.
Signing the European Agreement for association of Bulgaria to the European Union
created legal basis for the development of close political relations, for gradually
embedding the country in a zone of free trade and its complete integration into the 
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European Union. The share of the European Community in Bulgaria’s overall foreign
trade is over 50%. Bulgaria’s main exports to the Community are textiles and base
metals; its main import from the EU is machinery. Within the currency board the
Bulgarian Lev is fixed to the Euro. The macroeconomic situation in Bulgaria is to
great extent dependent on the prospects of the Economic and Monetary Union.
In Bulgaria, the development of the relations with the EU is considered as an
additional guarantee for its political and economic interests. The country is already
part of the circle of EU’s privileged partners. Through the European Agreement for
Association, the EU committed itself to providing a decisive support for the
successful completion of the political and economic reforms in the country. In regards
to Bulgaria’s relations with third parties and other international organizations, the
association gives additional credit of trust and offers better opportunities for
expanding the role of the country in creating a system for security and stability on the
Balkans and in Europe. One should not forget that Bulgaria’s association with the EU
has deep political meaning. It is a guarantee for carrying out a democratic reform in
the political system and restructuring the economy to work according to market
principles. Bulgaria’s association with the EU is also a factor that gives the Balkans a
more European outlook, i.e. brings better prospects to Europe’s most turbulent region.
This would justify the high costs of accession to the attractive European structures. In
order to avoid disappointments, both parties should get to know each other better.
For Bulgaria it is necessary to complete its legal and institutional regime so that    the
so-called “four freedoms” (free movement of goods, free movement of persons,
freedom to provide services and free movement of capital) be guaranteed.
The endorsed by the Accession Conference with Bulgaria negotiating principles and
the pre-accession strategies of EU and Bulgaria prompt difficulties with the chapters
treating agriculture, environment, persons’ and capital free movement, transport and
energy policy, services and taxation. The main problem comes from the constitutional
ban on the acquisition of property rights over land by foreigners. Bulgaria requests a
transitional period of seven years with regard to the acquisition of agricultural land
and forests by non-resident legal persons and by non-national natural persons.
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Bulgaria has no special requests on the provisions of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, as well as on the Common Defense Policy. Bulgaria is not eager to
enter the discussions within the EU and between EU and USA on creating a EU’s
own military and security mechanism and its capabilities. The leadership in Bulgaria
is keeping close eye on the plans for organizing rapid reaction forces, but it stresses
on the membership in NATO as a top priority.
Since January 2000, there are three pre-accession instruments financed by the
European Community to assist the applicant countries of Central Europe in their pre-
accession preparations: the Phare programme; ISPA finances large-scale
infrastructure projects in the fields of environment and transport; SAPARD supports
agricultural and rural development. Bulgaria can rely on them, but in the foreseeable
future there is no chance for accession to the structural funds of EU.
In the years 2000-2002, the indicative annual financial allocations for Bulgaria are €
100 million from Phare,  € 52 million from SAPARD, and between € 83 and 125
million from ISPA.
5.9. Conclusions and Perspectives
Bulgaria has clearly made further progress towards becoming a functioning market
economy. It is not yet able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within
the Union in the medium term. Progress in macroeconomic stability has helped to
improve the functioning of domestic markets, thereby increasing the ability to become
competitive.
Bulgaria’s ability to assume the obligations of membership - that is, the legal and
institutional framework, known as the acquis, by means of which the Union
implements its objectives is not unquestionable. One should keep in mind that there
may be new acquis by the conclusion of the negotiations.
On the whole, the transposition of the acquis on the free movement of goods is
progressing. However, major work remains to be done in order to start and complete
transposition in a number of sectors. The adoption of European harmonised standards
should be accelerated.
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Bulgaria has already achieved substantial progress in the process of aligning to the
acquis in capital movements. Although some uncertainties with regard to the regime
still exist, the main outstanding issue concerns the constitutional ban on the
acquisition of land by foreigners.
However, whilst reform of the judiciary is recognised as a priority by the government
and has started with the adoption of legal changes, significant further efforts and
resources are needed if the judicial system is to become a strong, independent,
effective and professional system, able to guarantee full respect for the rule of law as
well as for effective participation in the internal market of EU.
Besides maintaining a strong drive for full-right membership, it is especially
important for Bulgaria to take coherent steps preparing it for future stages of
development of its relations with the EU. In addition to the efforts for adapting the
economy, the political and administrative systems; for harmonizing the legislature,
Bulgaria has to give more attention to a number of organizational issues. There is a
severe deficit of qualified specialists that could carry out the relations with the
structures of EU and even work within those structures
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